..uV;:,:d 


Ql^":  'OVr'LXTEOlll'J:^ 


COLLECTIONS 


Georgia  Historical  Society 


Vol.  VII 


PART  III 


THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT 

OF  THE  ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA, 

IN    AMERICA,  AND   OF  ITS  DEFEAT  ON  ST.  SIMONS  ISLAND 

BY 
GENERAL  JAMES  OGLETHORPE 


/ ) 


Published  by 

The  Georgia  Historical  Society 

Savannah,  Ga. 


Savannah,  Ga. 

Savannah  Morning  Nevrs 

1913 


PREFACE 


The  translation  that  follows  was  made  from  manuscripts 
in  the  library  of  Mr.  W.  J.  DeRenne,  copied  from  the  origi- 
nal documents  preserved  in  the  Archives  of  the  Indies  at 
Seville.  Each  of  these  manuscripts  bears  a  heading  giving 
the  provenance  of  its  original,  and  each  is  further  certified 
as  being  a  true  copy.  Heading  and  certificate  are  reproduc- 
ed with  the  first  document  of  the  translation,  but  it  has  not 
been  thought  worth  while  to  repeat  them  with  the  remain- 
der. 

The  papers  of  this  collection  fall  more  or  less  naturally 
into  groups : — Letters  and  orders,  diaries,  reports  and  re- 
turns. The  list  of  sea-  and  shore-signals,  and  one  set  of 
naval  instructions,  have  with  the  returns  been  placed  last 
as  being  somewhat  detached,  logically,  from  the  substance 
of  the  other  papers.  They  have  their  significance  and  in- 
terest, however,  in  that  they  reveal  the  extreme  care  be- 
stowed on  the  expedition.  It  will  be  noticed  that  the  list 
of  signals  and  the  set  of  naval  instructions  relate  to  an 
earlier  expedition,  planned  but  not  carried  out. 

The  sketches  of  guns  and  mortars  are  due  to  Lieutenant 
J.  W.  Lang,  9th  Regiment  of  Infantry,  United  States  Army. 
They  are  reproduced  from  illustrations  in  the  catalogue  of 
the  Artillery  Museum  at  Madrid. 

The  Treaty  of  Vienna,  November  18,  1738,  gave  Spain 
but  a  short  respite  from  war.  Claims  and  counterclaims 
arising  chiefly  out  of  colonial  questions,  led  to  much  diplo- 
matic parleying  with  England,  and  in  January,  1739,  she 
saw  herself  obliged  to  pay  that  country  an  indemnity  of 
£95,000.  On  the  presentation  of  a  demand  for  a  counter- 
indemnity,  England  threatened  war;  on  August  20th  au- 
thorized reprisals,  and  finally  on  October  30,  1739,  declared 
war.  It  is  of  this  war,  terminated  b}^  the  Treaty  of  Aix-la- 
Chapelle,  October  18,  1748,  that  the  events  of  the  following 
pages  form  a  part. 

War  or  no  war,  the  Spanish  had  long  been  contemplating 
an  expedition  against  the  English  Colony  of  Georgia. 
They  kept  such  an  expedition  on  the  stocks,  as  it  were,  to 


be  launched  when  opportune;  and  finally  did  launch  it  in 
June  of  1742  to  overwhelm  the  English  King's  new  Colony 
"in  the  place  called  Georgia."  To  the  King  of  Spain,  and  to 
his  subjects  in  Cuba  and  Florida,  the  chief  object  was  puni- 
tive: the  insolent  and  perfidious  English  were  to  be  chas- 
tised and  the  chastisement  was  to  be  extermination.  There 
was  no  notion  of  conquest;  once  the  object  attained  and  the 
English  swept  ofif  the  face  of  the  earth,  troops  and  ships 
were  to  return  to  their  respective  garrisons  in  St.  Augus- 
tine and  Havana.  So  much  stress,  indeed,  w^as  laid  on  this 
withdrawal  as  to  justify  the  belief  that  its  accomplishment 
was'  almost  as  much  a  matter  of  concern  as  the  advance  it- 
self. This  concern  undeniably  affected  the  morale  of  the 
commanding  general,  if  not  of  the  entire  expedition. 

In  forming  an  estimate  of  the  events  dealt  with  in  the 
following  pages,  it  is  needful  to  place  one's  self  in  a  proper 
point  of  view.  If  w-e  place  ourselves  abroad,  the  events  are 
inconspicuous ;  if  we  recross  the  Atlantic,  they  loom  large. 
In  reality,  we  must  not  regard  the  attempt  of  Spain  on 
New  Georgia  as  an  affair  between  small  numbers  in  a  dis- 
tant and  unimportant  land;  it  was  Spain  and  England  striv- 
ing for  mastery  in  a  vast  continent,  and  although  Spain,  as 
already  said,  had  no  notion  of  conquest,  to  England,  that  is 
to  Oglethorpe,  the  notion  of  permanency  was  ever  present 
and  fundamentally  real.  To  him  the  question  was  whether 
his  beloved  Georgia  should  be  a  Spanish  waste,  or  a  living, 
free,  English  colony,  a  potential  State.  How  he  answered 
this  question  we  all  know:  he  brought  to  naught  as  grave 
a  danger  as  ever  threatened  the  Colonies,  and  he  did  it 
alone. 

The  point  of  view  must  needs  then  be  local,  but  with  a 
national  outlook ;  it  follows  that  the  papers  in  this  collec- 
tion acquire  a  double  interest.  And  this  interest  grows 
with  the  conviction,  begot  of  an  examination  of  the  records, 
that  Oglethorpe-  by  all  the  rules  of  the  game,  should  have 
been  jjeaten.  He  was  out-manned,  out-shipped,  and  out- 
gunned. But  he  was  a  soldier,  and  knew  his  business;  al- 
though men,  and  ships,  and  guns  are  necessary,  alone  they 
are  not  suflficient.  They  must  first  be  welded  into  a  homo- 
geneous instrument  and  then  intelligently  used,  before  pos- 
itive results  can  be  expected.  This  homogeneity  was  lack- 
ing to  his  adversaries,  a  fact  that  he  must  have  been  ac- 
quainted with ;  moreover,  they  had  not  had  time  to  know 
their  commander,  Montiano,  nor  he  his  troops.  And  lastly, 
it  is  in  the  highest  degree  probable  that  Oglethorpe  had 
measured  his  antagonist. 


That  Montiano  had  failed  to  take  his  own  measure,  is 
proved  by  his  pitiable  report  to  his  King.  Without  in  the 
least  intending-  it,  in  complete  unconsciousness,  he  strips 
his  own  inefficiency  bare  for  our  inspection  and  examina- 
tion. Psychologically,  conditions  were  against  the  Span- 
iards from  the  outset,  but  this  must  not  in  the  least  be  taken 
to  detract  from  Oglethorpe :  he  had  to  reckon  on  the  one 
hand  with  a  force  much  greater  than  any  he  could  muster, 
and  on  the  other  hand,  with  certain  possibilities  in  his  favor; 
but  in  respect  of  these  he  might  very  easily  have  been  in 
error. 

The  Spaniards  sailed  into  St.  Simons  gallantly  enough, 
and  landed  their  men  between  the  forts  and  the  town  of 
Frederica.  No  resistance  was  offered.  Bearing  in  mind 
that  a  landing  under  fire  is,  for  the  landing  party,  a  delicate 
operation,  we  may  well  ask  why  Oglethorpe  should  have 
neglected  this  opportunity  to  do  his  adversary  a  serious 
harm.  But  a  little  reflection  will  show  that  this  case  really 
ofifered  no  opportunity.  As  soon  as  it  became  evident  that 
the  run-past  of  the  ships  was,  or  would  be,  successful,  the 
evacuation  of  the  forts  was  imposed.  To  leave  troops  in 
the  forts,  even  if  they  could  have  held  out,  was  foll}^  so 
clear  that  we  need  waste  no  time  over  the  matter.  But 
once  withdrawn,  where  should  they  go?  Should  they  pro- 
ceed to  resist  this  disembarkation,  either  alone,  or  in  junc 
tion  with  other  forces  brought  down  for  the  purpose? 

But  Oglethorpe  could  not  tell  where  the  Spaniards  would 
land :  it  was  not  inconceivable  that  they  would  deliver  their 
first  attack  on  the  town  itself.  If,  however,  they  should 
choose  to  land  between  the  town  and  the  forts,  then  it  was 
the  part  of  wisdom  to  leave  them  to  follow  this  course ;  for 
once  ashore,  they  would  have  miles  of  swamp  to  cross  be- 
fore reaching  him,  and  his  inferiority  in  numbers  would  be 
more  than  compensated  by  the  advantage  of  positions  se- 
lected in  advance.  If  he  had  attempted  to  oppose  this  land- 
ing, he  would  have  had  the  morasses  at  his  back,  and  so  in 
case  of  check,  have  converted  an  admirable  natural  defence 
into  a  most  serious  obstacle  to  successful  withdrawal. 
Moreover,  so  few  were  his  men  that  he  could  not  afiford 
to  divide  them ;  and  lastly,  and  quite  apart  from  any  other 
consideration,  he  had  no  guns  to  oppose  to  the  Spanish 
naval  artillery,  against  which  any  musketry  fire  that  he 
could  bring  to  bear,  ineffective  in  those  days  beyond  two 
hundred  yards,  would  have  been  powerless. 

The  issue  proved  the  wisdom  of  his  dispositions.  The 
first  attempt  of  the  Spaniards  to  push  their  way  through  the 
morasses  was  also  their  last,  nor  did  they  later  make  any 


effort  of  any  other  sort.  This  failure  to  undertake  any- 
thing more  must  be  regarded  as  discreditable  to  the  "glory 
and  reputation  of  the  arms  of  the  King,"  particularly  if  the 
Spanish  account  of  losses  be  correct.  That  it  is  not,  we 
know  from  other  sources.  Indeed,  so  great  were  Montia- 
no's  losses,  and  among  his  best  troops,  so  sudden  and  un- 
expected his  check,  so  uncompromising  his  defeat,  that  the 
matter  was  really  then  and  there  settled.  In  plain  English, 
he  had  no  stomach  for  further  business.  After  that  disas- 
trous beating  when  his  grenadiers  fell  only  to  incarnadine  the 
waters  of  the  swamp  in  which  they  were  entrapped,  he  sent 
out  only  Indians  to  see  '"if  they  could  find  some  other  road 
to  Frederica".  Meanwhile  his  rations  were  being  reduced, 
he  had  not  got  his  guns  ashore,  and  rumors  unnerved  him. 
In  these  straits  he  fell  to  calling  councils  of  war  and  so  was 
lost.  That  he  had  made  only  one  genuine  effort  to  reach 
his  objective,  that  in  spite  of  the  failure  of  this  effort,  he 
still  outnumbered  Oglethorpe,  that  in  any  case  his  fleet  was 
substantially  intact,  these  things  made  no  impression  on 
him.  His  one  concern  was  to  withdraw.  And  yet  so  blind 
was  he  to  his  own  shortcomings  that  he  attributes  his  fail- 
ure to  the  Almighty  and  actually  asks  his  King  to  approve 
his  conduct  of  affairs  and  to  bestow  honors  upon  him.  To 
be  sure,  he  had  razed  a  few  earthworks  evacuated  by  their 
garrisons,  carried  off  a  few  guns  spiked  by  the  enem}^ 
burned  a  few  houses  abandoned  by  the  inhabitants.  And 
here  we  may  now  well  leave  him,  recounting  his  victories 
over  inanimate  things,  and  glossing  his  failure,  for  this  fail- 
ure made  the  State  of  Georgia  possible. 

C.  DeW.  W. 
West  Point,  New  York,  October  19,  1912. 


Y  A  M  A  C  R  A  W  \  I  N  D  i/a  ^  S 


Xon;:  The  Figurvs  .lie  Faihcmii at 
lcw\\  Jwr  upCTi  die  Uors  Ipecified 
ou  bodi  thrfc  Drau^U;niid  at  bi^ 
WatcratJidc>1fitfdicreU4l^tliaiiu 
■\\&tcr  aiid  ni '^■e  Boi  there  is  4  i 
Ricboin9\Vaicr,aiid  over  both  Bars 
40  Gun  Ship5  niiv  go  aiid 
(afeljinbotliSounOi 


# 


GENERAL   ARCHIVES    OF   THE   INDIES:   AUDIENCE    OF 
SAN  DOMINGO,  LOUISIANA  AND  FLORIDA. 


Report  Upon  the  Expulsion  of  the  English  from  the  Territories 
They  Have  Usurped  in  Florida,  and  Survey  of  Limits  and 
Incidences.     From  1738  to  1743;  Case  87,  Drawer  1,  File  3. 


Affidavit  of  Juan   Castelnau,  a  Prisoner  in   Georgia. 


Havana,  July  24,  1739.* 
Don  Juan  Francisco  de  Guemes  y  Horcasitas  transmits 
the  depositions  made  by  Juan  Castelnau,  a  native  of  Los 
Pasages  in  Guipuzcoa,  on  the  present  state  of  the  Settle- 
ments of  New  Georgia,  where  he  was  held  a  prisoner  for  18 
months,  and  of  its  fortifications,  forces  and  establishments. 

Sir:  Juan  Castelnau,  who  says  he  is  a  native  of  Los  Pas- 
ages  in  Guipuzcoa,  having  come  from  Cartagena  in  this  dis- 
patch boat  now  on  her  way  to  those  kingdoms  [i.  e.  Castile 
and  Leon,  or  Spain]  with  the  order  and  permission  consist- 
ing in  a  decree  petitioned  for  by  him  of  Lieutenant  General 
Don  Bias  de  Lesso,  I  have  taken  the  declarations  that  follow 
to  substantiate  the  reasons  he  gave  to  obtain  the  said  per- 
mission. As  I  find  from  them  that  he  has  told  the  truth,  and 
given  an  exact  account  and  trustworthy  news  of  the  state  of 
the  towns  of  New  Georgia,  its  fortifications,  forces  and  es- 
tablishments, both  as  these  were  at  the  time  of  the  expedi- 
tion intended  and  planned  for  the  past  year  of  1738,  and 
as  they  were  after  the  arrival  of  the  Commanding  General 
Don  Diego  Ogletop,**  I  have  thought  it  proper  to  send  your 
Lordship  the  testimony  of  his  declarations,  to  the  end  that 
His  Majesty  may  be  thoroughly  informed  of  past  and  pres- 
ent conditions,  because  it  agrees  with  all  the  inquiries  and 
news  which  I  had  made  and  acquired  for  the  expedition, 
and   with   those   of  the    Governor   of   Saint   Augustine    in 


•  It  should  he  recollected  that  these  dates  are  Gregorian;  those  of  the 
contemporaneous  English  accounts  are  Julian.  The  difference,  as  Is  well 
known,    was    at    this    epoch,    eleven    days. 

•*  Oglethorpe's  name  has  In  all  cases,  been  left  exactly  as  the  Spaniards 
•wrote  it. 


8  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


Florida,  made  after  the  return  of  Don  Diego  Ogletorp  to 
those  Colonies. 

God  keep  vour  Lordship  many  years. 

Havana,  July  24,  1739. 
Your  most  obedient  servant  kisses  your  hand. 
Don  Juan  Francisco  de  Guemes  y  Horcasitas. 

To  Sefior  Don  Joseph  de  la  Quintana. 


DECLARATION. 

In  the  ciiy  of  Havana,  on  the  18th  day  of  July,  1739,  Don 
Juan  Francisco  de  Guemes  y  Horcasitas,  Field  Marshal  of 
the  Armies  of  His  Majesty,  his  Governor  and  Captain  Gen- 
eral over  the  said  city  and  of  the  Island  of  Cuba,  said: — 
That  the  day  before  yesterday,  the  16th  of  the  current 
month,  there  came  into  this  port  [Havanal  from  that  of 
Cartagena  of  the  Indies,  the  dispatch  frigate  on  her  way  to 
the  kingdom  of  Castile  and  aboard  of  her,  Juan  Castelnau, 
a  native  of  Los  Pasages  in  the  Province  of  Guipuzcoa,  who 
was  for  18  months  a  prisoner  in  New  Georgia  and  other 
settlements,  which  the  English  have  occupied ;  and  that  up- 
on his  lil)eration,  he  succeeded  in  passing  through  Virginia 
and  other  parts  to  the'  city  of  Santo  Domingo  in  the  island 
of  Hispaniola,  and  thence  to  Cartagena  aforesaid.  Here 
he  presented  himself  to  His  Excellency  Don  Bias  de  Leso,* 
Lieutenant  General  of  His  Majesty's  fleets,  Commander  of 
the  Galleons  there  stationed,  and  of  all  the  naval  forces  in 
America,  who  upon  request  ordered  him  to  proceed  here 
in  the  dispatch  frigate.  In  order  now  to  possess  ourselves 
of  all  that  he  has  seen,  surveyed,  and  understood,  let  him 
appear  forlhwitlT.  and  under  oath,  clearly  and  distinctly 
set  forth  the  matter,  according  to  the  questions  that  may 
be  made  to  him.  And  by  these  presents,  I  so  provide,  com- 
mand and  sign. 

Guemes. 

Before  me,  Miguel  de  Ayala, 

Chief  Clerk,  State  and  War. 


•  I.^ao.  or  I.czo.   la  mentioned  by  Altamira  (Hlstorla  de  Espana,  Vol.   IV., 
p     1S4)    »■   one   of   tho   celebrated  Spanish   seamen   of   the  time. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA       9 

Declaration  of  Juan  Casfelnau. 

His  Lordship,  the  Governor  and  Captain  General  imme- 
diately caused  Juan  Castelnau,  a  native  of  Los  Pasages,  to 
appear  before  him,  who  being-  sworn  before  God  and  on  the 
Cross  according  to  law,  promised  in  consequence  to  tell  the 
truth,  whereupon  the  following  questions  were  put  to  him; 

Asked  why  he  had  come  to  this  place  in  the  dispatch 
boat  that  had  anchored  in  its  port,  the  16th  instant,  on  its 
way  from  Cartagena  to  Spain,  he  said,  that  finding  himself 
in  Cartegena,  he  had  asked  permission  of  His  Excellency 
Don  Bias  de  Leso,  Lieutenant  General  of  the  Fleets  of  His 
Majest}^,  Commander  of  the  Galleons  in  that  port,  and  of 
all  the  naval  forces  in  America,  to  go  to  Havana  and  make 
report  to  His  Lordship  of  the  state  of  the  Colonics  of  New 
Georgia  in  which  the  English  had  kept  him  a  prisoner  for 
18  months,  as  appears  from  the  petition  which  he  presented 
to  the  said  Don  Bias  de  Leso  and  from  his  decree  in  evi- 
dence. Asked  why  and  when  he  had  been  apprehended  by 
the  English  of  the  Colonies  of  New  Georgia,  where  he  de- 
clared he  had  been,  he  answered  that  it  was  because  they 
took  him  for  a  spy  of  Spain,  and  that  it  was  in  the  beginning 
of  the  year  1737  on  passing  from  Florida  to  Carolina,  when 
he  was  examined  by  two  tribunals ;  that  after  two  months 
of  confinement  on  account  of  said  suspicion,  the  tribunals 
finding  him  guiltless,  had  enlarged  him. 

Asked  how  he  had  passed  from  Florida  to  Carolina,  and 
for  what  reason  he  was  in  Florida,  he  said  he  had  gone 
from  Pensacola,  where  he  had  assisted  the  paymaster  of 
that  post,  to  Florida  with  the  idea  of  crossing  Carolina  on 
his  v/ay  to  Europe  in  order  to  return  to  his  own  country, 
and  that  to  that  end  he  had  received  authority  from  the 
Governor  of  Saint  Augustine  in  Florida,  who  was  then  Don 
Francisco  del  Moral  Sanchez,  to  make  a  journey  through 
Carolina. 

Asked  where  he  had  been  after  being  set  at  liberty  in 
Carolina,  as  declared  by  him,  and  for  how  long,  he  answer- 
ed that  returning  to  Florida  for  the  purpose  of  seeing  if  he 
could  not  earn  some  money  on  account  of  having  spent  and 
consumed  that  which  he  had  before  while  a  prisoner  in 
Carolina,  he  had  embarked  in  a  pirogue  at  Port  Royal  and 
arrived  at  Savannah,  a  town  which  they  said  was  the  cap- 
ital of  New  Georgia,  through  fear  of  falling  in  with  the 
English  commanding  officers  of  the  other  ports.  He  put 
to  sea  with  the  master  of  the  said  pirogue,  and  bad  weather 


10  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

coming  on,  they  were  driven  in  and  compelled  to  save  their 
lives  by  going  ashore  on  an  island  called  Emilia,  whence 
a  guard  of  four  Englishmen  there  stationed  took  him  to 
Saint  Simon's.  Here  had  his  residence  a  commanding  of- 
ficer called  Captain  Gasquin,  who,  after  enquiring  into  the 
reasons  which  had  brought  him  thither  put  him  aboard  the 
manual  or  coast  guard  vessel  of  the  place,  invariably  forbid- 
ding him  to  communicate  with  whatever  Spanish  vessel 
might  be  in  those  waters,  until  the  Commander  Don  Diego 
Obletor  having  arrived  from  London,  he  recovered  his 
liberty. 

Asked  in  what  manner  he  had  proceeded  from  those  parts 
to  Cartagena,  he  said  that  Don  Diego  Obletor  had  assisted 
him  to  embark  in  a  ship  sailing  to  Virginia,  whence  he  had 
gone  by  land  to  Mallorca.*  Here  he  embarked  in  a  bilan- 
der  bound  for  the  French  coast  of  San  Domingo,  and  having 
arrived,  he  betook  himself  to  the  city,  and  made  report  to 
the  President  of  all  that  had  befallen  him  ;  and  the  Presi- 
dent after  taking  his  declaration,  had  sent  him  on  to  Car- 
tagena, to  Don  Bias  de  Leso. 

Asked  if  he  had  been  able  to  learn  anything  of  the  posts 
occupied  by  the  English  in  those  parts,  of  what  strength 
they  were  and  how  fortified  before  the  coming  out  of  the 
Commander  Don  Diego  Obletor,  he  answered  that  he  had, 
that  the  established  posts  were  Savannah  or  New  Georgia,** 
containing  some  200  houses  of  wood,  very  far  each  from  the 
other,  for  which  reason  they  take  up  much  room ;  the  town 
situated  on  a  bank  of  the  river  of  the  same  name,  on  a  bluff 
forty  feet  high  with  a  battery  of  10  pieces,  about  8-pound- 
ers,  without  any  garrison  whatever,  the  service  of  the  bat- 
tery being  undertaken  by  the  citizens  themselves ;  that  only 
the  area  surrounding  the  battery  is  inclosed  by  a  stockade 
of  pine  logs  about  18  feet  high  and  one  foot  thick,  and  that 
the  rest  of  the  settlement  is  open :  that  at  the  mouth  of  the 
river  stood  a  tower  of  wood  constructed  both  as  a  lookout 


•  Evidently  New  York;  elsewhere  In  these  papers  we  have  Xoyorca:  the 
scribe  could  readily  write  Mnllnrrn,  with  which  name  he  was  acquainted,  for 
Noyorca,  of  which  he  had  probably  never  heard  before. 

••  It  will  be  remarked  that  to  the  affiant.  Savannah  and  New  Georgrla 
mean  the  same  thinp.  Similarly.  In  the  papers  that  follow,  Florida  Is  fre- 
quently used  where  we  should  v.Tlte  Paint  Auprustlne.  ."Sometimes  the  con- 
text enables  us  to  dlstingnish  between  the  chief  town  and  the  Colony,  some- 
times It  does  nrit.  Thus,  when  Horcasltas  tells  Mnntlano  "to  raze  and  destroy 
Carolina  and  its  plantations,"  he  may  mean  Charleston  and  surrounding: 
plantations,  or  the  Colony,  though  the  former  Is  perhaps  the  more  likely. 
Where  no  doubt  can  exist,  the  name  of  the  town  has  been  given  In  the  trans- 
lation.    In    other    cases    the    MS.    has    been    followed. 


»u.^^JL*S  i^iu  ■■■■■■•■111 


R  .///«,.^,..-.^  '!<..-■  ^r'''"-'^^/'".tiri:li"-  '^"  '^  '"'*'" ''  *'"'"' 


O 


[The  Horizontal  Scale  of  this  Reprodu 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  U 


and  as  a  beacon  for  that  port,  which  the  English  call  Tebi, 
and  we  Cruces.  And  farther  to  the  south  lies  the  Island 
of  Saint  Simon,  before  reaching  which  there  is  another  fort 
facing  the  Island  of  Santa  Cathalina  which  they  call  Darien, 
garrisoned  by  about  thirty  Scotchmen,  and  mounting  six 
guns  of  the  same  calibre.  That  in  the  aforementioned  is- 
land [of  Saint  Simon]  there  is  a  town  called  Frederica  sit- 
uated on  the  bank  of  the  river  Saint  Simon,  and  said  to 
contain  thirty  or  forty  houses  or  huts  of  boards  and  palm 
leaves,  with  another  battery  also  of  ten  guns  of  the  said* 
caliber,  without  any  troops  for  its  service,  the  citizens  act- 
ing as  guard.  South  of  this  town,  say  a  league  and  a  half, 
is  a  careening  ground  with  three  or  four  houses  of  boards, 
and  on  the  point  on  the  south  of  the  island  they  have  con- 
structed a  battery  of  sixteen  guns  of  the  same  calibre  to 
sweep  the  entrance  of  the  Harbor  of  Gualquini,  which  the 
English  call  Fort  Frederica,  beneath  whose  guns  lay  the 
manual  in  which  he  was  a  prisoner.  Continuing  further 
south,  on  the  Point  of  Bejecez,  on  the  Isle  of  Whales  stands 
a  fort  which  they  called  Saint  Andrew  with  sixteen  or 
twenty  men  commanded  by  Captain  Makay,  mounting  ten 
guns  of  the  same  calibre.  Still  farther  south  yet  is  the  Is- 
land of  Emilia  which  we  Spaniards  call  San  Pedro,  where 
they  keep  four  men  as  a  lookout,  and  have  one  gun  and  a 
stone  mortar.  That  these  were  at  the  time  in  question  the 
settlements,  fortifications  and  forces  which  they  had.  He 
was  further  of  the  opinion  that  all  the  settlers  to  be  found 
might  number  three  hundred  men,  all  of  whom  were  capa- 
ble of  bearing  arms. 

Asked  on  what  date  he  set  forth  from  those  Colonies  to 
go  to  Virginia,  when  the  Commander  Don  Diego  Obletor 
arrived,  and  what  troops  he  brought  with  him,  he  answered, 
that  he  himself  set  out  on  Nov.  4,  1738,  of  the  past  year,  and 
that  the  Commander  Don  Diego  Obletor  arrived  in  the  pre- 
ceding September  of  the  same  year  with  five  transports  and 
one  vessel  mounting  more  than  twenty-two  guns,  and  said 
to  be  a  warship  called  the  Blandfort,  and  that  in  the  said 
transports  he  had  brought  over  about  five  hundred  men 
and  more  according  to  appearances,  said  to  be  regular 
troops ;  that  in  the  month  of  July  of  said  year,  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Cocran  had  arrived  from  Gibraltar  with  three  hun- 
dred men  drawn  from  its  garrison,  that  after  the  arrival 


•  1.  e.   said  of  the  battery  at  Savannah. 


12  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


of  the  Commander  Oblctor  there  came  an  English  packet 
boat  loaded  solely  with  artillery  and  implements  of  war; 
that  the  troops  mentioned  were  distributed,  six  hundred 
men  in  the  Isle  of  Saint  Simon  in  Fort  Frederica,  and  two 
hundred  in  Saint  Andrew ;  and  that  at  the  same  time  when 
the  five  hundred  came  with  the  Commander  Obletor,  came 
also  two  hundred  women  with  them,  the  purpose  being  to 
compel  the  soldiers  to  marry  them. 

Asked  if  after  the  arrival  of  all  these  people,  and  while 
he  A'as  still  in  those  parts,  he  had  seen  or  learned  whether 
they  were  making  new  fortifications  or  occupying  other 
posts  or  laying  out  new  settlements,  or  whether  he  detect- 
ed any  especial  design  of  the  Commander  Obletor,  he  said 
that  he  saw  them  tracing  out  under  the  direction  of  a  French 
engineer  they  had  brought  out,  a  castle  in  the  fort  at  Fred- 
erica,  and  for  this  purpose  had  collected  a  supply  of  bricks 
and  timber  in  the  same  Isle  of  Saint  Simon  between  the 
town  and  the  careening  ground ;  that  with  the  same  engin- 
eer they  were  taking  soundings  on  the  bar  and  in  the  chan- 
nel ;  that  they  were  building  two  other  small  forts  to  com- 
mand the  land  approaches  from  Florida  to  Georgia  so  as  to 
guard  against  any  surprise  by  Spanish  Indians ;  that  each 
one  was  occupied  by  a  corporal  and  20  settlers,  that  one  of 
these  [forts]  was  called  Fort  Augustus,  but  he  had  forgot- 
ten the  name  of  the  other ;  that  they  had  not  laid  out  any 
new  settlements;  that  he  had  [not]*  detected  any  especial 
design  on  the  part  of  Commander  Obletor,  but  that  he  had 
heard  the  officers  say  that  the  design  in  view  was  to  take 
possession  of  Saint  Augustine  in  Florida,  and  had  remarked 
that  in  case  the  outl)reak  of  war  was  doubtful  they  had 
made  certain  arrangements  looking  to  this  end. 

Asked  what  number  of  Indians  they  had  under  allegiance 
in  those  parts,  where  they  were  situated,  and  to  what  use 
they  were  put,  he  said  it  seemed  to  him  there  were  about 
200  kept  in  two  towns,  one  immediately  adjacent  to  New 
Georgia,  in  which  they  had  set  up  a  school  for  the  children, 
and  the  other  must  be  at  Darien ;  that  they  were  to  be  used 
to  commit  hostilities  on  the  Spaniards  and  that  he  had 
strong  proof  of  this;  for  while  he,  the  declarant,  was  there, 
the  Governor  of  Saint  Augustine  in  Florida  had  the  year 
before  in  1738  written  to  Captain  Gasquin  for  satisfaction 
by  punishing  some   Indians   guilty  of  homicide,   and   that 

•  The   context   shows   that   the   negative   particle   has   been  through   error 
omitted. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  13 

he  had  seen  the  same  Indians  on  their  return  from  this  af- 
fair regaled  by  him  with  aguardiente  and  other  things,  and 
told  that  whenever  they  brought  in  Spanish  scalps  they 
would  be  rewarded,  and  that  he  had  this  from  a  nephew  of 
his. 

Asked  if  a  town  of  Esquisaros  which  is  called  Surisbu,* 
on  the  bank  of  the  Savannah,  adjoining  Port  Royal  due 
west,  is  well  advanced,  and  populous,  he  said  that  this  town 
is  now  abandoned  and  demolished,  and  that  its  inhabitants 
had  gone,  part  to  Port  Royal,  and  others  to  New  Georgia, 
and  that  only  a  few  plantations  had  been  left. 

Asked  the  population  of  Port  Royal,  what  fortifications 
it  had,  if  the  anchoring  ground  is  good,  and  whence  come 
the  ships  that  may  anchor  there,  he  said  that  Port  Royal 
might  contain  40  or  50  houses,  but  that  the  country  is  well 
filled  with  plantations  as  far  as  Saint  George,  worked  by 
many  negroes ;  that  there  is  a  fort  called  Vinfort  at  half  a 
league  from  Port  Royal  to  guard  the  entrance  of  the  port, 
square  of  trace,  with  4  curtains  and  bastions,  made  of  tim- 
ber, earth  and  oyster  shell,  and  that  he  had  heard  they  were 
adding  some  sort  of  outwork;  that  the  anchoring  ground 
of  the  Port  is  the  best  of  the  entire  Province  of  Carolina, 
but  that  in  the  entrance  there  is  not  sufficient  depth  for  ves- 
sels of  greater  burden  than  that  corresponding  to  24  or  30 
guns  at  the  most. 

Asked  what  harvests  they  had  in  New  Georgia,  and  what 
products  were  most  highly  prized,  he  said  that  corn,  rice, 
beans,  squashes  and  other  vegetables  were  planted;  that  the 
product  most  prized  was  silk,  that  consequently  they  had 
planted  mulberry  trees,  and  that  they  continually  displayed 
more  and  more  ardor  in  this  matter. 

Asked  what  kind  of  boats  they  had  and  how  many  in 
those  rivers,  for  communicating  one  port  with  another,  he 
said  that  each  port  had  a  pirogue  with  a  swivel-gunf  in  the 
bow;  and  that  besides,  they  had  two  or  three  canoes,  in 
which  they  carried  supplies  back  and  forth,  but  that  4  or  5 
individuals  had  their  own  boats. 

Asked  what  was  the  purpose  of  the  packet  boat  under 
the  orders  of   Captain   Gasquin,  and  what  port  it  served 


•  Purysburg. 

t  Pedrero  in  MS..  This  word  means  (a)  swivel-gun;  (b)  small  gun; 
(c)  stone-mortar.  Usually  there  Is  nothing-  In  the  texts  that  follow  to 
Indicate  which  is  meant.  The  word  Is  frequently  used,  and  except  that  the 
meaning  "swivel-gun"  is  probably  correct  aboard  ship,  ashore  the  context 
throws  no   light  on  the  point. 


U  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

with  the  greatest  frequency,  he  said  that  while  he  was  there,- 
it  set  out  thrice  to  cruise  along  the  coasts  of  the  jurisdiction, 
and  that  during  the  winter  it  lay  in  the  port  of  Gualquini 
in  the  river  of  Saint  Simon,  and  added  that  he  had  seen  as 
many  as  twenty  pounds  of  silk  made  there  and  of  good  qual- 
ity. He  afifirms  that  his  declaration  made  under  oath  is  the 
truth ;  that  he  is  forty  years  of  age ;  and  signed  his  declara- 
tion, to  which  His  Lordship  appended  his  flourish. 

Juan  Castelnau. 
Before  me,  Miguel  de  Ayala, 

Chief  Clerk,  State  and  War, 


Petition  of  Juan   Castelnau. 
Memorial. 

Most  Excellent  Sir:  Juan  Castelnau,  a  native  of  los  Pas- 
ajes  in  the  Province  of  Guipuzcoa,  kneeling  in  full  devotion 
at  the  feet  of  your  Lordship,  says  that  he  was  captured  in 
New  Georgia,  where  the  English  held  him  a  prisoner  for 
18  months,  and  proceeded  to  the  Island  of  San  Domingo  in 
an  English  sloop,  in  order  to  describe  to  His  Majesty's  rep- 
resentatives the  state  and  conditions  of  the  English  in  that 
Colony.  After  having  made  the  proper  declaration  before 
the  President  of  San  Domingo,  he  was  sent  to  this  port 
[Cartagena]  in  a  bilander  chartered  for  the  purpose  by  the 
said  President,  in  order  to  inform  your  Lordship  of  all  mat- 
ters (as  he  has  done).  Desiring  now  to  go  on  to  Havana 
to  inform  his  Lordship  the  Governor  of  that  position,  should 
it  be  necessary,  of  the  state  of  the  Colonies  of  New  Georgia, 
and  to  repair  his  needs  by  the  help  of  a  few  friends  whom 
he  has  in  that  city,  he  humbly  supplicates  your  Lord- 
ship to  grrnt  him  authority  to  take  passage  in  this  dispatch 
boat  for  the  said  city  of  Havana ;  and  to  order  its  Captain 
to  transport  him  without  any  cost  whatever,  a  favor  he 
hopes  to  receive  from  the  compassion  of  your  Lordship. 

Cartagena,  June  22,  1739. 

Juan  Castelnau. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  IS 

Official 

Decree.  Cartagena,  June  23,  1739. 

Seeing  that  all  the  allegations  of  this  person,  as  set  forth 
in  this  petition,  are  true,  he  is  granted  permission  to  go  in 
this  dispatch  boat  to  the  port  of  Havana,  in  case  it  be  im- 
portant to  advise  the  Governor  of  that  position  of  all  that 
this  person  has  seen  and  declared.  And  the  Captain  of  this 
dispatch  boat  virill  transport  him  without  any  cost  to  the 
said  port  of  Havana. 

Leso, 


A  true  copy  of  the  originals  in  my  keeping,  to  which  I 
refer.  By  oral  order  of  the  Governor  and  Captain  General 
of  this  Fortress  and  Island,  I  give  these  presents  for  de- 
livery to  his  Lordship,  written  on  eight  sheets  with  this 
one,  at  Havana,  July  21,  1739.  I  afftx  my  seal  [there  is  a 
seal]  in  witness  of  the  truth. 

Miguel  de  Ayala. 


We  certify  that  Don  Miguel  de  Ayala,  by  whom  these 
affidavits  are  sealed  and  signed,  is,  by  royal  appointment,  a 
Chief  Clerk,  State  and  War,  in  this  city  of  Havana  and 
Island  of  Cuba,  is  faithful,  loyal  and  trustworthy,  and  as 
such  practices  his  profession,  and  receives  full  faith  and 
credit. 

Havana,  July  21,  1739. 

Christoval  Leal,  Notar}'  Public  (his  flourish).* 
Antonio  Ponce  de  Leon,  Royal  Notary  (his  flourish). 
Tomas  de  Salas  y  Castro,  Royal  Notary  (his  flourish). 


True   copy  of   the   original   preserved   in   these   General 
Archives  of  the  Indies,  Case  87,  Drawer  1,  File  3. 
Seville,  July  6,  1906. 

(Signed)  Pedro  Torres  Lanzas. 

Head  Keeper  of  Archives. 

•  The   rubrica,  or  flourish  is  what  gives  validity  to  a  Spanish  signature. 
In  some  cases,  the  rubrica  is  used  alone,   without  the  name  of  its  maker. 


16  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


LETTER   OF    MONTIANO   TO   THE   KING   ENCLOSING  A 

MAP  AND  GIVING  INFORMATION  IN  RESPECT 

OF  FLORIDA  AND  ADJACENT 

COUNTRIES. 


Brief  ] 


St.  Augustine,  August  20,  1739. 

The  Governor,  Don  Manuel  de  Montiano,  says : 

That  in  order  more  clearly  to  justify  the  right  of  Your 
Majesty  to  the  colonies  occupied  by  the  English,  it  has 
seemed  proper  to  him  to  enclose  a  map  of  these  colonies, 
based  on  the  information  received  from  different  persons 
well  acquainted  with  the  country  and  who  have  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  bars,  ports,  rivers  and  roads  therein,  hav- 
ing trafficked  over  them,  so  that  having  a  better  knowl- 
edge of  these  territories  and  of  their  situation,  the  proper 
measures  may  be  taken. 

He  says  further  that  as  appears  from  these  maps,  the 
English  have  occupied  the  best  bars  and  the  deepest  ports 
capable  of  sheltering  sea-going  ships  of  large  size;  such  as 
the  bar  of  St.  Helens ;  that  of  Santa  Cruz ;  that  of  St.  Simon ; 
that  of  Gualquini;  that  of  the  [Bay  of]  Whales  and  others 
of  less  depth,  a  thing  which  Your  Majesty  does  not  pos- 
sess on  this  entire  coast  running  north  and  south  because 
the  bar  of  St.  Augustine  has  a  depth  of  only  seventeen 
palms. 

He  also  declares  that  the  River  St.  Isabel  is  navigable 
to  within  two  days'  journey  /6i  the  towns  of  the  Uchee  In- 
dians in  the  provinces  of  Apalache  and  that  the  English 
having  craftily  occupied  them,  may  now  come  down  as  far 
as  the  coasts  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  occupy  on  it  some 
port,  such  as  that  of  St.  Joseph,  Pensacola  or  others.  The 
consequences  of  this  action  would  be  most  fatal  to  the  com- 
merce of  our  galleons  and  fleets ;  and  he  proposes,  in  order 
to  prevent  this,  the  occupation  of  the  said  Bay  of  St.  Joseph, 
and  that  a  strenuous  eflfort  be  made  to  bring  about  the 
evacuation  by  the  English  of  all  the  territory  from  New 
Georgia  toward  the  south  with  the  Bar  of  St.  Helens;  and 
that  whatever  territories  be  left  them,  limits  should  be 
marked  out  on  a  line  running  southeast  and  northwest, 
taking  from  them  as  many  as  possible  of  the  towns  of  the 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  17 

Uchee  Indians  and  as  much  as  possible  of  the  coast  of  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico.  This  done,  we  should  succeed  in  depriv- 
ing them  of  all  hope  for  their  projects  and  in  holding  our- 
selves ports  on  that  coast,  in  which  our  ships  and  fleets 
could  shelter  themselves  whenever  accident  or  misfortune 
should  overtake  them. 

[The  Letter] 
Sir:— 

As  a  result  of  the  remission  to  Your  Majesty  of  the  docu- 
ments which  I  have  been  able  to  find  in  the  archives  of  this 
place  [St.  Augustine],  justifying  the  right  and  title  of  Your 
Majesty  to  the  colonies  illegally  occupied  by  the  English, 
it  has  appeared  to  me  proper  to  add  a  map  of  these  Colo- 
nies, based  on  the  information  brought  in  by  different  peo- 
ple well  acquainted  with  the  country  and  thoroughly  in- 
formed in  respect  of  the  bars,  harbors,  rivers  and  roads  by 
reason  of  having  trafficked  over  them,  so  that  having  a  full 
knowledge  of  those  territories  and  their  situation,  Your 
Majesty  may  take  such  measures  as  may  seem  suitable. 
And  as  I  conceive  it  to  be  a  part  of  my  duty  to  present  to 
Your  Majesty  whatever  I  take  to  be  beneficial  to  the  royal 
service  and  to  the  protection  of  the  royal  dominions,  I  beg 
leave  to  set  forth  to  Your  Majest}^  that  according  to  the 
map,  the  English  have  occupied  the  best  harbors  and  the 
deepest  ports,  able  to  shelter  vessels  of  deep  draft,  such  as 
the  Bar  of  St.  Helens,  that  of  Santa  Cruz,  that  of  St.  Si- 
mon, that  of  Gualquini,  that  of  the  Bay  of  Whales,  and 
others  of  less  depth ;  and  that  Your  Majesty,  in  all  the  royal 
possessions  of  this  coast  from  north  to  south,  owns  nothing 
like  these,  because  this  port  of  St.  Augustine  has  a  depth 
of  only  seventeen  palms.  At  the  same  time,  I  must  in- 
form Your  Majesty  that  the  River  St.  Isabel  is  a  naviga- 
ble one  to  within  two  days'  journey  of  the  Uchee  Indians 
in  the  province  of  Apalache;  and  that  the  English  have 
occupied  them  by  craft  and  cunning,  so  that  they  can  de- 
scend to  the  coasts  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  occupy  on 
them  some  port  like  that  of  St.  Joseph,  Pensacola  or  oth- 
ers, the  consequences  of  which  would  be  most  serious  for 
the  commerce  of  the  galleons  and  the  fleets  of  Your  Majes- 
ty. In  order  that  this  may  not  happen,  I  make  bold  to  pro- 
pose to  Your  Majesty  the  proprietjr  of  occupying  the  said 
Bay  of  St.  Joseph  and  that  the  whole  effort  of  Your  Majesty 
should  be  bent  on  dislodging  the  English  from  New 
Georgia  toward  the  south,  including  the  Bar  of  St.  Helens 


IS  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


and  that  whatever  territories  be  left  to  them,  their  limits 
should  be  marked  out  along  a  line  southeast  northwest, 
taking  from  them  as  many  as  possible  of  the  Uchee  towns 
and  those  of  the  coast  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  This  would 
result  in  depriving  them  of  all  hope  of  carrying  out  their 
prjjccts  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  in  furnish'ng  Your 
Majesty  harbors  on  the  said  coast  in  which  ships,  in  case 
of  misfortune,  may  take  shelter. 

God  keep  the  Catholic  Royal  Person  of  Your  Majesty, 
many  happy  years,  as  demanded  by  Christendom. 
St.  Augustine  in  Florida,  Aug.  20,  1739. 

(Sgd)  Don  Manuel  de  Montiano. 
(A  Flourish) 
[  Answer  ] 
In  a  letter  of  the  20th  of  August,  Your  Lordship  has  en- 
closed in  greater  justification  of  the  right  of  His  Majesty  to 
the  Colonies  occupied  by  the  English  in  those  provinces, 
a  map  of  these  Colonies,  based  on  the  information  given 
to  Your  Lordship  by  different  persons  well  acquanited  with 
the  country  and  having  full  knowledge  of  the  bars,  ports, 
rivers  and  roads,  by  reason  of  having  trafficked  over  them 
to  the  end  that  having  a  full  knowledge  of  circumstances, 
suital)le  measures  might  be  taken.  These  matters,  having 
been  laid  before  His  Majesty,  he  is  informed  of  the  subject 
and  of  the  especial  exposition  which  Your  Lordship  makes 
at  the  same  time,  to  the  effect  that  it  would  be  proper  to 
occupy  the  Bay  of  St.  Joseph  and  apply  all  our  energies 
to  dislodge  the  English  from  New  Georgia  toward  the  south, 
including  the  Bar  of  St  Helens  and  that  whatever  terri- 
tories be  left  to  them,  the  limits  should  be  a  line  running 
southeast  and  northwest  taking  from  them  as  many  of  the 
towns  of  the  Uchee  Indians  and  as  much  of  the  coast  of  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  as  is  possible,  which  would  result  in  rob- 
bing them  of  all  hope  of  success  for  their  projects  and  in 
giving  us  ports  on  that  coast  in  which,  in  case  of  accident 
or  misfortune,  our  war  ships  might  take  shelter. 

His  Majesty  therefore  directs  me  to  say  to  you  that  he 
will  keep  in  mind  all  the  facts  presented  for  the  betterment 
of  the  royal  service,  and  that  he  is  much  pleased  with  the 
zeal  with  which  you  have  acquired  these  facts  and  com- 
municated them. 

May  God  keep  Your  Lordship  many  vears. 

Madrid,  May  24,  1740. 
To  Don  Manuel  de  Montiano. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  19 


Endorsement. 

To  Don  Manuel  De  Montiano. 

Issued  in  duplicate  and  triplicate,  advising  him  of  the 
receipt  of  his  report  conveying  information  relating  to  the 
English  colonies  and  the  districts  which  the  English  of 
Georgia  should  evacuate. 


20  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


THE  KING  ORDERS  THE  DISPATCH  OF  AN  EXPEDITION 
AGAINST  GEORGIA. 


The  King  has  entrusted  to  Don  Juan  Francisco  de  Gue- 
mes  y  Horcasitas  an  expedition  of  importance  the  nature 
of  which  he  will  communicate  to  Your  Lordship  as  directed. 
Toward  the  execution  and  success  of  this  affair,  it  is 
proper  that  Your  Lordship,  after  leaving  in  a  state  of  de- 
fense that  [St.  Augustine]  fortress,  should  strive  with  all 
available  forces,  and  communicate  all  the  information  and 
advice  expected,  in  order  that  action  may  be  concordant 
and  efficacious.  His  Majesty  commands  me  to  communi- 
cate to  Your  Lordship  this  decision  for  your  information, 
and  in  order  that  the  aforementioned  Governor  of  Ha- 
bana  may  advise  you  with  the  punctuality  demanded  by 
the  royal  service.  I\iay  God  keep  Your  Lordship  many 
years. 

Madrid,  31  October,  1741. 
To  Don  Manuel  de  Montiano. 

[No  signature]  * 

The  King  having  resolved  upon  an  expedition  from  that 
Island  [Cuba]  against  the  enemy,  and  having  decided  that 
its  Governor  General,  Lieutenant  Don  Juan  Francisco  de 
Guemes  y  Horcasitas  should  organize  it  according  to  the 
orders  sent  him,  and  deeming  it  proper  that  whatever  be- 
tide, the  troops  to  be  selected  for  the  said  expedition  shall 
have  their  place  taken  by  detachments  from  the  squadron 
under  the  orders  of  Your  Excellency,  in  such  numbers  as 
shall  not  interfere  with  its  navigation,  or  other  functions. 
His  Majesty  commands  mc  to  say  to  Your  Excellency  that 
you  are  to  furnish  these  detachments  and  that  if  any  naval 
officers  should  wish  to  go  as  volunteers  on  this  expedi- 
tion, you  are  not  to  hinder  them.  You  are  to  help  the 
aforesaid  Governor  to  the  limit  of  your  powers  and  of  the 
necessities  of  the  case,  in  order  to  bring  about  the  end  con- 
fided to  him,  by  reason  of  the  great  interest  taken  in  this 

•  We  know,  however,  from  Montlano's  answer,  that  this  and  the  following 
Ifttera   were   all   Bent   by   the   Minister  Don   Jose   de   CamplUo. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  21 


matter  by  the  royal  service.     God  keep  Your  Excellency 
many  years. 

Madrid,  31st  October,  1741. 
To  Don  Rodrigo  de  Torres. 

[  No  signature  ] 

With  regard  to  the  resolution  of  His  Majesty  to  set  on 
foot  from  the  Island  [Cuba]  operations  against  the  enemy, 
and  to  the  order  sent  to  Lieutenant  General  Don  Juan  de 
Guemes  y  Horcasitas,  Governor  of  Havana,  to  carry  them 
out,  His  Majesty  bids  me  charge  you,  that  in  case  of  your 
selection  to  take  command,  you  are  to  accept-  and  execute 
that  duty,  in  full  confidence,  because  of  your  zeal  and  re- 
cord of  services,  that  you  will  ably  discharge  this  trust  in 
all  that  relates  to  the  ro3^al  service. 

God  keep  Your  Lordship  many  years. 

Madrid,  31st  October,  1741 
To  Don  Antonio  de  Salas. 

[  No  signature  ] 

Your  Excellency  is  informed  in  respect  of  the  motives 
which  induced  His  Majesty  in  the  year  1737  to  resolve  up- 
on the  extirpation  of  the  English  from  the  new  colony  of 
Georgia  and  from  the  territories  of  Florida  which  they  have 
usurped,  as  well  as  of  the  orders  sent  out  to  this  end,  and 
of  all  dispositions  made  for  their  execution,  until  a  suspen- 
sion was  commanded. 

I  bring  these  past  matters  to  the  recollection  of  Your 
Excellency,  because  we  are  now  in  a  state  of  open  war, 
and  under  no  necessity  to  practice  the  caution  which  in  the 
former  conjuncture  of  affairs  compelled  us  to  give  pause. 
His  Majest};-  considers  the  time  opportune  to  accomplish 
the  destruction  of  Carolina  and  of  its  dependencies,  thus 
compensating  ourselves  for  the  ancient  perfidies  of  which 
the  English  have  made  the  colony  the  seat,  as  well  as  for 
the  present  hostilities,  by  inflicting  a  damage  that  will  ruin 
and  terrify  them,  seeing  the  affection  in  which  they  hold 
that  country,  and  the  benefit  they  derive  from  its  commerce. 
Accordingly  His  Majesty  has  directed  the  organization  of 
an  expedition  from  that  Island  [Cuba]  to  be  composed  of 
some  regular  troops  and  of  as  much  militia  as  may  be  nec- 
essary, and  that  it  pass  over  to  the  aforementioned  province 


22         THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

of  Carolina  with  its  appurtenant  territories,  and  devastate 
it  by  sacking  and  Burning  all  the  towns,  posts,  plantations 
and  settlements  of  the  enemy,  for  the  purpose  of  this  inva- 
sion must  be  solely  to  press  hostilities  until  the  effort  shall 
have  gone  home,  and  success  be  achieved.  It  will  help 
you  to  know  that  the  English  Colonies  in  America  are  so 
weakened  by  the  men  and  supplies  drawn  off  to  lay  siege 
before  Cartagena  that  their  relief  from  England  has  been 
under  discussion. 

It  is  the  intention  of  His  Majesty  that  in  carrying  out 
this  expedition,  regular  troops  be  used  in  such  numbers  as 
are  indispensable,  having  due  regard  to  the  defense  of  that 
Island  [Cuba]  ;  and  that  deficiencies  be  made  up  with  mili- 
tia and  natives  in  such  strength  as  to  secure  favorable  re- 
sults, imitating  the  course  we  followed  when  we  recovered 
Pensacola  from  the  power  of  the  French. 

In  order  that  the  number  of  regular  troops  to  be  selected 
by  Your  Excellency  for  this  purpose  may  not  be  seriously 
reduced,  you  may  avail  yourself  in  any  emergency  that  may 
arise,  of  those  in  the  squadron  under  the  command  of  Lieu- 
tenant General  Don  Rodrigo  de  Torres,  provided  that  he 
be  not  reduced  to  the  inability  of  taking  the  seas,  or  of  per- 
forming any  other  operations  expected  of  him.  To  this 
end,  I  am  inclosing  an  order  which  Your  Excellency  will 
hand  him,  directing  him  to  further  this  enterprise  to  the 
utmost,  in  order  to  bring  it  to  a  happy  issue.  Although 
Your  Excellency  has  a  personal  knowledge  of  that  coun- 
try, of  its  nature  and  conditions,  through  previous  recon- 
naissances and  surveys  made  in  view  of  practical  possi- 
bilities, yet  His  Majesty  desires  that  you  communicate 
and  entrust  to  Don  Manuel  de  Montiano,  Governor  of 
Florida,  the  decision  taken,  propounding  to  him  the  meas- 
ures to  be  adopted  to  carry  it  out,  and  directing  him  to  con- 
cur with  all  the  forces  which  the  state  of  defense  of  his 
post  will  allow.  Your  Excellency  is  to  advise  whether 
the  enterprise  is  to  be  carried  on  at  one  point,  or  at  sev- 
eral points  (which  here  is  thought  to  be  the  proper  course), 
and  to  inform  him  in  respect  of  said  points.  It  is  further 
His  Majesty's  wish  that  he  give  you  all  the  information 
in  his  possession,  and  should  go  on  informing  himself  as 
to  the  state  of  the  English  inhabitants  of  Carolina,  and  any 
other  matters,  knowledge  of  which  might  be  of  import  to 
Your  Excellency.  I  am  inclosing  a  letter  for  that  Gover- 
nor, in  which  vou  will  find  his  instructions. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA      23 


Other  directions  and  details  are  omitted,  because  it  is 
known  that  Your  Excellency  has  all  the  knowledge  and 
light  that  could  be  desired  to  bring  so  grave  a  matter  to  a 
successful  end.  Hence,  and  because  His  Majesty  is  con- 
vinced of  your  zeal,  activity  and  experience,  he  intrusts 
this  expedition  to  your  care,  directing  you  to  order  what- 
ever may  forward  it,  with  the  determination  that  springs 
from  your  sense  of  duty  and  loyalty  to  the  royal  service, 
and  without  the  loss  of  a  moment  of  time.  In  respect  of 
expenses,  dispositions,  and  methods,  Your  Excellency  has 
plenary  powers  to  confer  and  treat  of  ways  and  means  with 
officers  and  persons  who  may  profit  by  your  advice  to 
spread  the  desolation  and  secure  the  advantages  that  we 
expect  in  respect  of  that  province.  And  in  order  that 
the  great  volume  of  preparations  may  not  pass  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  English,  His  Majesty  orders  that  you  take  your 
measures  in  secret,  alleging  pretexts  to  dissimulate  and 
conceal  the  end  in  view,  so  as  to  deceive  the  public.  For 
otherwise  we  expose  and  risk  this  blow,  which  is  to  sur- 
prise the  enemy  without  giving  him  any  opportunity  to 
prepare  himself  by  arming  and  fortifying  and  so  oppose  a 
greater  resistance  and  opposition  to  our  efforts. 

His  Majesty  leaves  to  the  judgment  of  Your  Excellency 
the  selection  of  the  officer  or  officers  to  command  this  ex- 
pedition :  you  are  authorized  to  take  those  most  satisfac- 
tory to  you,  and  of  best  known  and  approved  conduct:  but 
in  the  belief  that  Brigadier  Don  Antonio  de  Salas,  who  is 
detained  out  there  [in  Cuba]  is  well  fitted  for  this  service, 
I  send  Your  Excellency  the  inclosed  letter  in  order  that 
you  may  give  it  to  him,  if  you  should  see  fit  to  employ  him 
for  the  command  (in  which  case  you  will  be  required  to 
furnish  him  the  pay  corresponding  to  his  duty,  or  with  such 
as  you  may  judge  proper).  If  you  do  not  appoint  him,  you 
will  withhold  this  letter. 

If  a  few  naval  officers  should  wish  to  go  as  volunteers, 
you  will  approve  it,  assuring  them  that  His  Majesty  will 
not  lose  sight  of  their  resolution  and  spirit,  but  will  assist 
them  in  whatever  may  be  for  their  comfort,  and  Your  Ex- 
cellency will  divulge  this  in  ample  time,  so  that  the  sug- 
gestion may  appear  attractive. 

It  is  by  His  Majesty's  command  that  I  communicate 
these  matters  to  Your  Excellency,  so  that  as  soon  as  you 
shall  have  received  this  letter,  you  may  apply  yourself  to 
their  accomplishment,  and  take  all  other  steps  that  may 


24  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


lead  to  the  success  of  an  enterprise  which  His  Majesty  de- 
sires shall  be  promptly  carried  out  and  which  it  is  confi- 
dently expected  will  produce  the  results  expected,  as  is 
plain  from  the  fervor  and  zeal  which  you  have  ever  shown 
in  His  Majesty's  service.  I  should  say  to  Your  Excellency 
that  after  the  enemy's  country  shall  have  been  laid  waste, 
the  troops  and  militia  must  withdraw  to  that  Island  [Cuba], 
and  a  report  be  made  of  events, 

God  keep  Your  Excellency  manv  years. 

'Madrid,  Oct.  31,  1741. 

To  Don  Juan  Franc-  de  Guemes  y  Horcasitas. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  25 


MONTIANO  ACKNOWLEDGES  THE  RECEIPT  OF  ORDERS 
RELATING  TO  THE  EXPEDITION  AGAINST  GEOR- 
GIA, AND  REPORTS  HIS  ACTION. 


St.  Augustine,  in  Florida 

12  March,  1742. 
The  Governor,  Don  Manuel  de  Montiano,  agreeably  to 
the  advice,  that  he  must  assist  with  all  the  forces  possi- 
ble in  bringing  to  a  happy  issue  an  expedition  against  Car- 
olina entrusted  to  the  Governor  of  Habana,*  reports  that 
he  has  sent  to  the  said  Governor  a  return  of  the  garrison 
of  that  post  [Saint  Augustine]  for  the  selection  of  the 
troops  not  necessary  to  its  defense,  to  serve  in  said  expe- 
dition, and  anticipating  a  happy  issue. 

Sir:— 

In  a  letter  of  the  31st  of  October  of  the  past  year,  you 
did  me  the  honor  to  say  that  the  King  had  entrusted  to 
Don  Juan  Francisco  Guemes  y  Horcasitas,  an  expedition 
of  importance  which  he  would  communicate  to  me  as  di- 
rected, and  that  toward  the  execution  and  success  of  this 
affair,  I  should,  after  leaving  this  post  [Saint  Augustine] 
in  a  state  of  defense,  strive  with  all  available  forces,  com- 
municating all  the  information  and  advice  expected,  in  or- 
der that  action  might  be  concordant  and  efficacious.  And 
that  His  Majesty  had  commanded  Your  Lordship  to  con- 
vey this  decision  for  my  information  to  the  end  that  the 
aforementioned  Governor  might  treat  with  me  with  the 
punctuality  called  for  by  the  royal  service. 

With  regard  to  this  determination,  I  have  to  inform  Your 
Lordship,  that  as  soon  as  I  was  informed  of  it,  I  set  to 
work  to  acquire  as  much  information  as  was  possible ;  and, 
without  losing  a  moment  of  time,  nor  engaging  in  any  other 
matter,  I  passed  my  reports  on  to  the  Lieutenant  Gen- 
eral, Governor  of  Havana,  offering  my  recommendations 
charged  rather  with  hopes  than  with  certainties.  But  it 
is  impossible  for  me  to  say  how  contented  I  am  with  the 


•  Navarra,  in    the    MS.    (itself   a  copy   of   the   original    in   the    Archives   at 
Seville). 


26         THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

great  administration  of  that  Governor  General,  who  will 
so  adjust  his  measures  to  action,  as  morally  to  persuade 
me  that  the  favorable  results  expected  are  in  my  opinion 
almost  inevitable. 

In  respect  of  other  matters,  I  venture  to  suggest  to  Your 
Lordship,  that,  according  to  my  comprehension  of  the 
case,  the  design  of  the  King  will  be  the  antidote,  the  whole- 
some medicine,  that  will  restore  to  health  this  debilitated 
and  deserted  Province,  of  good  consideration ;  for  Caro- 
lina once  ruined  and  destroyed,  the  extermination  of  her 
colonial  dependencies  will  follow,  and  all  the  slaves  now 
under  her  heavy  yoke  will  pass  over  to  us.  This  is  what 
they  most  desire :  as  they  are  numerous,  we  shall  be  able 
to  make  here  many  settlements,  and  turn  their  people  to 
account  in  war.  And  what  is  more,  it  will  follow  that  the 
Indians,  no  longer  having  any  one  to  instigate  or  protect 
them,  will  continue  always  with  us  in  a  state  of  tranquil 
peace;  these  Provinces  will  grow  and  people  themselves, 
since  they  are  all  as  it  were  paramos,*  and  families  from 
Galicia  and  the  Canaries  will  be  able  to  establish  them- 
selves in  quiet. 

I  am  sending  to  the  aforesaid  Lieutenant  General,  Gov- 
ernor of  Havana,  a  return  of  the  troops  of  this  post,  and  I 
leave  to  his  judgment  the  selection  he  may,  with  due  re- 
gard to  the  defense  of  this  place,  see  fit  to  make  for  the  con- 
templated expedition.  This  is  all  I  have  to  lay  of  this  mat- 
ter before  Your  Lordship  for  the  information  of  His  Ma- 
jesty. 

That  God  keep  Your  Lordship  many  years,  is  my  desire. 
Saint  Augustine  in  Florida,  12  March  1742. 

Sir:  I  kiss  your  hand,  being  your  most  grateful  ser- 
vant. 

Don  Manuel  de  Montiano 

[A  flourish  follows.] 

To  Senor  Don  Jos6  de  Campillo.** 


•A  paramo  Ib  a  hlph.  bloak  plateau;  the  word  Is  South  American.  Pre- 
cisely what  plains  Montiano  had  In  mind,  of  course,  we  do  not  know.  In  all 
probability   he   uses   the   word   In    a   loose   way. 

••  One  of  the  ministers  of  Philip  V.,  remembered  as  tbe  author  of  a  book, 
"f/uevo  tMema  de  golAemo  cconnmico  para  la  Amf^ica,"  published  posthum- 
ously In  17s'j.  In  this  work.  Campillo  criticised  the  system  of  colonial  ad- 
mlnlftrntlon  and  proposed  certain  reforms,  arraying  himself  against  the  mili- 
tary system  of  conquest  followed  In  America.  He  argued  that  this  system, 
houevtr  nt-KMsary  at  first,  was  now  out  of  date,  and  pleaded  for  economical 
liberty. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  27 


THE  GOVERNOR  GENERAL  OF  CUBA  INFORMS  THE 
GOVERNOR  OF  FLORIDA  WHAT  TROOPS  AND  SHIPS 
WILL  BE  SENT  FROM  HAVANA,  FOR  THE  EXPEDI- 
TION AGAINST  GEORGIA,  AND  MAKES  VARIOUS  SUG- 
GESTIONS. 


Sir, — 

Among  the  obstacles  and  difficulties  arising  in  carrying 
out  the  will  of  His  Majesty,  and  communicated  by  me  to 
Your  Lordship  under  date  of  February  3rd,  past,  the  most 
serious  was  the  possibility  that,  and  doubt  whether,  the 
English,  strengthened  by  the  fresh  re-enforcement  of  4,000 
men  which  arrived  in  Jamaica  toward  the  end  of  January 
of  the  present  year,  would  enter  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and 
attempt  to  attack  this  Havana  or  some  other  position  of 
the  Islands.  But  this  fear  has  vanished,*  as  you  may 
see  from  the  enclosed  paper  sent  m.e  by  the  Governor  of 
[Santiago  de]  Cuba,  and  from  the  letter  of  Don  Sebastiiln  de 
Eslava,**  Viceroy  of  Santa  F^,t_  a  copy  of  which  I  enclose. 
The  occasion  seemed  to  me  therefore  opportune  to  profit 
by  this  fortunate  conjuncture  of  affairs,  without  however 
being  able  to  furnish  the  3,000  men  nor  the  means  which 
your  Lordship  warned  me  would  be  necessary  to  strike  the 
blow  directed  by  His  Majesty.  For  I  have  neither  the 
former,  nor  the  frigates  suitable  to  make  it  attainable  in 
the  way  that  I  should  prefer,  nor  any  ships  of  war  §  to  take 
the  place  of  these  frigates,  inasmuch  as  these  ships  must 
fulfill  their  principal  purpose.? 


•  The  allusion  is  to  the  failure  of  the  English  troops,  some  5,000  in  all, 
to  capture  Santiago.  A  squadron  under  Admiral  Vernon  and  General  Went- 
worth  had  landed  in  Guantanamo  Bay;  after  four  months'  effort,  the  enter- 
prise was  abandoned,  with  a  loss  by  the  English  of  over  2,000  men  from  the 
effects    of    the    climate. 

••  This  officer  conducted  the  defense  of  Cartagena  against  Admiral  Ver- 
non, who  failed  in  his  attempt  to  capture   the  place. 

t  New  Granada,  in  .South  America,  sometimes,  as  here,  called  Santa  Fe. 
the  Colombia  of  to-day.  It  was  one  of  the  Spanish  vice-royalties,  and  occa- 
sionally called  the  reino   (Kingdom)   of  Santa  Fe. 

§In  the  Spanish  navy  of  the  XVIII  century  "the  principal  type  of  war- 
vessel   was   the   navio  [line-of-battle-ship] assisted   by   the   fragata 

[frigate]   as  scout  or  despatch   vessel." 

"Brigantines  were  also  used  on  despatch  duty,  and  packet  boats  \fiaqtie- 
boteay  "Galleys  were  falling  Into  disuse."  "The  armament  of  ships  of 
war  consisted  of  bronze  and  wrought-iron  guns  of  calibre  varying  from  36 
to  4  (weight  in  pounds  of  the  projectile).  The  average  range  was  about  3,000 
meters." 

Altamira  y   Crevea,   Historla  de  Espana,   IV,   189-190. 

X  A  British   fleet  was  still  In  West  India  waters. 


28  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

Wherefore  I  judged  that  1,000  regulars  and  800  militia 
would  suffice,  and  under  this  hypothesis  was  elaborating 
this  plan,  when  there  arrived  here  an  Englishman,  the  Cap- 
lain  of  the  frigate  captured  by  Fandiuo,  and  a  man  of 
"lear  mind  and  straightforward  disposition.  I  tested  and 
compared  his  representations  with  those  of  Simonin,  who, 
as  Your  Lordship  knows,  is  thoioughly  acquainted  with 
that  port  and  its  bar  [Frederica],  and  with  the  number  of 
whites  living  in  Carolina,  and  found  that  his  information 
differed  materially  from  that  which  Your  Lordship  had 
sent  me. 

As  a  result  of  this  investigation  and  of  my  inability  to 
make  a  greater  effort  than  the  one  decided  upon,  I  con- 
voked a  secret  council  of  war  of  whose  decision  you  will  be 
informed  by  the  copy  that  I  am  remitting.  It  is  impossi- 
ble to  assemble  a  greater  number  of  men;  and  even  if  it 
were,  we  could  not  transport  them,  for  what  has  already 
beer  done  under  this  head  is  due  to  the  assistance  of  Lieu- 
tenant General  Don  Rodrigo  de  Torres. 

I  am  sending  Your  Lordship  a  boat  with  this  news  under 
the  seal  of  inviolable  secrecy,  so  that  you  may  be  inform- 
ed of  the  determination  we  have  taken,  and  show  the  great- 
est activity  in  equipping  the  expedition,  to  the  end  that  it 
shall  with  the  greatest  promptitude  set  sail  to  anchor  on 
that  bar  [Saint  Simon's],  and  proceed  without  the  slightest 
delay  to  the  extinction  of  that  country  [Georgia].  To  carry 
out  these  orders  Your  Lordship  will  take  from  your 
own  post  400  regular  troops,  300  of  your  garrison,  the  100 
who  were  sent  from  this  place  under  the  command  of  Don 
Gregorio  de  Aldana,  and  also  the  100  of  the  militia  of  Pardo, 
who  were  sent  to  you  at  the  same  time.  From  this  place 
will  proceed  in  30  transports  composed  of  frigates  and 
bilanders.  1,300  men,  600  regulars,  700  militia,  composing 
the  1,800  without  counting  the  seamen;  among  the  trans- 
ports goes  separately  the  vessel  for  the  500  men  who  are 
immediately  to  embark  at  Saint  Augustine  and  besides,  two 
large  barges  well  armed  with  swivel  guns  Of  these  ves- 
sels as  many  as  possible  will  proceed  with  guns  mounted, 
to  say  nothing  of  a  French  frigate  of  24  guns,  which  hap- 
pened to  be  in  this  port,  and  which  we  took  for  this  expe- 
dition, of  the  packet  boat  "Diligent,"  and  of  the  galley.  I 
regard  this  force  as  sufficient  to  attain  the  end  sought  with 
happiness  and  without  risk. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  29 


All  the  stores  and  water  required,  go  in  the  said  ves- 
sels; it  will  not  be  necessary  to  draw  even  a  single  ration 
from  your  post.  The  proper  ammunition,  arms  and  im- 
plements likewise  will  be  sent.  Your  Lordship  will  ver- 
ify the  return  of  property  of  the  Agent  of  the  Exchequer, 
who  is  to  go  in  charge  of  issues  and  administration.  Such 
being  the  dispositions  taken  here,  Your  Lordship  will 
have  equipped  the  six  galliots,  the  launches,  and  the 
pirogues  of  your  garrison,  as  well  as  any  other  vessel  that 
may  prove  useful ;  the  troops  must  be  ready  to  embark  at 
once,  without  the  slightest  hindrance.  For  delay  would 
be  prejudicial,  since  the  urgency  of  the  whole  affair  (whose 
success  I  believe  to  be  easy)  consists  in  this  that  the 
enemy  shall  neither  perceive,  nor  be  warned  of,  our  inten- 
tions. 

For  all  reasons,  it  has  seemed  to  me  that  your  appoint- 
ment to  the  command  of  this  expedition  will  insure  its 
success,  for  with  the  knowledge  of  Your  Lordship,  your 
devotion  to  the  throne,  your  deeds  and  your  experience, 
go  the  satisfaction  and  glory  of  His  Majesty,  and  the  sat- 
isfaction of  all  of  us  who  are  interested  in  his  service,  re- 
joicing over  the  void  caused  by  the  forces  of  Admiral  Ver- 
non, because  of  the  task  upon  which  these  are  engaged. 

Colonel  Don  Francisco  Rubiani,  Lieutenant  Colonel  and 
Commandant  of  the  Regiment  of  Dragoons  of  Italica  will 
go  hence  in  command  of  all  that  set  out.  From  your  own 
post  you  will  arrange  for  the  services  of  Don  Antonio  Sal- 
gado  as  Lieutenant  Colonel.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Don  Mig- 
uel de  Rivas  may  be  left  behind  to  command  the  place. 

The  Engineer  of  the  Second  Grade,  Don  Antonio  de 
Arredondo,  also  accompanies  the  expedition,  as  being  one 
who  knows  those  parts  as  far  as  Port  Royal,  and  has  ex- 
act and  detailed  information  in  respect  of  everything  else. 
He  may  be  employed  by  Your  Lordship  on  any  duty  you 
may  be  pleased  to  order  for  the  best  interest  of  the  under- 
taking, and  can  take  charge  of  the  details  of  operations. 
The  Engineer  Don  Pedro  Ruiz  Olano  may  also  go.  Should 
Don  Pedro  de  Estrada,  a  man  who  has  given  such  good 
proofs  of  spirit  and  gallantry,  be  in  Saint  Augustine,  it 
would  be  eminently  agreeable  that  he  should  fit  out  his 
bilander  and  accompany  the  expedition  in  any  capacity  your 
Lordship  may  think  proper. 

I  remain  convinced  not  only  of  the  partial  but  of  the  en- 
tire success  of  our  enterprise,  because  of  Your  Lordship's 


30  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


known  leadership.  And  I  am  expecting  at  tke  very  least 
that  the  forces  furnished  will  without  the  slightest  let  or 
hindrance  forthwith  destroy  all  the  plantations  as  far  as 
Port  Royal.  For  as  Your  Lordship  knows,  it  is  His  Majes- 
ty's desire  that  the  sudden  blow  struck  should,  as  far  as 
its  force  will  reach,  and  events  permit,  lay  waste  Carolina 
and  its  dependencies.  But  this  course  must  be  consistent 
with  the  information  your  Lordship  may  obtain  from  pris- 
oners, and  with  other  measures  to  be  suggested  by  your 
ripe  judgment  looking  to  the  secure  withdrawal  of  our 
forces  through  the  interior  channels  between  the  Keys.  It 
is  of  the  greatest  consequence  and  importance  to  raze  and 
destroy  Carolina  and  its  plantations.  This  result  can  be 
better  secured  bv  first  getting  rid  of  the  regiment  of  Ogle- 
thorpe, which  might  proceed  to  the  defense  of  some  other 
point  where  hostilities  had  broken  out,  if  not  first  attacked 
where  they  are  now  in  Gualquini  and  Saint  Simon,  as  pro- 
jected. It  is  entirely  probable  and  credible  that  surprised 
by  this  blow,  they  will  abandon  everything  and  flee  to  the 
woods,  and  thus  give  us  greater  freedom  to  draw  full  profit 
from  this  idea  and  its  opportunity  so  favorable  to  us.  And  if 
it  were  possible  to  find  means  to  notify  the  negroes  in  good 
time  to  follow  the  cause  which  Your  Lordship  says  they  de- 
sire, this  would  be  an  opportune  disposition  for  the  com- 
plete success  of  our  plans. 

The  expedition  over  with  the  happy  issue  desired,  Your 
Lordship  will  take  steps  for  the  immediate  return,  with 
the  least  possible  expenditure  of  time,  of  the  troops  and 
militia  about  to  set  forth  and  also  of  the  detachment  which 
I  sent  on  some  time  ago  under  the  command  of  Don 
(jregorio  Aldana,  sending  them  in  detachments  in  the  ves- 
sels which  Your  Lordship  will  judge  best  fitted  for  the  navi- 
gation of  the  Canal.  I  beg  leave  to  remind  Your  Lordship 
that  I  have  only  400  men  left  for  the  service  of  this  place. 

Whatever  I  may  have  forgotten  or  omitted,  I  beg  Your 
Lordship's  attention  and  perspicuity  to  supply,  as  of  one  on 
the  sjjot.  It  is  my  desire  to  overlook  not  even  the  most 
trifling  circumstance  which  might  forward  the  happy 
issue  I  am  anticipating.  May  Your  Lordship  have  no  other 
care  than  to  secure  and  bring  victory,  unless  it  be  to 
employ  mc  in  any  relation  in  which  I  may  satisfy  Your 
Lordship. 

God  keep  Your  Lordship  many  years. 

Havana,  May  14,  1742. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  31 


Postscript  in  margin. 

1  warn  Your  Lordship  that  this  expedition  will  sail  hence 
the  2nd  or  4th  of  the  next  month,  according  to  the  effort 
made  to  complete  its  equipment,  so  as  to  take  advantage 
of  the  fine  weather,  and  that  you  must  have  made  all  your 
preparations,  and  warned  some  of  the  monks  of  the  mis- 
sions in  those  parts  to  go  along  as  missionaries. 
Your  most  affectionate,  faithful  servant 
Who  kisses  your  hand. 
Don  Juan  Francisco  de  Guemes  y  Horcasitas. 
To  Don  Manuel  de  Montiano 


32  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


THE  GOVERNOR  GENERAL  OF  CUBA  APPOINTS  THE 
GOVERNOR  OF  FLORIDA  COMMANDER  OF  THE  EX- 
PEDITION AGAINST  GEORGIA,  AND  ISSUES  HIS  OR- 
DERS   FOR   THE   CONDUCT   OF    OPERATIONS. 


Copy. 

Sir, — Having  received  orders  from  His  Majesty,  to  send 
an  expedition  from  this  island  against  the  English,  his 
enemy,  to  punish  them  for  the  insults  committed  against  his 
subjects,  by  the  subjects  of  Great  Britain  in  Carolina  and 
by  those  recently  and  unlawfully  settled  in  His  Majesty's 
territories  in  a  place  called  Georgia,  and  impressed  by  its 
importance  to  His  Majesty's  service  and  by  the  pernicious 
results  of  having  tolerated  the  aforesaid  insults,  I  have 
made  up  a  command  of  all  the  land  and  naval  forces  I  can 
possibly  assemble,  to  accomplish  these  very  just  and  very 
important  ends,  according  to  the  wish  of  the  king. 

In  consequence  of  this  and  of  the  faculty  he  has  bestow- 
ed upon  me,  to  select  as  the  commanding  officer  of  this 
expedition,  one  who  possesses  the  requisite  character  and 
qualities,  I  am  led  to  designate  you  as  the  Commanding 
General  of  all  these  forces,  as  much  by  the  confidence  I 
have  in  your  fitness  and  experience  as  because  of  the 
knowledge  which  you  possess  of  those  places.  I  am  also  guid- 
ed by  your  affection  for  His  Majesty  and  your  zeal  for  his 
service,  as  shown  in  your  letter  of  the  3rd  of  March  of  the 
present  year. 

For  the  troops  which  are  to  be  under  your  orders,  I  an- 
ticipate the  greatest  success,  and  I  am  directing  3rou  accord- 
ing to  what  I  believed  was  best  adapted  to  secure  a 
happy  termination,  in  conformity  with  the  resolution  of 
the  board,  a  copy  of  which  I  have  sent  you,  enjoining  upon 
Your  Lordship  the  least  possible  effusion  of  the  blood  of 
His  Majesty's  troops  and  subjects,  and  to  insure  in  any 
event  a  withdrawal.  The  number  of  regular  troops  will 
be  1,000,  with  proper  number  of  officers,  and  of  militia  800, 
composed  of  whites,  mulattoes  and  negroes,  also  properly 
officered.  These  troops  you  will  assign  as  will  seem  best 
to  you. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  33 


The  naval  forces  which  it  has  been  possible  to  assemble 
are  reduced  to  one  frigate  of  24  guns,  to  a  packet  boat  of 
14,  one  galley,  and  the  six  galliots  which  you  have  with 
you ;  two  schooners,  two  bilanders,  and  two  barges  and  pi- 
rogues under  oars,  which  will  be  used  to  convoy  the  trans- 
ports, guard  and  cover  the  coasts  and  inlets,  and  to  man- 
age and  carry  on  within  the  interior  channels  the  move- 
ment and  landing  of  troops  during  the  operations.  All 
these  elements  (excepting  the  troops  to  embark  at  Saint 
Augustine,  and  the  schooner  and  pirogues  to  join  there) 
will  leave  this  port  [Havana]  under  the  command  of  Colo- 
nel Don  Francisco  Rubiani,  Lieutenant  Colonel,  Gover- 
nor, and  Commanding  Officer  of  the  Regiment  of  Dragoons 
of  Italica,  who  is  to  arrive  off  your  bar,  and  deliver  this 
letter  to  Your  Lordship.  He  will  be  under  your  orders  as 
second  in  command  and  join  his  forces  with  the  troops  and 
vessels,  which  are  to  be  ready  in  the  post  for  the  campaign. 

As  the  fundamental  condition  of  the  most  rapid  and  easy 
outcome  of  the  expedition,  and  of  the  reduction  of  risks, 
consists  in  making  withdravv^al  sure,  in  whatever  misfor- 
tune, I  regard  as  indispensable  the  invasion  before  any- 
thing else  is  attempted,  of  the  Island  of  Saint  Simon,  first 
occupying  the  northern  entrance  so  as  to  close  the  pass  to 
the  enemy,  and  intercept  any  relief  he  might  receive  from 
that  direction ;  the  landing  is  to  take  place  from  three  ves- 
sels at  one  and  the  same  time  on  the  beach  facing  east. 

This  first  step  having  been,  thanks  to  the  Divine  Grace, 
and  to  Your  Lordship's  wise  management,  successfully 
taken.  Your  Lordship  will  next  adopt  such  measures  as 
are  suggested  by  the  information  you  may  have  or  obtain, 
to  proceed  northward  by  interior  channels,  devastating, 
laying  waste,  sacking  and  burning  whatever  settlements, 
plantations,  and  towns  there  may  be  as  far  as  Port  Royal 
inclusive,  razing  its  fort,  and  taking  possession  of  the  en- 
tire country ;  for  Your  Lordship  is  informed  of  the  fact 
that  those  parts  hold  no  hostile  troops  able  to  resist  those 
under  your  command.  The  necessity  of  gaining  time  when- 
ever possible,  without  any  delay  must  ever  be  kept  in  mind, 
so  as  to  give  no  opportunity  for  resistance  to  form.  Our 
operations  must,  under  His  Majesty's  commands,  be  re- 
duced to  a  sudden  stroke,  and  for  this  reason  the  greatest 
celerity  is  imperative. 

After  taking  possession  of  Port  Royal,  it  will  be  proper 
to  send  out  negroes  of  all  languages  (some  of  which  sort 


34  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


accompany  the  militia  of  this  place  for  this  very  purpose) 
to  convoke  the  slaves  of  the  English  in  the  plantations 
round  about,  and  ofifer  them,  in  the  name  of  our  King,  lib- 
erty, if  they  will  deliver  themselves  up  of  their  own  accord, 
and  to  say  that  lands  will  be  assigned  them  in  the  terri- 
tories of  Florida,  which  they  may  cultivate  and  use  for 
themselves  as  owners,  under  the  direction  and  laws  of  the 
Kingdom  of  Spain.  In  proportion  as  you  receive  and  ob- 
tain (and  this  I  believe  will  be  the  case)  trusthworthy  and 
favorable  information  forwarding  the  conquest  and  increas- 
ing the  damage  done  the  enemy,  you  will  act  accordingly, 
never  losing  sight  of  the  importance  of  making  sure  of 
your  withdrawal,  in  order  not  to  lose  the  fruit  of  our  opera- 
tions. 

All  the  neutral  and  friendly  vessels  met  on  the  way,  you 
may  detain,  requiring  them  to  follow  the  convoy,  until 
there  shall  be  no  disadvantage  in  allowing  them  to  pro- 
ceed on  their  course.  To  the  person  who  goes  as  agent 
in  charge  of  all  matters  relating  to  the  Royal  Exchequer, 
in  respect  of  the  good  and  economical  administration  of 
warlike  stores  and  implements,  you  will  afford  all  neces- 
sary help,  shov/ing  him  and  requiring  him  to  show  the 
greatest  attention,  corresponding  to  the  confidence  I  have 
reposed  in  him,  and  maintaining  the  best  of  relations  with 
him,  in  order  that  the  service  may  thus  be  punctually  and 
easily  performed. 

All  the  effects  found  and  taken  by  our  troops  you  will 
collect  and  keep  in  a  secure  place  under  the  supervision 
of  the  agent  of  the  Royal  Exchequer,  who  will  be  required 
to  make  an  inventory  for  the  distribution  in  equal  parts 
among  soldiers,  militia  and  sailors. 

As  regards  prisoners,  in  respect  of  whose  classes  and 
numbers  no  decision  can  be  reached  in  advance.  Your 
Lordship  will  take  such  measures  as  seem  most  suitable ; 
just  as  in  all  the  other  cases  that  come  up,  you  will  make 
such  decisions  as  most  redound  to  the  advantage  of  the 
King's  service,  and  to  the  glory  and  reputation  of  his  arms. 

The  expedition  having  been  concluded  with  the  happy 
issue  that  wc  have  a  right  to  expect.  Your  Lordship  will 
direct  that  the  troops  and  militia  of  this  place  [Havana]  re- 
turn to  it  without  the  slightest  delay,  in  the  vessels  that 
can  make  the  best  way  through  the  channel,*  seeing  that 

•  The    Florida    Channel. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  35 

now  the  southwest  winds  will  prevail;  all  the  ships  will 
take  the  same  course,  even  at  the  cost  of  increased  labor 
and  of  a  longer  voyage,  because  thus  we  avoid  encounters 
which  otherwise  might  have  injurious  consequences  for 
us. 

The  Second  Engineer,  Don  Antonio  de  Arredondo,  goes 
informed  with  regard  to  all  I  have  been  able  to  anticipate 
and  advance  for  the  success  and  safety  of  this  important 
operation.  He  will  communicate  with  you,  so  that  you 
may  select  what  may  appear  to  you  best  fitted  for  the  happy 
issue  of  our  plans,  the  glory  and  satisfaction  of  our  royal 
master,  and  of  his  royal  intentions.  I  am  inclosing  to 
your  Lordship  a  full  copy  of  the  orders  under  which  I  have 
been  acting,  and  of  which  I  beg  that  you  will  acquire  full 
understanding. 

Commending  myself  to  your  Lordship  in  the  sincerest 
affection,  I  pray  Our  Lord  to  keep  you  many  years. 

Havana,  June  2,  1742.  Your  most  affectionate  faithful 
servant,  who  kisses  your  hand. 

Don  Juan  Francisco  de  Guemes  y  Horcasitas. 
To  Don  Manuel  de  Montiano. 


36         THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL,  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


Illustrations  of  Spanish  Guns. 


PEDRERO. 
40  cm.  Cal.,  21  cm.  long. 
1709  A.  D.  6031  Artillery  Museum. 
Madrid. 


5477   Cannon. 

310  cm.  long,  15.2  cm.  Calibre 


XVIII  Century. 
Artillery    Museum,    Madrid. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA 


37 


Length 


BOMBARD — mounted  and  assembled. 

Cana  255  cm. 


Recamara        81    "  J    Made  1518  A.  D. 
No.  3301  in  Artillery  Museum,  Madrid. 
This  piece  has  2  recamaras — used  alternately. 


.UjyunillllliiiMlilllillillliiiriliatM, 


3356  Artillery  Museum, 

Madrid. 
PEDRERO. 

144  cm.  long,  16.5  cm.  Calibre. 


Made  1679. 


38  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


5489.     Museum    of    Artillery,    Madrid. 
MORTAR 
1773  A.  D. 


Can  fi> 


Recamara 

il''!'l!!il;:i"l'i]^^JS^, 


BOMBARD  Complete  No.  6587  Artillery  Museum 

240  cm.  long  XV  Century.  Madrid. 


3570  Artillery  ^luseum,  Madrid. 
FALCONET  XV  Century. 

105  cm.  long,  6.7  cm.  Calibre. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  39 


ORDERS  TO  THE  COMMANDING  OFFICER  OF  THE 
FLEET. 


Orders  to  be  obeyed  by  the  commander  of  the  Fleet,  and 
instructions  for  his  guidance,  with  the  understanding  that  he 
is  in  all  matters  to  be  under  the  orders  of  the  general 
selected  to  command  the  expedition  which  is  to  dislodge  the 
foreigners  that  have  settled  and  established  themselves  in 
the  dominions  of  the  King  in  the  Provinces  of  Florida. 

1.  He  will  leave  the  post  of  Havana,  if  the  v/eather  per- 
mit, on  the  day  appointed,  with  all  the  vessels  of  war  and 
transports  after  having  made  all  necessary  arrangements 
to  keep  his  ships  together  in  good  order  during  the  journey, 
and  established  signals  for  prompt  comprehension  and  cor- 
rect action  in  any  case  that  may  come  up.  He  will  like- 
wise have  drawn  up  the  special  orders  to  be  observed  with 
all  the  precision  and  clarity  possible  by  the  respective  com- 
manders of  the  vessels  under  his  command 

2.  He  will  proceed  directly  to  Saint  Augustine  in 
Florida,  without  anchoring  anywhere,  unless  driven  to  it 
by  inevitable  necessity. 

3.  When  in  sight  of  the  Bar  of  Saint  Augustine  he  will 
approach  as  closely  as  possible,  and  anchor  with  his  entire 
fleet  on  the  bar. 

4.  As  soon  as  the  tide  serves,  he  will  order  the  trans- 
ports to  enter  the  harbor,  and  anchor  in  front  of  the  castle. 

5.  As  soon  as  the  said  tide  nears  the  flood,  he  will  de- 
termine whether  the  depth  on  the  bar  will  permit  the  en- 
trance of  the  vessels  under  his  command,  without  lighten- 
ing, and  if  so,  these  will  enter,  and  proceed  to  anchor  in 
front  of  the  Hermitage  of  Our  Lady  de  la  Leche.  Should 
lightening  prove  necessary,  all  will  execute  it  at  the  same 
time  with  the  greatest  dispatch,  transporting  in  launches 
and  boats  the  weight  that  may  be  necessary.  But  this  is 
to  be  done  only  in  case  it  is  impossible,  by  reason  of  storms, 
to  remain  at  anchor  outside. 

6.  He  will  remain  in  port  (or  wherever  el^^e  he  may 
think  proper)   until  the  commanding  general  gives  orders 


40         THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


to  begin  operations  and  put  to  sea  with  his  entire  fleet, 
which  he  will  obey  without  loss  of  time. 

7.  He  will  convoy  the  flotilla  of  small  vessels  that  are 
to  cross  the  bar  of  the  Saint  John's  River,  until  he  sights 
its  inlets  on  an  east  and  west  line,  when  he  will  either  lie-to, 
or  if  the  weather  permit,  anchor;  the  first  is  the  better 
course,  if  it  should  be  necessary  to  go  outside  under  the 
threat  of  the  east  wind,  dangerous  on  this  coast;  the  sec- 
ond, in  order  to  avoid  drifting  with  the  currents.  Circum- 
stances must  determine  which  of  these  two  courses  ap- 
pears to  him  the  better,  without  losing  sight  of  the  fact 
that  he  must  endeavor  as  far  as  possible  to  keep  the  coast 
in  view  during  the  entire  course  of  the  expedition  so  as 
distinctly  to  observe  the  signals  made  from  it,  or  to  re- 
ceive information  sent  out  to  him,  since  the  happy  issue  of 
the  enterprise  depends  partly  if  not  entirely  on  the  unity 
and  joint  effort  of  the  two  fleets. 

8.  He  will  lie-to  or  remain  at  anchor,  as  may  be  deter- 
mined, off  the  inlets,  until  he  shall  have  received  from  the 
beach  a  signal  to  proceed  on  his  course. 

9.  He  will  continue  on  his  way,  observing  both  by  day 
and  by  night  the  signals  made  to  him  from  land,  so  that  on 
receiving  information  of  the  point  at  which  the  interior 
flotilla  happens  to  be  resting,  he  will  again  anchor  or  lie-to, 
until  again  ordered  to  proceed.  For,  as  the  interior  flotilla 
can  proceed  only  when  the  tide  is  favorable,  at  intervals 
of  six  hours  and  a  few  minutes,  it  is  incumbent  on  the  sea 
fleet  so  to  adjust  its  progress,  as  to  be  but  a  short  distance 
away,  and  so  avoid  slipping  on  and  then  being  discovered 
by  the  foreigners  of  Fort  Frederica  or  Gualquini  before 
the  interior  flotilla  shall  have  come  up  and  taken  its  dis- 
position for  attack. 

10.  Should  some  accident  prevent  people  coming  down 
to  the  shore  to  make  signals,  he  will  proceed  along  the 
coast  under  shortened  sail ;  and,  after  taking  into  account 
the  change  of  tides,  and  whatever  may  further  the  advance, 
will  estimate  approximately  where  the  interior  flotilla 
must  be,  giving  due  regard  to  the  increase  of  distance 
caused  by  the  windings  of  the  interior  channels,  and  by  the 
fact  that  on  some  nights  it  will  perhaps  be  impossible  to 
sail  and  take  advantage  of  the  tide  on  account  of  a  few 
narrow  passes  impossible  to  navigate  save  by  day. 

11.  He  will  also  consider  a  possible  delay  due  to  the 
capture  of  the  Fort  of  Vegcses  on  the  channel  of  the  Island 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA      41 

of  Whales,  this  in  order  that  both  fleets  may  always  be  ap- 
proximately on  the  same  parallel.  And  if  all  the  precau- 
tions mentioned  should  remain  without  the  result  expected, 
after  having  maturely  weighed  the  aforesaid  contingencies, 
and  adjusted  his  course  accordingly,  he  will  set  his  course 
directly  for  the  entrance  of  Gualquini,  where  he  will  an- 
chor on  the  bar  with  his  entire  squadron  in  from  four  and 
a  half  to  six  fathoms,  so  as  to  bring  the  point  of  the  north 
of  the  Island  of  Saint  Simon  to  bear  N.  N.  W.,  and  that  of 
the  north  of  the  bar  of  Whales  to  bear  S.  W.  y^  S.  If 
while  on  this  position,  the  sea  should  rise  and,  unable  to 
ride  it  out,  he  should  fear  that  his  cables  would  not  hold, 
he  may  go  in  nearer  to  shelter  himself,  setting  his  course 
N,  W.  y^  W.,  and  proceeding  some  four  miles  in  four  fath- 
oms of  water,  so  that  the  said  point  of  the  Island  of  Saint 
Simon  shall  bear  N.,  that  of  Whales  S.  S.  W.,  and  the  Castle 
of  Frederica  W.  N.  W.,  this  being  recognizable  by  the  red- 
dish color  of  the  mound  of  earth  at  the  shoulder  of  the 
bastion.  If  however,  he  can  maintain  himself  without  the 
said  risk  in  the  said  six  fathoms,  he  will  do  so,  in  order  to 
be  in  a  better  position  to  land,  on  account  of  the  surf  on 
the  shoals  at  the  entrance. 

12.  He  will  maintain  himself  thus  at  anchor,  with  the 
English  flag  flying,  unless  signalled  to  get  under  way  and 
capture  the  port.  This  the  commanding  general  will  or- 
der to  take  place  on  the  beach  of  the  south  point  at  the 
place  marked  R,*  whenever  the  opportune  occasion  shall 
arise,  as  determined  by  his  readiness  to  surprise  or  attack 
the  fort  which  the  foreign  settlers  have  built  on  the  island 
in  question.  This  in  turn  will  depend  on  the  time  of  junc- 
tion of  the  two  fleets,  provided  always  that  not  the  slight- 
est movement  shall  take  place  until  the  proper  signal  is 
made. 

13.  As  soon  as  he  shall  see  the  said  signal,  he  will  order 
the  landing  body  assigned  to  this  duty  with  its  officers  to 
embark  in  launches,  and  direct  it  to  go  ashore  on  the 
nearest  beach  of  the  Island  of  Saint  Simon  outside  of  the 
surf  of  the  north  shoals,  near  the  point  Q. 

14.  The  said  landing  shall  be  so  ordered  that  the  troops 
shall  set  foot  ashore  a  short  time  before  dawn,  neither 
sooner  nor  later.  To  this  end  he  shall  measure  the  time  he 
may  consider  necessary,  having  the  day  before  marked  the 

*  The   chart   to   which    reference    is   made    here   and    elsewhere    In    these 
orders,    has   apparently   not   come   down    to   us. 


42  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


shoals  and  indicated  the  nearest  point  for  the  execution  of 
the  plan,  and  approximately  observed  the  distance  between 
shipside  and  shore.  Although  announcing  that  one  and 
the  same  signal  will  be  made  of  the  arrival  of  the  interior 
flotilla  in  the  Bay  of  Gualquini,  of  the  disembarkation  of 
the  troops  and  of  their  getting  under  way  to  enter  the  port, 
yet,  even  though  the  said  signal  be  made  at  the  hour  of 
prayers,  or  later,  or  at  any  other  hour,  he  will  not  on  that 
account  undertake  any  movement  before  the  time  already 
mentioned  of  the  break  of  day,  unless  the  signal  should  be 
made  to  undertake  everything  at  the  moment  when  it  is 
set,  no  matter  what  the  hour,  because  it  is  possible  that  this 
course  might  be  advantageous;  and  in  this  case  he  will 
without  the  slightest  delay  set  about  the  disembarkation, 
and  get  under  way  to  capture  the  port  provided  that  this 
operation  take  place  by  daylight. 

15.  As  soon  as  the  launches  carrying  the  troops  shall 
have  sheered  off,  the  commander  will,  if  the  tide  be  falling, 
stand  by  with  his  anchors  apeak ;  if  not  falling,  he  will 
hoist  sail ;  if  the  wind  does  not  serve,  he  will  begin  to  tow, 
or  do  whatever  he  thinks  best.  With  the  bilanders  lead- 
ing ahead  by  the  hawse  he  will  set  out  to  capture  the  port, 
using  his  best  endeavor  to  have  the  landing  troops  very 
early  in  the  morning  surprise  the  look-out  of  the  foreign- 
ers, marked  O  on  the  chart.  He  will  also  cause  the  fleet 
to  take  the  port  as  early  as  possible,  so  that  the  enemy 
seeing  himself  attacked  on  all  sides  without  hope  of  relief 
shall  at  once  surrender  without  resistance. 

16.  This  bar  of  Gualquini  lies  in  north  latitude  31"  18', 
with  6  to  43/2  fathoms  at  the  point  mentioned  above.  To 
enter  the  port,  set  the  course  N.  W.  ^4  W.,  and  continue  on 
it  in  ^1/2  and  5  fathoms  till  3>4  are  reached;  shift  to  N.  W. 
^  N.,  when  the  bar  will  be  found,  with  V/2  fathoms  at  half 
tide.  From  this  point  with  course  N.  W.  J4  W.,  easing  to 
N.  W.,  5,  6,  and  7  fathoms  will  be  found,  deepening  until 
a  line  north  and  south  through  the  fort  of  the  strangers  is 
crossed,  where  14  fathoms  will  be  obtained,  shallowing  as 
shown  on  the  chart. 

17.  Having  taken  the  position  mentioned  with  his  squad- 
ron, if  the  foreigners  open  fire  on  him  with  their  artillery, 
he  will  return  it,  as  will  also  all  the  boats  under  his  com- 
mand, signal  having  been  previously  made  to  form  in  line 
and  to  fire  on  the  enemy  in  the  aforesaid  case.  But  if  they 
do  not  open  fire  upon  his  ships,  he  will  in  no  wise  fire  him- 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA      43 


self,  but  will  merely  order  his  vessels  to  anchor  in  good  or- 
der in  the  part  marked  thus  Y,  provided  that  if  he  should  be 
compelled  to  fire  against  the  hostile  fort,  he  will  endeavor 
to  dismount  and  disable  its  guns.  He  will  direct  that  in 
going  about,  so  as  to  use  both  broadsides,  all  vessels  must 
have  their  launches  and  boats  ahead  by  the  hawse,  to  pre- 
vent drifting  with  the  current,  in  order  that  they  may  with 
the  greatest  promptitude  forge  ahead  or  in  any  other  direc- 
tion which  may  appear  to  him  suitable.  It  is  indispensable 
that  each  vessel  go  about  in  the  proper  place  in  which  it 
may  find  itself,  the  vanguard  and  rear  guard  standing  on 
opposite  tacks.  For  if  the  said  maneuver  is  not  executed 
in  this  form  and  the  ships  lose  their  positions,  it  will  be 
impossible  to  make  head  against  the  current  so  as  to  pre- 
sent the  other  broadside  to  the  enemy. 

18.  From  the  conditions  already  laid  down,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  ships  should  lie-to  when  delivering  their  fire, 
keeping  up  against  wind  and  current  in  such  manner  as  to 
secure,  without  undue  drifting,  a  good  position  for  the  pur- 
pose in  hand. 

19.  It  is  possible  that  in  this  port  of  Gualquini  we  shall 
find  at  anchor  a  packet  boat  or  war  vessel  which  they  own. 
If  this  shall  not  have  surrendered  when  he  arrives  with  his 
squadron,  he  will  take  possession  of  it,  either  by  capitula- 
tion or  by  force,  if  it  resists ;  he  must  send  it  to  the  bottom 
without  giving  quarter  to  anybody ;  but  if  it  surrenders  vol- 
untarily, he  will  give  it  the  best  treatment  possible. 

20.  If  while  at  anchor  outside  on  the  bar  with  the  En- 
glish flag  flying,  as  already  arranged,  there  should  come  out, 
as  is  usual,  a  boat  to  reconnoiter  or  to  bring  a  pilot,  he  will 
cause  it  to  be  captured  with  the  boats  and  launches  which 
he  will  have  overboard  and  ready  from  the  moment  he  shall 
have  anchored. 

21.  Should  he  be  forced  by  any  wind  to  remove  from 
the  coast  and  for  this  reason  be  unable  to  see  all  the  sig- 
nals, then,  as  soon  as  the  wind  shall  have  ceased,  he  will 
return  to  the  coast,  and  depending  on  the  length  of  time 
that  he  will  have  been  absent,  he  will  examine  the  state  in 
which  he  finds  the  interior  flotilla.  As  a  measure  of  pru- 
dence, and  according  to  the  conclusions  arrived  at,  he  will 
see  to  it  that  no  matter  what  cause,  contingency,  delay,  or 
weather  shall  have  come  up,  the  flotilla  shall  cross  over  to 
the  Bay  of  Gualquini  and  take  whatever  action  has  been 
decided  upon. 


44  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


22.  Whenever  he  encounters  vessels,  he  will  cause  them 
to  be  searched  as  he  may  think  proper;  but  no  matter  of 
what  nation  they  may  be,  he  will,  for  the  purpose  of  em- 
barrassing the  enemy,  take  possession  of  them,  either  peace- 
fully or  by  force,  and  of  all  the  commercial  vessels  belong- 
ing to  these  new  colonies,  from  which  are  to  be  evicted  the 
intruding  settlers  as  having  furtively  and  illegally  settled 
upon  them.  But  if  these  vessels  should  be  registered  from 
Noyorca*  and  bound  to  St.  Augustine  with  stores  for  its 
garrison,  or  else  returning  from  the  said  place  to  their  own 
country  or  coming  from  any  other  country,  in  respect  of 
which  the  reason  given  above  does  not  hold  good,  he  will 
not  capture  them,  but  will  compel  and  order  them  to  con- 
tinue their  voyage  under  his  convoy.  He  will  take  these 
precautions  to  make  sure  of  the  first  class  of  vessels,  and  to 
detain  the  second,  until  the  commanding  general  may  have 
taken  cognizance  of  the  case  and  ordered  that  there  is  no 
objection  to  giving  them  their  liberty. 

23.  The  bilanders  and  other  smaller  vessels  under  his 
command  will  proceed  nearer  to  the  coast  than  the  larger 
ships,  in  order  that  they  may  the  more  clearly  and  prompt- 
ly pick  up  the  signals  made  from  it  and  communicate  them 
to  the  flagship,  according  to  the  directions  which  the  com- 
mander of  the  fleet  shall  have  given  to  this  end  before  leav- 
ing port. 

24.  As  soon  as  this  operation  shall  have  been  concluded, 
he  will  leave  the  port  of  Gualquini  with  his  squadron  and 
landing  body  and  proceed  directly  to  the  Bay  of  Saint 
Simon,  at  whose  entrance  he  will  anchor  on  the  bar  in 
proper  order  and  with  the  same  precautions  which  he  ob- 
served in  that  of  Gualquini.  Here  he  will  remain  until  the 
commanding  general  orders  him  by  pre-arranged  signal 
to  put  to  sea,  so  that  if  the  signal  should  be  set  to  disem- 
bark his  people,  he  will  answer  by  executing  the  order  and 
sending  his  launches  to  the  beach  on  the  south  point  of  the 
entrance.  In  this  case,  he  will  order  the  captains  of  the 
bilanders  to  sail  into  the  harbor  and  join  hands  with  the  in- 
terior flotilla,  with  orders  to  fire  on  the  redoubt  of  the  for- 
eigners, if  this  should  open.  If  on  the  contrary,  it  should 
not.  he  will  keep  his  station  with  his  ships  without  under- 
taking any  movement  whatever  as  much  to  avoid  risking 
his  ships  in  entering  and  leaving  the  harbor  as  because  it 

*Sew    York,    probably. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  45 


has  been  considered  unnecessary  to  employ  so  great  a  force 
in  the  reduction  of  the  redoubt  and  its  garrison,  and  princi- 
pally to  prevent  hostile  vessels  from  going  south  and  thus 
possibly  embarrassing  the  withdrawal  of  our  own  vessels 
through  the  interior  channels.  To  this  end,  he  will  con- 
stantly maintain  in  the  tops  a  good  guard  of  men  of  the 
utmost  trustworthiness,  who  will  attentively  keep  a  good 
lookout  in  all  directions. 

25.  As  soon  as  he  shall  have  seen  the  bilanders  leaving 
the  said  port  and  a  signal  to  make  sail  and  continue  the 
voyage,  he  will  obey  it,  setting  his  course  with  his  entire 
squadron  direct  for  the  bar  of  Las  Cruces  [Tybee  Bar] ;  and 
without  waiting  for  any  other  order  or  signal,  he  will  enter 
the  bay. 

26.  The  mouth  of  Las  Cruces,  he  will  recognize  by 
means  of  a  lofty,  wooden  tower,  which  the  foreigners  have 
built  on  the  north  point;  on  the  south,  they  have  a  small 
redoubt. 

27.  On  coming  within  sight  of  the  said  bar,  he  will  hoist 
the  English  ensign  and  will  keep  it  flying  until  he  shall 
have  entered  and  placed  himself  in  a  position  to  prevent 
communication  of  this  event  to  other  parts.  He  will  then 
hoist  the  Spanish  ensign  and  at  the  same  time  will  send  an 
officer  ashore  under  a  white  flag  with  orders  to  inform  the 
commanding  officer  of  the  fort,  that  if  he  does  not  surren- 
der without  resistance  or  delay,  he  will  be  put  to  the  sword 
with  his  entire  garrison  without  exception,  and  to  tell  him 
at  the  same  time  that  the  remaining  forts  and  settlements  of 
the  south  have  been  depopulated  and  ruined  and  that 
a  strong  fleet  is  coming  by  the  interior  channels  to  destroy 
and  reduce  to  naught  those  which  may  have  remained. 

28.  The  officer  designated  for  this  duty  will  carefully 
observe  the  disposition  and  force  of  the  redoubt  and  the 
strength  of  its  garrison  in  order  that  in  case  of  refusing  to 
surrender  and  offering  resistance,  the  most  convenient  and 
best  measures  may  be  taken  to  capture  it.  He  will  with- 
draw to  his  ship,  as  soon  as  he  has  executed  his  commis- 
sion. 

29.  While  all  this  is  going  on,  he  [the  Naval  Comman- 
der] will  anchor  in  the  middle  of  the  channel,  posting  the 
vessels  under  his  order,  so  as  to  occupy  both  mouths  of 


46  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


the  Tamaja,*  these  being-  the  same  which  on  joining  form 
the  Savannah  River.  In  this  way,  all  the  approaches  will 
be  covered  and  the  communications  of  the  enemy  embar- 
rassed. 

30.  If  the  commanding  officer  of  the  said  fort  should 
surrender  without  resistance,  the  garrison  will  be  distrib- 
uted among  tlie  vessels  of  the  fleet,  orders  being  given  to 
treat  them  well.  The  guns,  munitions  and  stores  found 
will  be  collected  and  orders  given  to  burn  to  the  ground  all 
the  houses  and  to  ruin  and  destroy  whatever  may  be  found. 
The  same  orders  will  be  issued  with  regard  to  the  tower 
mentioned. 

31.  If  the  commanding  officer,  in  contempt  of  the  cour- 
teous and  peaceful  proposition  made  to  him,  should  decide 
to  defend  himself,  the  naval  commander  will  make  the  best 
disposition  to  invest  the  place.  He  will  disembark  troops 
in  sufficient  number,  having  regard  to  the  report  on  the 
garrison  of  the  fort  and  its  situation  made  by  the  officer 
he  sent  ashore,  to  secure  success  without  risk,  because  if 
he  considers  that  the  operation  is  somewhat  difficult  he 
must  not  expose  himself,  but  instead  will  send  with  the 
greatest  dispatch  one  or  two  launches,  well  armed  and 
manned,  to  the  south  through  the  channels,  with  an  offi- 
cer to  report  everything  accurately  to  the  general ;  and, 
in  addition,  the  conclusion  he  had  come  to  in  respect  of  what 
is  needed  to  attack  and  conquer  the  said  fort  and  settle- 
ment. The  officer  will  be  enjoined  to  travel  night  and  day 
until  he  shall  have  met  the  interior  flotilla.  He  must  be 
furnished  with  the  countersign  and  parole  because  it  is 
considered  important  that  this  information  should  reach 
the  general  as  soon  as  possible. 

32.  Even  should  the  commanding  general  of  the  fort 
surrender  without  resistance,  the  two  launches  will  be 
sent  to  report  this  result  to  the  commanding  general  with 
all  the  incidents  which  mav  liavo  occurred,  and  with  an  ac- 
count of  the  state  in  which  it  was  found. 

33.  Since  it  is  possi))le  in  the  said  port  to  find  a  few  ves- 
sels from  Europe,  bringing  stores  and  people,  for  the  sup- 
port of  these  settlements,  he  will  take  as  many  as  he  shall 


•  This  word  Buffffpsts  the  Altamaha:  but  as  this  stream  has  no  connection 
with  thp  FRvnnnah,  It  Is  not  impossible  that  the  scribe  has  wiltton  T  for  Y, 
■  n<l  tlint  the  word  Is  really  Yama.la,  i.  e..  Yamanraw.  If  this  emendation  be 
arTcptablc,  then  the  author  of  these  orders  probably  has  some  local  con- 
flvuratlon    In    mind. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  47 


have  found,  using  them  for  the  service  and  re-enforcement 
of  his  squadron.  He  will  take  the  most  exact  precautions 
for  safety  until  the  general  shall  have  joined  and  given 
directions,  the  expedition  being  concluded,  for  its  orderly 
and  well-arranged  withdrawal. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  in  all  relations  the  general  will 
labor,  in  accordance  with  the  zeal  and  experience  he  is 
known  to  have,  for  the  complete  success  of  the  royal  ser- 
vice, and  the  glory  and  reputation  of  the  king's  arms.  In 
respect  of  accidents  which  cannot  be  anticipated,  I  have 
confidence  that  his  experience  and  prudence  will  lead  him  to 
display  the  same  zeal  in  prosperity  as  in  adversity,  and  a 
perfect  constancy,  such  that  neither  will  success  produce  the 
slightest  carelessness  nor  misfortune  abate  his  courage, 
keeping  in  mind,  as  he  will,  that  all  of  us  depend  upon  the 
Divine  Omnipotence  to  which  must  be  attributed  both 
prosperity  and  adversity,  while  displaying  on  his  own  part 
the  diligence,  activity  and  strength  that  are  required  to 
achieve  success  in  anything  upon  which  we  have  set  oifr 
hearts. 


48  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


LETTER  OF  THE  GOVERNOR  GENERAL  OF  CUBA  TO 
THE  KING'S  MINISTER,  ANNOUNCING  THE  FAILURE 
OF  THE  EXPEDITION  AGAINST  GEORGIA,  AND  EN- 
CLOSING TWO   JOURNALS   OF   EVENTS. 


Sir, — 

Hoping  as  I  have  been  from  day  to  day  to  receive  from 
Florida  tlie  happy  new^s  I  had  promised  myself  of  the  suc- 
cessful results  achieved  by  the  expedition  against  the  En- 
glish Colonies  in  the  North,  I  had  kept  back  the  dispatch 
boat  under  the  command  of  Don  Juan  Baptista  Goicochea, 
which  had  entered  this  port  from  Vera  Cruz  on  its  way 
back  to  Spain,  so  as  more  promptly  to  communicate  this 
news. 

Accordingly,  on  the  eighth  instant,  through  the  fortu- 
nate arrival,  after  42  days'  journey,  of  a  boat  which  was 
sent  to  me,  I  learned  that  the  first  convoy  of  small  vessels 
had  on  the  9th  of  June  safely  reached  the  Bar  of  Saint 
Augustine,  as  did  on  the  15th  of  the  same  month,  that  of 
the  larger  ones,  which  left  this  port  under  the  orders  of 
the  Naval  Lieutenant,  Don  Antonio  Castaueda.  At  Ra- 
tones  Inlet,  the  messenger  was  pursued  by  an  English 
sloop,  which  was  trying  to  capture  him,  and  so  he  was 
compelled  to  run  aground,  but  succeeded  in  saving  all  his 
people  and  the  dispatches  which  later  he  managed  to  send 
on  to  me  in  a  coast  fishing  boat. 

Just  when  I  thought  that  the  expedition  was  at  least  well 
advanced,  if  not  as  completely  successful  as  we  had  reason 
to  expect,  the  Governor  of  Florida  tells  me  in  letters  that 
I  received,  dated  the  26th,  and  postdated  the  28th  and  29th 
of  the  same  month  of  June,  that  partly  on  account  of  the 
bad  weather  and  partly  on  account  of  the  necessity  of  water- 
ing the  boats,  and  of  other  inconveniences  arising  out  of 
the  (lifTiculties  and  dangers  of  navigation  over  that  bar 
(the  P»ar  of  St.  Augustine],  he  had  been  as  yet  unable  to 
embark  the  troops  which  were  to  set  out  from  that  garrison 
to  join  hands  with  those  froiu  this  particular  place  and  with 
the  militia  which  has  been  selected  for  the  purpose.  Upon 
this     aforementioned     day,     the     29th,     he     was     still     at 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA      49 


St.  Augustine  with  all  the  troops  on  board  ready  to  put  to 
sea  to  carry  out  the  orders  with  which  he  was  charged.  The 
Engineer  of  the  Second  Class,*  Don  Antonio  de  Arredondo 
reports  the  same  thing  to  me,  sending  me  the  journal  which 
accompanies  this  letter  and  includes  the  23d  of  the  said 
June.  From  this  journal,  Your  Excellency  will  take  note 
of  the  encounter  between  some  of  the  small  vessels  of  the 
first  convoy,  on  the  coast  of  Florida  between  the  Bar  of 
Mosquitos  and  that  of  Matanzas.  It  would  seem  that  the 
English  had  gone  in  a  boat  and  launch  to  capture  a  small 
sloop  from  the  presidio  of  Florida,  which  was  carrying  the 
detachment  of  artillerymen  from  the  garrison  of  this  place 
[Havana]  as  well  as  to  capture  another  launch  from  this 
port.  As  they  boarded  these  vessels  to  loot  them,  our  peo- 
ple who  had  jumped  ashore,  fired  upon  them  from  the  sand 
dunes,  and  compelled  them  to  surrender  to  the  number  of 
sixteen,  among  them  a  lieutenant  of  the  frigate.  In  this 
affair,  we  had  the  misfortune  to  lose  the  sub-lieutenant  of 
artillery  and  the  corporal  of  the  detachment. 

Notwithstanding  Arredondo's  assertion,  under  date  of 
19th,  in  his  journal,  that  from  a  few  prisoners  returned  by 
Don  Diego  Oglesor,  Governor  of  Georgia,  to  the  coasts  of 
Florida,  it  was  learned  they  had  discovered  nothing  of  our 
plans,  yet  I  feared  that  they  had  been  warned  by  the  delay, 
so  far  of  14  days,  off  the  bar  of  Saint  Augustine,  of  a  fleet 
so  numerous  as  ours  and  that  it  was  not  impossible  that 
they  might  be  on  their  guard,  and  so  hinder  us ;  and  all  this 
in  spite  of  the  effort  I  had  made  in  advance,  to  advise  the 
Governor  of  Florida  through  an  officer  (as  I  informed  Your 
Excellency  in  a  letter  of  June  8,  of  which  I  inclose  a  dupli- 
cate), who  arrived  more  than  20  days  before  the  arrival 
of  the  convov  of  larger  vessels  under  the  command  of  Don 
Antonio  de  Castaneda. 

Having  received  this  news,  and  fearing  that  through  the 
delay  they  had  already  made  they  might  suffer,  if  supplies 
should  be  lacking,  and  in  order  to  forestall  anv  accident  due 
to  necessity  or  want,  I  at  once  prepared  a  brigantine  and  a 
sloop  to  send  a  month's  supplies  in  addition  to  those  of  three 
months  and  a  half  that  they  took  out  with  them.  These 
boats  left  this  port  with  the  stores  on  the  15th  inst.     On 


•  Ingeniero  en  seffiindo,  it  was  not  until  1756  that  engineers  held  mili- 
tary rank  in  the  Spanish  army.  Elsewhere  In  these  papers,  Arredondo  !■ 
given  the  first  grade,  ingeiierto  enjefe. 


50  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

the  following  day  there  returned  to  it  a  sloop,  one  of  those 
that  had  set  out  with  the  expedition,  and  in  it  came  Naval 
Lieutenant  the  Marquess  de  Casinas  and  the  captain  of  the 
militia  battalion  of  this  place,  Don  Laureano  Chacon,  with 
his  company.  From  these  officers  I  learned  that  the  issue  of 
the  expedition  had  not  corresponded  to  our  well-founded 
hopes  and  to  the  measures  that  had  been  taken  for  its  suc- 
cess, and  that  all  the  vessels  in  different  divisions  had  strug- 
gled to  regain  Florida  and  this  place  Havana,  without  any 
other  result  than  that  of  having  attacked  Gualquini  with 
success,  capturing  its  forts,  artillery,  mortars,  munitions  and 
implements ;  and  that  this  outcome  was  due  to  the  bad 
weather  which  had  delayed  and  disordered  the  execution 
of  our  plans,  to  say  nothing  of  hindrances  later  encountered 
and  felt. 

I  have  up  to  the  present  day  no  other  information  than 
that  given  me  b}^  the  aforesaid  officers,  and  that  which  is 
contained  in  more  or  less  detail  in  the  private  diary  kept  by 
the  Marquess  de  Casinas  of  daily  events,  and  brought  off 
by  him  and  given  to  me. 

Seeing  now  that  the  w^hole  expedition  had  begun  to  re- 
treat and  that  they  had  sighted  land  six  leagues  farther  to 
the  south  of  Saint  Augustine,  these  officers  judged  it  proper 
to  set  their  course  for  this  port  and  assured  me  that  the 
other  boats  were  doing  the  same  thing. 

Such  being  the  news  in  hand,  it  has  appeared  to  me  proper 
no  longer  to  delay  the  dispatch  boat  under  the  command  of 
Don  Juan  Baptista  Goicochea.  As  soon  as  I  shall  have  re- 
ceived the  information  to  be  given  me  by  the  Governor  of 
Florida,  it  will  be  dispatched  in  another  boat  which  I  am 
holding  ready  for  the  purpose.  I  shall  then  explain  with 
greater  particularity  all  that  has  happened  and  the  reasons 
that  prevailed  against  continuing  the  expedition  and  in 
favor  of  forming  the  resolution  to  retreat. 

As  I  had  already  made  up  my  mind,  from  the  condi- 
tion in  which  I  considered  the  enemy  to  be  and  from  the 
superiority  of  our  forces,  that  at  the  very  latest,  his  towns, 
plantations  and  settlements  would  be  attacked  and  des- 
troyed as  far  as  Port  Royal ;  and  as  I  had  even  flattered 
myself  that  these  favorable  results  might  be  obtained  as 
far  as  Carolina  [Charleston]  I  have  been  profoundly  aston- 
ished at  the  frustration  of  hopes  so  well  founded  of  serving 
the  king  advantageously  and  maintaining  the  glory  of  his 
arms ;  and  that  the  labor  and  zeal  inspired  by  my  devotion, 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  51 

and  by  my  interest  in  our  success  should  have  come  to 
naught.  But  although  not  successful  everywhere,  yet 
according  to  the  relation  of  the  Marquess  de  Casinas,  the 
destruction  of  the  forts  and  settlement  of  Gualquini  and 
that  of  Bejeces  was  accomplished.  That  many  stores  and 
implements  should  have  been  destroyed,  and  the  harbor 
gallantly  forced  in  the  face  of  all  its  fire,  both  by  sea  and 
land,  with  such  intrepidity,  as  reported  by  those  to  whom 
I  have  talked  on  the  subject,  is  due  to  Don  Antonio 
Castaiieda. 

The  King  and  Your  Excellency  do  not  need  to  be  inform- 
ed how  deeply  I  am  mortified  that  this  expedition  has  not 
been  carried  out  to  the  complete  satisfaction  of  His  Majes- 
ty's desires ;  and  that  on  my  part  nothing  was  omitted  that 
could  have  the  least  bearing  on  its  happiest  issue.  Until 
all  the  vessels  with  the  troops  and  militia  shall  have  re- 
turned, I  shall  take  all  the  precautions  that  are  due. 

Praying  Your  Excellency  to  report  to  His  Majesty  the  re- 
sults so  far  of  this  operation,  may  God  keep  Your  Excel- 
lency many  years. 

Havana,  August  18,  1742. 

Excellent  Sir: 

Your  most  humble,  grateful  servant  kisses  your  hand. 
Don  Juan  Francisco, 

Guemes  y  Horcasitas. 
(A  Flourish.) 
To  His  Excellency  Don  Joseph  de  Campillo. 


[Letter  acknowledging  receipt  of  that  of  Guemes,  with 
papers.] 

With  the  letter  of  Your  Excellency  of  the  18th  of  August, 
have  been  received  the  accompanying  reports  and  diary, 
treating  of  the  management  and  progress  of  the  expedition 
which  left  your  port  against  Carolina.  We  have  also  the 
news  reported  to  Your  Excellency,  through  Naval  Lieuten- 
ant Don  Carlos  Riggio  (who  has  arrived  at  that  place 
[Havana]  )  by  the  Governor  of  Florida,  and  also  that  for- 
warded by  Your  Excellency  in  a  letter  of  the  20th,  to  the 
eflfect  that  on  that  day  Don  Antonio  Castaneda  returned  to 
that  port  [Havana]  with  the  greater  part  of  the  convoy  and 
troops.  The  King,  having  acquainted  himself  with  your 
report  upon  the  measures  and  arrangements  you  made  for 


52        THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


this  expedition,  and  also  with  your  reflections  upon  its  is- 
sue, and  the  reasons  why  it  did  not  come  up  to  the  expecta- 
tions produced  by  the  forces  and  arrangements  with  which 
it  was  undertaken,  desires  me  to  express  to  Your  Excel- 
lency his  satisfaction  with  everything  done  by  Your  Excel- 
lency, a  satisfaction  in  exact  agreement  with  the  confidence 
he  was  gracious  enough  to  repose  in  your  zeal  and  efficiency. 
He  considers  as  entirely  sound  the  remarks  you  make 
upon  the  unhappy  issue  of  events.  His  Majesty  under- 
stands that  this  is  to  be  traced  to  the  poor  direction,  lack 
of  diligence  and  inefficiency  of  the  one  who  should  have 
made  extraordinary  efforts  to  profit  by  the  advantages  that 
placed  success  within  his  grasp. 
May  God  keep  you  many  years. 

San  Ildefonso,  October  28,  1742. 
To  Don  Juan  Francisco  Guemes  y  Horcasitas.* 

JOURNAL    KEPT   BY    DON    ANTONIO    DE    ARREDONDO, 
CHIEF  ENGINEER  OF  THE  PRESENT  EXPEDITION. 

June  5,  1742. 

At  sunrise  the  signal  was  made  to  put  to  sea  and  execut- 
ed by  the  entire  convoy,  as  it  was  ready  to  sail.  At  twelve 
o'clock,  we  sallied  from  the  Morro,  at  which  time  we  haul- 
ed up  our  launches  and  boats ;  steady  drizzle. 

June  6th. 

From  yesterday  noon  until  today  at  the  same  hour :  at 
one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  we  ran  into  a  rain  squall  with- 
out wind,  which  lasted  until  5.  We  stood  all  night  under 
foresail  and  mizzen  sail  until  5  o'clock  in  the  morning.  At 
noon,  we  took  the  sun,  but  as  there  were  great  differences 
in  the  observations,  we  took  the  mean  to  fix  the  course 
which  W2s  northeast  by  north. 

June  7th. 

From  yesterday  until  today :  at  sunset,  all  the  elements 
of  the  convoy  kept  together.  At  nine  in  the  evening,  great 
signs  of  a  squall  which  burst  upon  us  with  thunder,  light- 
ning and  rain,  lasting  until  one  o'clock  in  the  night.  At 
sunrise  two  vessels  were  missing.     At  noon,  we  took  the 


•  Not  Blifnfrt  but  probably  written  by  Oamplllo.  In  the  MS.  this  letter 
follow*  Arredondo's  diary.  We  have  put  It  where  !t  belongs,  immediately 
after  the  letter  which   It   acknowledges. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  53 

sun  and  found  our  latitude  to  24°  40',  and  our  longitude 
295°  16'.  At  this  hour  the  two  boats  which  had  been  miss- 
ing rejoined  us. 

June  8th. 

From  yesterday  until  today:  at  one  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon, we  sighted  Dong  Key,  its  northeast  head  bearing 
north  five  and  a  half  decrees  toward  the  east  and  the  south- 
west point,  west.  At  sunset  all  the  vessels  were  together. 
At  midday  the  sun  gave  us  25°  3'  latitude  and  longitude 
295°  40',  all  the  vessels  being  together. 

June  9th. 

At  three  of  the  afternoon,  signal  was  made  to  crowd  on 
all  sail  which  was  kept  up  till  four.  At  six  land  was  dis- 
covered from  the  top  and  recognized  by  the  pilot  as  Bis- 
cayne  Key  which  bore  west  by  north  at  a  distance  of  five 
leagues.  At  six  in  the  morning,  the  top  announced  that 
only  twenty-two  vessels  were  in  sight :  at  seven,  land  was 
visible  and  after  examination  by  the  pilot  he  declared  that 
it  was  the  shore  of  Jega,  bearing  west  by  northwest.  At 
8  a  sloop  signalled  that  she  wished  to  speak  to  us,  and  ob- 
serving that  her  bowsprit  had  been  injured,  the  Honduran 
was  sent  to  find  out  what  was  the  matter,  and  returned  say- 
ing, that  it  was  the  royal  sloop  "St.  Joseph,"  and  that  the 
night  before,  on  going  about,  the  guard  schooner  had  foul- 
ed her,  and  thus  had  damaged  her  bowsprit,  but  that  she 
was  not  making  any  water  nor  had  suffered  any  other  dam- 
age. At  noon  we  took  the  sun  and  found  ourselves  in  26° 
54'  latitude  and  295°  25'  longitude.  On  this  day  a  sloop 
of  the  convoy  was  missing. 

June  10th. 

From  yesterday  until  today:  at  4  of  the  afternoon,  we 
sighted  main  land,  being  the  palm  grove  of  Ays,  according 
to  the  pilot.  At  5,  signal  was  set  to  go  about,  which  was 
executed  by  the  entire  convoy,  the  course  being  set  S.  E., 
with  the  wind  E.  N.  E.  At  sunset  the  top  announced  that 
only  twenty-two  vessels  were  in  sight.  At  this  hour  we 
had  lost  the  land.  The  whole  night  remained  calm.  At 
sunrise  we  saw  the  same  vessels  as  those  of  yesterday  after- 
noon and  found  at  noon  our  latitude  to  be  28°  28'  and  lon- 
gitude 292°  15'. 


54  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

June  11th. 

From  yesterday  until  today:  at  1:30  of  the  afternoon 
signal  was  made  to  put  about,  which  was  done,  and  the 
course  set  W.  54  N.  W.,  the  wind  being  north  and  light.  At 
sunset  all  the  boats  visible  this  morning  were  still  in  sight. 
The  whole  night  a  moderate  wind  blew  out  of  the  south- 
west. At  sunrise  twenty-one  vessels  were  seen.  At  noon, 
we  took  soundings  and  found  ourselves  in  twenty-two 
fathoms,  bottom  reddish  gravel  and  dark  colored  sand. 
At  ten,  we  tacked  to  the  S.  S.  W.,  wind  west,  and  at  noon 
our  latitude  was  30°  1'  and  longitude  295°  10'. 

June  12th. 

From  yesterday  until  today :  at  2 :30  of  the  afternoon 
sounded  in  twenty-six  fathoms;  found  the  bottom  the  same, 
for  which  reason  we  decided  to  cast  anchor  because  the 
currents  were  carrying  us  to  leeward.  Signal  to  this  effect 
was  made  and  obeyed.  At  sunset  only  eighteen  vessels 
were  seen  because  apparently  the  currents  had  prevented 
their  keeping  together,  and  at  the  same  time  it  was  con- 
jectured that  they  were  invisible  because  the  horizon  was 
overcast.  The  entire  night  was  calm,  with  the  wind  to  the 
southwest,  but  we  found  the  currents  extremely  strong; 
at  5:30  of  the  morning,  signal  was  made  to  hoist  sail,  which 
was  done  with  the  wind  to  the  northwest,  course  S.  W. 
Only  fifteen  vessels  were  visible,  being  those  only  that  had 
anchored.  At  noon,  our  observation  gave  us  29°  42'  lati- 
tude, and  longitude  245°  4'.* 

June  13th. 

From  yesterday  until  today:  at  one  of  the  afternoon,  we 
set  our  course  W.  S.  W.,  with  the  wind  north,  northwest, 
eastern  horizon  heavily  submerged.  At  three  of  the  after- 
noon we  saw  land  but  could  not  make  out  what  it  was, 
bearing  W.  Y^  S.  W.,  at  a  distance  of  three  leagues.  At 
sunset  signal  to  go  about  and  set  the  course  east,  wind 
north,  northeast.  At  this  hour  only  fourteen  vessels  were 
in  sight.  The  eastern  horizon  was  strongly  overcast,  with 
more  or  less  indications  of  weather.  At  ten  at  night  the  wind 
freshened  from  the  north  into  a  squall  so  that  we  stood  un- 
der foresail  and  mizzensail.  At  three  in  the  morning  signal 
was  made  to  change  our  course  to  the  E.  S.  E.  and  S.  E., 
with  the  wind  northeast,  this  on  account  of  having  sounded 
and  found  only  twelve  fathoms  and  a  half.     The  night  con- 

•  So  In   original,   probably  Copyist's  error  for  295'    4'. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA      55 

tinued  calm  with  some  swell  until  half  past  four,  when  the 
wind  settled  in  the  south  and  southeast  with  many  squalls 
and  showers.  At  this  hour  we  set  our  course  to  the  E,  and 
E.  yi  N.  E.  At  sunrise,  the  sun  being  invisible,  the  top 
announced  that  fifteen  vessels  were  in  sight.  Afterwards 
two  others,  small  ones,  were  discovered  and  a  frigate  to 
the  windward  which  made  a  signal  of  recognition  which 
was  answered,  and  we  found  it  to  be  the  Sacra  Familia,  so 
that  we  were  now  eighteen,  all  told.  At  ten  we  sounded 
in  fifteen  fathoms  and  the  skies  having  cleared  and  the  rain 
stopped,  signal  was  made  to  head  south,  the  wind  being 
east-southeast.  At  midday  we  took  the  sun  and  found  our 
position  to  be  latitude  29°  28',  and  longitude  297°  7'. 

June  14th. 
From  yesterday  till  today ;  at  six  of  the  afternoon,  sig- 
nal made  to  set  the  course  N.  E.  by  N.,  with  the  wind  east- 
southeast.  At  this  hour  there  was  a  flurry  of  rain.  At 
sunset  seventeen  vessels  were  in  sight,  the  two  small  ones 
that  were  seen  this  morning  having  been  unable  to  come 
up.  The  night  continued  calm,  and  the  currents  proving 
more  powerful  than  the  wind,  we  cast  anchor  in  twelve 
and  a  half  fathoms  of  water  at  half  past  one  in  the  morning. 
At  six,  signal  to  make  sail  was  set,  which  we  all  did,  with 
the  course  S.  S.  W. ;  wind  east-southeast,  which  all  six- 
teen vessels  executed.  At  8  :00  land  was  seen  at  a  distance 
of  four  leagues  and  a  half,  continuous  coast.  At  midday 
the  sun  gave  us  29°  latitude  and  at  the  same  time  we  recog- 
nized that  we  were  ofif  the  bar  of  Mosquito  Inlet,  for  which 
reason  we  set  our  course  N.  N.  W. 

June  15th. 
From  yesterday  till  today :  at  six  of  the  afternoon,  the 
packet  boat  "Diligent"  was  signalled  to  come  up  within 
speaking  distance  and  ordered  to  press  all  sail  and  hasten 
to  reconnoiter  the  bar  of  Matanzas  and  inform  us  by  can- 
non shot  and  to  hoist  a  signal  lantern  for  our  guidance ;  and 
that  as  soon  as  she  should  be  ofT  the  bar  of  Saint  Augus- 
tine, she  should  anchor,  and  from  time  to  time  make  a 
smoke  signal.  We  continued  with  the  rest  of  the  vessels 
on  the  same  course  and  at  one  o'clock  in  the  morning  an- 
chored east  and  west  on  a  line  with  the  tower  of  St.  Anas- 
tasia  in  twelve  fathoms  of  water.  As  soon  as  it  dawned 
we  discovered  at  anchor  the  seven  vessels  which  had  been 
missing.      They    had    succeeded    in    getting    in    two    days 


56         THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


before,  so  that  we  were  finally  all  reunited.  At  8:00  there 
came  alongside  a  boat  from  the  garrison  to  take  ashore  the 
second  in  command,  Don  Francisco  Rubiani  and  myself. 
The  officer  who  came  off  told  us  that  on  the  5th,  the  first 
division  of  small  vessels  that  had  set  out  from  Havana  on 
the  first  day,  having  run  into  an  English  frigate,  our  gal- 
ley called  upon  her  to  show  her  colors  and  as  ehe  failed  to 
do  so,  we  cleared  for  action  and  opened  fire  on  her  with 
our  guns,  to  which  the  frigate  made  no  answer,  and  under 
her  courses  alone,  advanced  upon  our  galley,  and  prepared 
to  attack  her.  But  this  design  was  perceived,  and  the  wind 
being  fresh,  the  galley  rejoined  the  convoy  under  a  signal 
to  press  on  all  sail ;  but  her  commanding  ofificer  seeing  that 
the  Saint  Augustine  sloop,  in  which  were  embarked  the 
sub-lieutenant  and  the  artillerymen  of  Havana,  was  far 
astern,  gave  orders  to  stick  close  to  the  sloop  and  resist 
the  launch  and  boat  of  the  hostile  frigate,  which  she  had 
just  put  overboard  and  was  directed  to  cut  ofif  two  schoon- 
ers which  were  somewhat  delayed  behind  the  remainder 
of  the  convoy.  As  the  wind  continued  to  freshen,  the  gal- 
ley sent  a  boat  with  the  ensign  and  ten  men  of  his  garri- 
son to  re-enforce  the  aforesaid  schooners.  In  fact,  the 
launches  of  the  Englishman  had  come  alongside  to  board, 
but  were  by  the  help  of  the  officer  and  ten  men  just  men- 
tioned, formally  beaten  off  in  the  three  attempts  that  they 
made.  In  this  affair  we  suffered  no  damage,  except  that 
Don  Francisco  Alolina,  the  lieutenant  of  the  militia  of  Gua- 
nabacoa,  was  wounded  in  the  thigh.  The  hostile  ship,  see- 
ing that  her  launches  had  not  succeeded  in  their  attempt, 
now  directed  them  to  attack  the  Saint  Augustine  bilander 
and  the  launch  from  the  convoy  sent  by  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  galley  to  support  the  vessels  that  were  far 
astern.  Although  the  utmost  defense  possible  had  been 
made,  they  were  unable  to  resist  the  fire  of  the  ship  which 
was  at  anchor  in  three  fathoms  of  water,  and  so  ran  ashore, 
the  sub-lieutenant,  Don  Domingo  de  la  Cruz,  having  been 
killed  in  the  action  by  a  gun-shot,  as  well  as  the  corporal, 
Manuel  del  Pino,  by  another.  When  they  saw  our  people 
had  got  ashore,  the  enemy  leaving  their  boat,  swarmed 
over  the  bilander  in  order  to  loot  the  cargo  which  they 
supposed  she  carried.  From  the  shore,  we  "opened  fire  on 
them,  encouraged  by  seeing  that  the  English  boat  had  sunk 
in  the  siirf  on  the  shore,  and  assisted  by  two  Indians  who 
happened  to  be  fishing,  and  who  had  come  up  at  the  sound 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  57 


of  the  guns.  We  succeeded  in  overcoming  our  adversaries 
who,  after  a  moment  or  two  of  struggle,  asked  for  quarter. 
Of  the  English  in  the  boat,  six  were  wounded  and  nine  un- 
hurt. The  ship  when  it  saw  her  people  captured  set  sail. 
The  dragoons  who  went  to  the  help  of  the  bilander  were 
clever  enough  on  going  ashore  to  take  their  arms  with 
them  and  from  the  shore  diverted  the  hostile  launches, 
so  as  to  permit  the  artillerj-^men  also  to  go  ashore.  With- 
out this,  the  affair  would  not  have  succeeded.  The  prison- 
ers have  been  brought  to  this  place  and  among  them,  the 
officer  in  command,  who  is  a  brother  of  Captain  Makay. 
From  these  we  learned  all  about  the  fight  and  that  the  ship 
is  one  of  the  men-of-war  of  Carolina.  I  have  had  word 
of  mouth  with  one  of  them  but  have  learned  nothing  more 
than  what  we  already  know.  In  respect  of  the  condition 
of  affairs  in  Saint  Augustine,  I  also  learned  that  the  day; 
before  our  arrival  a  schooner  had  allowed  itself  to  be  sight- 
ed on  the  north  and  that  she  had  changed  her  course  as 
soon  as  she  had  seen  the  seven  vessels  at  anchor.  At  one 
o'clock  of  the  afternoon,  the  second  in  command,  Don  Fran- 
cisco de  la  Peiia  and  I  went  ashore,  and  we  passed  the  rest 
of  the  day  informing  ourselves  of  the  state  of  the  prepara- 
tions of  this  place. 

June  16th. 

Today  we  convened  the  pilots,  white  as  well  as  Indian, 
and  examined  them  carefully  in  regard  to  everything  we 
should  know  for  the  purpose  of  our  expedition.  Later  we 
held  council,  the  commanding  officers  and  the  naval  en- 
sign, Don  Francisco  de  la  PeSa,  in  which  we  agreed  upon 
the  method  of  attacking  the  north  and  south  entrances  of 
St.  Simon's  in  order  to  cut  off  the  communication  between 
the  various  stations  of  the  enemy,  deciding  to  detach  th'-ee 
•galliots  with  their  canoes  to  the  more  northerly  entrance 
and  two  to  enter  by  the  Bar  of  Whales ;  these  two  to  post 
themselves  within  the  river  between  the  Fort  of  St.  An- 
drew and  Frederica.  Today  we  had  squalls  from  the  nctrth- 
east  and  more  or  less  water  was  sent  on  board,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  all  the  launches  were  busy  unloading  stores. 

June  17th. 

Another  council  was  held  between  the  commanding  of- 
ficers and  Don  Francisco  de  la  Peua,  in  which  was  discuss- 
ed the  question  of  the  point  at  which  we  should  disembark 


5S  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

to  invade  the  Isle  of  St,  Simon ;  and  after  various  reflect- 
ions upon  the  matter,  and  weighing  all  the  circumstances 
with  the  greatest  attention,  it  was  unanimously  agreed  that 
the  disembarkation  should  take  place  on  the  east  coast  at 
the  most  sheltered  point  of  the  shoals  north  of  the  Bar  of 
Gualquini  and  that  from  this  point  a  cordon  should  be  form- 
ed with  part  of  the  troops  to  reach  as  far  as  the  careening 
ground  in  order  to  maintain  free  communication  within 
the  river  with  our  ships  and  to  receive  supplies  and  what- 
ever else  might  be  needful  from  that  point  in  full  security. 
It  was  further  agreed  that  the  ships  and  the  remaining 
vessels  should  enter  in  good  order  and  force  the  hostile 
battery,  and  should  string  themselves  across  the  river  of 
the  harbor  in  the  formation  to  be  prescribed  by  the  senior 
naval  officer,  Don  Antonio  Castafieda,  and  that  afterward 
operations  should  conform  to  the  turn  of  events. 

I  caused  lists  to  be  given  to  me  of  the  troops,  the  con- 
victs, the  Indians  and  the  negroes  of  the  garrison,  the  first 
being  composed  of  five  pickets  of  the  re-enforcement  and 
of  one  of  the  garrison,  well  equipped ;  of  ninety  convicts, 
of  fifty-five  Indians  and  of  fifteen  negroes,  all  armed.  Then 
I  promptly  made  the  lists  of  distribution  of  all  these  classes 
according  to  the  capacity  and  quality  of  the  vessels  and 
they  were  so  allotted. 

We  continued  today  sending  as  much  water  as  we  could 
on  board,  having  regard  to  the  necessities  of  the  vessels 
and  especially  those  of  the  royal  frigates.  Today  we  had 
squalls  from  the  northeast  and  some  of  them  gave  us  real 
concern,  by  preventing  communication  and  because  our 
vessels  were  so  completely  exposed  out  beyond  the  bar. 
Our  arrangements  were  thus  delayed. 

Today  we  saw  a  schooner  off  in  the  north  and  the  com- 
manding officer  Don  Antonio  Castafieda,  made  signal  to  the 
Honduran  ship  to  chase  her,  and  after  some  time,  she  de- 
clared herself  to  be  English  and  put  her  boat  overboard 
and  sent  it  to  us  with  the  French  captain  who  was  captur- 
ed on  this  bar  at  the  beginning  of  March  of  this  year,  with 
three  Spanish  prisoners  and  a  negro  of  Espinosa's.  Don 
Dicgo  Ogletorp  was  returning  these  people  with  a  letter 
to  the  Governor  of  St.  Augustine,  with  directions  to  leave 
these  prisoners  at  that  place.  I  learned  from  the  French 
captain  that  the  schooner  in  which  he  had  come  is  the  same 
that  was  seen  on  the  fourteenth ;  that  on  account  of  the  bad 
weather  she  had  not  approached  the  shore  to  carry  out  the 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA     59 


order  of  Oglettorp  and  that  having  recognized  our  sloop, 
the    English    captain    had    taken    the    resolution    to    leave 
aboard  of  her  both  the  French  captain  and  the  prisoners. 
These  declared  that  they  had  been  kept  confined  and  de- 
prived of  all  communication.     The  French  captain,  a  rea- 
sonably just,  fair  man,  had  been  kept  on  board  of  the  bi- 
lander  which,  from  the  description  he  gave,  is  the  one  from 
this  place  which  they  captured  after  it  had  come  to  anchor 
in  the  river  of  St.  Simon.     He  was  not  permitted  to  set  foot 
on  shore  more  than  twice,  when  he  was  taken  before  a 
Board,  presided  over  by  a  Doctor,  to  make  a  declaration  in 
respect  of  certain  efifects  and  bilanders.     These  he  lost,  for 
the  verdict  was  adverse  although  it  was  established  that  he 
had  come  to  bring  supplies  to  the  garrison.     In  spite  of  the 
closeness  of  the  confinement  in  which  he  was  kept,  they 
nevertheless    treated    him    with    the    greatest    distrust    as 
though  he  had  been  an  enemy.     He  understood  that  Oglet- 
torp  had  not  the  forces  to  resist  ours  because,  all  told,  they 
have  not  more  than  six  hundred  English,  divided  between 
troops  and  farmers,  and  that  these  are  distributed  in  differ- 
ent posts.     He  relates  further  that  the  battery  of  the  city  or 
town  of  Frederica  is  dismounted  and  he  reports  the  deep 
poverty  in  which  they  are  living,  without  fresh  meat,  the  sol- 
diers without  money  and  without  any  relief,  except  that  a 
French  officer  has  a  few  sheep  and  cattle.     The  negro  of 
Espinosa,  however,  enjoyed  a  little  liberty  and  says  that  a 
storm  and  heavy  rains  have  gradually  destroyed  the  battery 
at  the  entrance  of  Gualquini,  so  that  he  saw  it,  at  least  so  he 
says,  fallen  over  on  one  side.     On  asking  the  French  captain 
what  opinion  Oglettorp's  people  had  formed  on  seeing  our 
seven  vessels  anchored  in  front  of  the  bar,  he  said,  that 
they  thought  it  was  the  privateer,  Estrada  (who  has  as  yet 
not  come  in  from  his  cruise),  with  a  few  prizes;  and  that 
the  captain  of  the  English  man-of-war,  whom  a  few  days 
before  he  had  met,  had  told  them  of  the  combat  which  he 
had  had  with  our  galley  and  the  boats  of  the  first  division, 
and  that  he  had  given  them  an  account  of  the  prisoners 
which  the  Spaniards  had  taken  from  them  at  the  Bar  of 
Mosquitos,  telling  them   that  they  had  come  with  stores 
for  the  garrison  escorted  by  the  galley;  so  that  it  seems 
they  have  not  perceived  the  purpose  for  which  our  expedi- 
tion is  intended.     The  letter  of  Oglettorp  to  the  Governor 
reduces  itself  to  communicating  to  him  the  fact  that  he 
is  returning  the  prisoners  aforementioned,  claiming  credit 


60         THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

for  having-  rescued  them  from  the  power  of  the  Indians 
who  had  captured  them  ;  and  to  saying-  that  the  others  which 
he  holds  in  his  power  must,  by  order  of  the  king,  his  mas- 
ter, be  sent  to  London,  Don  Romualdo  Morales  being  of  the 
number ;  and  makes  frivolous  excuses  for  not  having  before 
given  an  answer  to  our  Governor. 

June  18th. 

We  drew  up  plans  of  battle,  divided  the  troops  into  col- 
umns, and  selected  the  reserve ;  the  three  naval  lieutenants, 
Don  Vicentte  Quintta,  Don  Carlos  Regio,  and  the  Mar- 
quess de  Casinas,  were  appointed  to  take  over  as  many 
other  pickets*  belonging  to  the  Captains  Don  Bernardo 
Quena  and  Don  Gregorio  Bermejo,  on  duty  as  regimental 
staft  captains,**  and  that  of  Don  Francisco  Palafox,  chos- 
en as  aide-de-camp  by  the  commanding  general.  Ballast 
was  sent  out  to  the  frigate,  Escalera,  assigned  to  the  fleet 
by  direction  of  the  commanding  general  and  in  agreement 
with  his  royal  officers  and  the  agents  of  the  Royal  Ex- 
chequer. Besides  we  continued  to  send  out  water  and  I 
made  a  distribution  of  cartridges,  at  the  rate  of  twenty 
rounds  for  the  disembarkation,  and  ordered  them  to  be 
distributed  to  each  vessel  by  the  adjutants.!  I  also  ordered 
the  issue  of  183  muskets  and  bayonets  to  the  militia  but 
these  orders  could  not  all  be  carried  out  because  there  was 
not  time  during  this  day  on  account  of  the  great  distance  to 
be  covered  and  because  the  tide  did  not  serve.  The  supply 
of  water  has  continued  and  the  ballast  for  the  frigate  of 
Escalera.  I  ordered  the  negro  of  Espinosa  to  be  held  a 
prisoner  with  directions  that  he  should  be  allowed  to  speak 
to  no  one  because  I  suspected  some  knavery. 


•  The  plqiiete  at  the  beginning  of  the  XVIII  century,  was  a  provisional 
and  umporary  company  forming  up  on  the  left,  and  made  up  of  men  drawn 
from  all  the  companies.  Later  in  the  text  It  has  Its  regular  meaningr  of 
picket,    I.    e.    guard. 

••  Sargenios  inaiores,  for  mayores.  In  modern  form].  The  anrgento 
mayor  was  charRcd  with  duties  of  administration,  accountability,  inspection 
and  discipline.  He  took  rank  after  the  captains,  but  they  nevertheless  were 
under  his  onlerB  In  mattf-rs  relating  to  his  office.  The  title  is  rather  that  of 
an    office   than   of   a   grade.     There    is   no    English    equivalent. 

t  Ayjtdant^,  In  nil  probability  the  assistants  of  the  sarffentos  mayores, 
who  were  called  (ujiirlniiles.  The  term  used  in  the  translation  "adjutant," 
muBt  not  he  taken  to  mean  what  we  actually  understand  by  it  In  the  military 
•ervlce,  but  Is  used  in  a  more  general  way.  Strictly  speaking  we  have  no 
English  equivalent  for  avidante,   any  more  than  we  have  for  itargento    mayor. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA     61 

June  19th. 

I  have  drawn  up  the  order  of  disembarkation  and  the 
stores  have  been  transported  to  the  frigate  of  Escalera  for 
the  troops  which  are  embarking,  namely,  the  detachment 
of  Don  Gregorio  Aldana.  The  schooner,  Guaraia,  has  suc- 
ceeded in  entering  this  port.  It  has  on  board  a  part  of  the 
supply  of  stores  for  the  schooners  and  other  vessels  of 
the  garrison  [of  Saint  Augustine].  The  baggage  of  the 
oflficers  of  the  pickets  has  been  ordered  on  board,  and  the 
supply  of  water  and  ballast  to  the  boats  has  continued  with 
the  greatest  energy,  each  of  these  being  about  completed. 

Today  we  saw  a  schooner  to  which  chase  was  given,  by 
order  of  the  senior  naval  officer,  by  the  bilander  of  Fide 
and  the  Honduran.  They  did  not  succeed  in  overtaking 
it,  but  we  have  formed  the  opinion  that  it  is  the  same  one 
which  brought  the  Frenchman  and  prisoners  sent  by  Ogle- 
torp  and  that  it  has  come  to  spy  us  out  and  observe  our 
movements. 

June  20th. 

While  we  were  completing  the  distribution  of  stores,  I 
passed  the  day  writing  to  the  Captain  General  of  Havana, 
giving  his  Excellency  an  account  of  all  that  had  passed  up 
to  the  present  day.  Orders  have  been  given  for  the  em- 
barkation tomorrow  afternoon  of  the  troops  of  the  garri- 
son, and  that  they  should  set  out  at  the  first  tide  and  come 
to  anchor  near  the  flagship,  in  order  that  each  may  receive 
its  sailing  instructions  from  the  naval  commander  and 
that  there  may  be  nothing  more  to  do  than  to  put  to  sea. 
Today  we  saw  a  brigantine  which  we  have  decided  must 
be  that  of  Estrada,  because  it  seems  suspicious  that  so  large 
a  vessel  ofif  this  bar  could  have  disappeared.  We  are  copy- 
ing out  the  order  of  disembarkation  in  order  that  each  one 
of  the  vessels  may  have  its  own  copy. 

June  21st. 

Yesterday  we  finished  supplying  the  vessels  of  the  garri- 
son with  their  proper  stores.  The  watering  of  the  ships, 
too,  has  been  finished.  At  dawn,  we  saw  a  brigantine 
which  we  decided  to  be  the  same  as  that  seen  yesterday ; 
and  in  fact,  at  one  o'clock  of  the  afternoon  it  anchored  ofif 
our  bar,  and  we  discovered  it  to  be  that  of  Estrada.  At  six  of 
the  afternoon  the  ship's  writer  came  ashore  with  a  letter 
from  the  said  Estrada,  giving  us  an  account  of  what  had 
happened   on   his   cruise.      He   reports   having  captured   a 


62         THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

schooner  of  rice  which  has  already  arrived  here  and  a  packet 
boat,  and  reports  further  having  been  attacked  by  a 
Carolina  war  vessel  on  the  third  instant  at  about  six  of 
the  afternoon,  when  the  combat  opened;  that  it  lasted  un- 
til midnight  and  that  each  damaged  the  other  more  or  less, 
with  the  loss  on  the  part  of  the  Spaniards  of  one  man  killed 
and  four  wounded;  among  them,  the  captain  in  the  hand^ 
the  lieutenant  in  the  head,  and  two  sailors.  As  for  the  loss 
of  the  English,  he  knew  nothing.  He  judges  merely  that 
the  damage  must  have  been  great  because  the  fire  of  all 
sorts  which  he  opened  on  him  was  incessant,  and  because 
the  Englishman,  dropping  astern,  was  the  first  to  cease 
the  combat,  so  that  this  action  may  be  compared  to  that 
which  Don  Pedro  Goycochea  had  with  the  English  frigate 
between  the  islands  of  San  Domingo  and  Porto  Rico,  be- 
cause the  circumstances  were  almost  the  same.  He  also 
says  that  he  has  learned  from  prisoners  that  two  hundred 
sailors  have  been  sent  from  Boston  to  re-enforce  the  fleet 
of  Admiral  Vernon  which  it  is  known  was  occupied,  ac- 
cording to  current  reports,  before  Cartagena;  and  that  it 
was  common  rumor  that  additional  forces  were  to  come 
out  to  join  those  of  Oglettorp  and  that  if  these  should 
arrive,  he  would  doubtless  use  them  before  St.  Augustine ; 
that  Carolina  was  not  of  a  mind  to  give  the  help  which 
Oglettorp  was  seeking,  unless  there  should  be  some  order 
from  the  King  to  that  efTect,  and  the  command  of  the 
expedition  committed  to  some  other  chief. 

The  brigantine  comes  in  short  of  meat  and  for  that  rea- 
son cannot  form  part  of  the  convoy ;  only  as  soon  as  it  shall 
have  entered,  we  shall  try  to  shift  its  arms  and  equipment 
to  the  guard  schooner,  and  if  Captain  Estrada  shall  have  re- 
covered from  his  wound,  we  shall  give  him  the  command 
of  her.     This  night  we  had  squalls,  winds  and  showers. 

June  22nd. 

Frequent  rains,  squalls  and  thunderstorms  have  today 
impeded  the  embarkation  of  the  troops,  nor  was  Estrada's 
brigantine  able  to  come  in;  and  as  the  horizons  indicated 
foul  weather,  all  the  pilots  were  assembled  and  gave  their 
opinion  that  the  vessels  should  not  set  out,  but  should  re- 
main until  tomorrow  when  the  embarkation  would  take 
place  and  the  ships  put  forth,  but  only  if  the  weather 
should  be  good. 

In  a  gazette  from  Boston,  brought  by  Estrada,  there  is 
a  ridiculous  article  as  follows:     It  says  that  a  gentleman. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA      63 

of  Georgia,  who  had  arrived  in  Boston  on  the  26th  of 
March,  had  given  trustworthy  news  that  General  Oglet- 
torp  with  eight  hundred  men  had  gone  to  lay  siege  to  St. 
Augustine,  that  among  these  men  he  had  three  hundred 
Indians  who  had  resolved  to  burn  the  place;  and  he  added 
that  the  motive  of  Ogleltorp's  expedition  was  that  he  had 
got  news  that  the  Spaniards  were  weak  and  in  great  need 
of  stores,  caused  by  the  presence  of  Admiral  Vernon's 
fleet  in  the  waters  of  Cuba. 

June  23rd. 
Although  we  had  thought  that  today  we  could  set  forth, 
the  morning  dawned  with  a  strong  wind  from  the  north- 
east, accompanied  by  squalls  and  showers,  and  the  water 
on  the  bar  had  become  so  rough  that  it  was  impossible  to 
cross  it ;  notwithstanding  which  two  attempts  were  made, 
in  order  to  bring  in  the  brigantine  of  Estrada,  which  is 
causing  us  concern,  on  account  of  its  bad  condition.  It 
fired  a  few  guns  of  distress  but  it  was  not  possible  to 
reach  it.  At  ten  of  the  morning,  we  had  the  unhappy 
news  that  Father  Domingo,  chaplain  of  the  packet  boat 
"Diligente,"  and  a  sailor  of  its  crew,  who  were  going  on 
board,  had  been  drowned  at  the  exit  of  the  bar,  but  that 
fortunately  the  vicar  general  of  the  expedition  had  mirac- 
ulously saved  his  life  by  happily  seizing  hold  of  the  launch 
and  keeping  himself  on  it  until  she  came  ashore.  We  have 
also  seen  ashore  on  the  beach  a  boat  without  knowing 
which  boat  it  is,  nor  how  many  people  have  been  drowned. 
This  afternoon  it  became  calm  so  that  the  Commanding 
General  assembled  the  commanding  officers  and  naval 
officers  and  the  pilots  of  the  garrison,  and  requested  that 
each  should  give  his  opinion  in  respect  of  our  sallying 
forth,  as  it  was  important  that  our  trip  should  be  short, 
and  clear  that  the  inconveniences  of  delay  would  be  se- 
rious ;  in  general,  each  person  should  give  reasons  for  and 
against.  The  pilots  were  unanimous  in  declaring  that  it 
was  not  possible  to  cross  the  bar  as  long  as  the  sea  was 
still  up,  ao-itated  as  it  was  by  the  squalls  and  wind  that 
had  prevailed.  After  various  reflections  on  the  subject, 
and  after  taking  into  account  the  fact  that  the  small  boats, 
which  were  to  follow  the  fleet  without  losing  land  from 
view  were  absolutely  necessary  to  the  success  of  our  op- 
erations, and  therefore  should  not  expose  themselves  to 
separation  from  the  convoy,  on  account  of  the  contrary 
winds  that  had  been  blowing,  and  the  great  variation  of 


64         THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


the  weather,  and  considering  further  that  the  journey 
from  this  point  to  the  hostile  coast  was  so  short,  it  was  de- 
cided to  be  absolutely  necessary  that  we  should  set  out  in 
settled  weather.  Accordingly,  all  minds  were  of  the  opin- 
ion that  we  should  wait  until  things  were  safe  and  that  if 
the  wind  should  shift  tomorrow  we  should  go  out.  With 
this  opinion,  the  order  was  given  that  at  the  beat  of  the 
drum  everyone  should  go  on  board  his  ship. 

[End  of  Arredondo's  Journal.] 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  65 


DETAILS  OF  WHAT  OCCURRED  IN  THE  PRESENT  EX- 
PEDITION,  ENTRUSTED  TO  THE  CARE  OF  BRIGA- 
DIER DON  MANUEL  DE  MONTIANO,  FROM  THE  15TH 
DAY  OF  JUNE,  ON  WHICH  THE  CONVOY  ARRIVED 
FROM  HAVANA  AT  ST.  AUGUSTINE,  THE  WHOLE  BE- 
ING  CONTAINED  IN  A  JOURNAL,  KEPT  BY  THE  MAR- 
QUESS OF  CASINAS,  ETC. 


Colonel  Don  Francisco  Rubiani  and  the  Engineer-in- 
Chief,  Don  Antonio  Arredondo,  were  immediately  put 
ashore  and  set  to  work  to  draw  up  the  plan  of  battle,  giv- 
ing at  the  same  time  directions  to  provide  the  vessels  with 
water.  As,  on  account  of  the  distance  and  difficulty  of 
crossing  the  bar,  the  dispatch  desirable  in  this  case  is  al- 
most impossible,  our  departure  has  been  greatly  delayed. 
Moreover,  we  wished  to  wait  in  order  to  determine  the 
effects  of  the  moon,  in  respect  of  which,  an  unfavorable 
forecast  had  been  made. 

The  intervening  time  was  spent,  however,  in  inspecting 
all  the  tools  and  implements  and  ammunition  brought  by 
the  vessels  of  the  convoy  for  the  purpose  of  adding  to  them, 
if  necessary,  from  those  in  the  garrison,  and  so  it  was  dis- 
covered that  the  nine  hundred  water  jars  were  defective, 
which  it  was  decided  to  repair  along  with  the  smaller  ves- 
sels of  all  the  ships.  On  the  26th  the  pickets  of  this  garri- 
son embarked,  600  strong,  after  the  Lord  Bishop  had  preach- 
ed them  a  sermon.  On  the  28th  the  commanding  officers 
went  on  board,  but  a  strong  wind  having  come  out  of  the 
west-northwest,  and  maintained  itself  until  the  30th,  the 
smaller  boats,  such  as  launches,  pirogues  and  galliots, 
which  carried  water  for  only  four  days,  were  compelled 
to  return  to  shore  to  renew  their  supply.  This  de- 
layed our  departure,  which  finally  took  place  the  first  of 
July  at  7  :00  in  the  morning,  with  wind  east-southeast.  We 
had  determined  in  orders  and  arranged  that  the  disembar- 
kation should  take  place  outside  of  the  Port  of  Gualquini, 
and  beyond  the  range  of  its  guns,  but  in  consequence  of  the 


66  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

representations  made  by  Don  Antonio  Castaneda  and  of  the 
excellent  reasons  he  gave  in  favor  of  the  advantage  of  forc- 
ing the  port,  orders  were  given  to  this  end.  The  convoy 
was  composed  of  fifty-two  vessels,  which  remained  together 
only  the  following  day,  because  the  wind  coming  on  from 
the  west-northwest,  with  considerable  force  and  raising 
a  considerable  sea,  four  galliots  and  the  pirogues  were 
compelled  to  seek  the  shelter  of  the  coast  as  best  they 
could ;  and  as  the  wind  held  with  great  tenacity  in  the  west, 
north  and  the  northwest,  and  as  there  were  frequent 
squalls,  it  resulted  that  various  vessels  were  separated 
from  the  convoy ;  of  these,  two  pirogues  filled  with  In- 
dians and  convicts  succeeded  in  returning  and  were  taken 
in  tow;  one  by  the  pink,  San  Lorenzo,  and  the  other  by 
the  frigate  of  Flecha. 

On  the  9th,  having  made  land  at  sunset  and  the  wind 
having  fallen,  we  cast  anchor  in  fourteen  fathoms  of  water 
at  which  time  we  heard  two  cannon  shots  and  at  the  change 
of  countersign,  two  more,  which  helped  us  set  our  course 
for  the  nearest  jioint  to  the  Port  of  Gualquini,  otherwise 
known  as  St.  Simon. 

At  half  past  four  of  the  afternoon  on  the  10th,  we  an- 
chored in  ten  fathoms  about  two  leagues  from  the  coast 
and  about  three  to  the  north  of  the  port.  All  the  vessels 
had  arrived  so  short  of  water  that  in  some  of  them  only  a 
pint  could  be  given  out :  there  being  none  among  the  thir- 
ty-three which  had  succeeded  in  anchoring  in  these  waters 
which  could  give  any  help  unless  it  Avas  the  flagship  and 
the  packet  boat,  which  was  ordered  to  make  a  return  of  its 
water  supply  with  orders  to  give  none  out.  Water  was 
issued  every  day  by  the  flagship  in  half  rations. 

The  enemy  made  a  show  at  various  times  of  sallying 
forth  from  the  port  as  far  as  the  range  of  the  guns  of  their 
castle.  Five  bilanders  would  come  out  and  anchor  and 
then  return  after  a  short  time.  In  these  attempts  or  ob- 
servations they  passed  the  entire  afternoon  as  well  as  in 
firing  various  guns,  which  we  inferred  was  for  the  purpose 
of  testing  their  batteries.  We,  ourselves,  did  nothing  else 
but  send  out  Don  Antonio  Arredondo  in  the  boat  of  the 
flagship  to  reconnoiter  the  shore  and  make  soundings  in 
order  to  determine  if  our  vessels  could  get  closer  in  shore, 
and  thus  facilitate  the  disembarkation,  in  case  we  should 
find  it  convenient  to  attempt  it  here.  Having  noticed  be- 
fore sunset  that  a  launch  had  set  out  from  the  port  and  was 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  67 


pressing  forward  under  sail  and  oar  in  the  direction  of  our 
flagship,  she  ran  up  the  English  ensign  and  pennants,  the 
other  vessels  of  the  convoy  doing  the  same  thing,  but 
nothing  came  of  it,  for  in  a  short  time  the  aforesaid  launch 
retired.  At  8:00  in  the  evening,  the  launch  of  the  packet 
boat  having  met  the  boat  of  the  flagship  which  had  sallied 
forth  for  the  purpose  of  sounding,  they  fired  on  each  other 
until  a  mutual  recognition  caused  the  fire  to  be  stopped, 
fortunately  without  any  damage  having  occurred  on  either 
side.  During  this  night,  we  heard  from  time  to  time  a  few 
hostile  cannon  shots  of  the  enemy. 

On  the  11th,  the  galley  joined  and  a  bilander,  one  of 
those  which  had  fallen  out  of  the  convoy,  as  well  as  a 
barge.  The  wind  continuing  fresh  from  the  W.  W.  S.  W. 
and  S.  W.  with  frequent  squalls  and  high  seas,  prevented 
our  entrance.  Our  desire  to  execute  this  movement  in- 
creased with  the  complaints  of  the  lack  of  water.  This 
want  was  met  in  the  manner  already  given,  for  no  water 
could  be  got  from  the  shore,  as  the  enemy  observed  our 
every  movement,  and  we  should  have  exposed  ourselves 
to  loss.  This  day  nothing  special  occurred,  unless  it  was 
the  usual  gun  shots  at  the  change  of  countersign  and  guard 
mounting:  there  were  some  others  too  during  the  course 
of  the  day. 

On  the  12th,  the  day  dawned  fair  and  so  the  command- 
ing general  set  the  signal  to  begin  the  disembarkation. 
With  this  end  in  view,  a  few  boats  with  troops  on  board 
set  out  to  take  a  position  astern  of  the  flagship,  when 
there  came  up  a  squall  so  violent  that  it  was  only  with 
much  labor  and  difficulty  that  the  vessels  were  able  to  re- 
sume their  positions.  We  now  recognized  that  any  wind 
from  the  outside,  even  one  blowing  only  a  short  time,  rais- 
ed a  great  sea  and  surf;  that  we  were  compelled  to  keep  our 
vessels  at  a  great  distance  from  shore  because  there  was 
not  sufficient  water  closer  in  for  the  larger  ones ;  further, 
that  the  absence  of  the  launches,  boats  and  pirogues  from 
the  garrison  of  St.  Augustine  as  well  as  of  the  four  gal- 
liots which  the  weather  had  separated  from  us,  made  an  or- 
derly landing  impossible.  Therefore,  Don  Antonio  Cas- 
taiieda  announced  it  as  his  opinion  that  the  port  should  be 
forced,  adding  to  the  excellent  reasons  already  given,  the 
no  less  excellent  consideration  that  our  vessels  were  in 
strong  peril  and  exposed  to  some  fatal  damage,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  severity  of  the  season  which  gave  us  no  hope 


68       THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


of  anything  but  bad  weather.  In  consequence,  it  was  de- 
termined to  force  the  port  and  to  wait  for  this  purpose 
for  suitable  weather.  The  winds  continued  west-south- 
west and  west,  with  great  strength  and  tenacity,  raising 
a  heavy  sea  and  accompanied  by  squalls  until  the  fifteenth, 
when  we  hoisted  anchor  to  challenge  the  fort.  The  wind 
having  fallen,  we  anchored  closer  in,  having  gained  some- 
thing like  two  leagues.  Until  that  particular  day,  noth- 
ing special  occurred  unless  it  was  the  continued  clamor 
for  water,  a  need  that  was  met  by  the  flagship  and  the 
packet  boat.  The  enemy  continued  his  practice  of  firing 
his  guns  at  the  change  of  the  countersign,  when  they 
mounted  the  guard,  except  the  fourteenth  day,  when  from 
ten  in  the  evening  until  eleven,  many  flashes  were  seen  on 
the  beach  and  from  eleven  till  twelve  many  cannon  shots 
were  heard,  as  many  as  fifty  having  been  counted.  Con- 
siderable doubt  existed  as  to  what  could  have  occasioned 
so  unusual  a  thing,  but  according  to  the  best  of  our  infer- 
ences, we  decided  that  it  must  be  our  four  galliots  cannon- 
ading Fort  San  Pedro. 


JOURNAL  FROM  THE  DAY  WHEN  THE  PORT  OF  GUAL- 

QUINT,    OTHERWISE    KNOWN    AS    ST.    SIMON,    WAS 
FORCED. 


July  16th. 

At  seven  in  the  morning,  the  entire  convoy  hoisted  an- 
chor, and  as  there  was  not  water  enough,  anchored  at  the 
entrance  of  the  port  at  a  distance  of  a  league  and  a  half  to 
wait  until  the  tide  should  rise  and  thus  make  the  entrance 
surer.  The  galley  and  two  galliots  accordingly  were  or- 
dered to  sound  the  channel  and  while  so  employed  were 
fired  on  by  the  enemy.  This  fire  they  returned  without 
having  received  any  damage.  They  then  withdrew,  having 
been  recalled  by  the  commanding  general  at  three  in  the 
afternoon,  because  now  wc  had  had  two  days  of  a  growing 
tide  with  a  fresh  wind  astern  and  a  smooth  sea.  We  sailed 
straight  into  the  harbor,  following  the  pre-arranged  order, 
and  using  as  buoys  the  galley  and  the  galliots  which  had 
been  sent  forward  for  this  purpose.  These,  as  soon  as  the 
flagship  had  passed  them,  used  all  diligence  to  get  in  closer 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA     69 

and  open  fire  under  the  gfuns  of  the  fort,  and  of  a  man- 
of-war  schooner,  and  of  four  bilanders  which  were  eche- 
loned out  from  it.  From  this  time,  the  enemy  began  to 
answer,  maintaining  the  fire  with  the  greatest  intensity 
from  the  time  the  flagship  entered  until  the  last  vessel 
passed.  This  vessel  was  the  pink  of  ParreSo,  which  unfor- 
tunately had  gone  aground  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy, 
who  continued  to  fire  incessantly  during  the  time  of  one 
sand  glass;  but  the  tide  rising,  the  boat  got  off,  having  lost 
only  one  man  killed  and  three  wounded  and  received  much 
damage  in  its  hull  and  two  cannon  shots  between  wind  and 
water.  The  whole  convoy  was  at  anchor  inside  the  har- 
bor at  half  after  five  of  the  afternoon,  and  it  was  discov- 
ered that  the  total  damage  received  in  the  rest  of  it  was 
confined  to  the  pink  of  Acosta,  three  men  killed  and  one 
wounded;  to  the  pink  hospital,  Lieut.  De  Berroa  wounded; 
in  the  bilander,  one  wounded ;  in  the  galley,  three.  In  a 
few  vessels  some  of  the  foremen  had  been  cut  down  and 
the  bilander  of  Don  Pedro  de  La  Madrid  had  had  its  mast 
shot  away.  As  we  feared  that  the  enemy  might  during 
this  night  bring  up  some  guns,  and  after  constructing  a 
battery  on  the  shore  opposite  the  point  where  the  vessels 
were  anchored,  do  them  some  damage,  we  decided  to  land 
the  troops  immediately,  to  which  end  the  commanding 
general  at  six  o'clock  set  a  signal.  It  being  now  after  sun- 
set, as  many  as  eighteen  boats,  most  of  them  very  small, 
now  pushed  ofif  from  the  flagship.  Some  of  these  contain- 
ed only  six  men  each,  because  the  sea  and  wind  being  con- 
trary allowed  no  more.*  The  three  barges,  however, 
brought  oflF  the  companies  of  grenadiers,  but  these  came 
last  of  all  on  account  of  the  struggle  against  contrary  winds 
and  tides,  landing  three  hours  after  every  one  else.  This 
first  landing  of  500  men  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Don  Antonio  Salgado.  There  was  no  resistance, 
but  on  account  of  the  night  there  was  some  disorder  which 
may  always  be  expected  on  such  occasions.  Fifty  men, 
all  told,  had  disembarked  by  seven  in  the  evening,  the  rest 
having  come  on  immediately  afterward,  except  the  men  in 
the  launches.  After  setting  foot  ashore,  the  troops  formed 
up  in  three  ranks,   throwing  out  advanced  sentinels  and' 


•  These  words  are  followed  In  the  MS.  by  the  expression  "en  los  corto 
buqaes".  The  meaning  of  this  compound  word  is  unknown;  the  word  Itself 
c*Q  be  found  In  no  Spanish  dictionary.  In  copying  It,  the  scribe  has  m«d» 
an  erasure,   as  though  he  were  not  sure  himself  of  the  original. 


70         THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

posting  a  few  pickets  in  advantageous  positions.  The 
movement  was  supported  by  the  galley,  galliots  and  packet 
boat,  which  before  the  boats  took  on  the  men,  swept  the 
shore  and  beach  with  their  fire,  and  the  immediate  point, 
where  the  landing  was  to  be,  maintaining  the  fire  until 
the  men  had  gone  ashore.  At  ten  o'clock  came  the  com- 
panies of  grenadiers;  and  at  half  past  eleven  the  command- 
ing general,  Don  Manuel  Montiano;  the  second  in  com- 
mand, Don  Francisco  Rubiani ;  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  and 
Engineer-in-Chief-  Don  Antonio  Arredondo.  At  this  time 
there  must  have  been  ashore  about  a  thousand  men  who, 
as  they  continued  to  arrive,  formed  up,  as  already  stated. 
Between  ten  and  twelve,  we  saw  a  few  fires  started  by  the 
enemy,  which  as  far  as  we  could  make  out,  seemed  to  be 
three  bilanders  and  something  else  larger.  From  the  great 
blaze  which  arose,  we  thought  this  last  must  be  some  pow- 
der magazine  which  they  had  blown  up.  At  this  hour, 
came  the  Indians  who  had  been  sent  out  to  reconnoiter. 
These  declared  that  they  had  entered  a  few  houses  at  some 
distance  from  the  fort  but  had  found  them  unoccupied; 
they  brought  back  with  them  a  few  trifles,  such  as  dishes 
and  fruit.  Nothing  especial  occurred  this  night,  nor  did 
we  undertake  any  movement,  nor  did  we  observe  anything 
else  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  than  what  has  already  been 
set  forth.     This  disembarkation  continued  until  daylight. 

July  17th. 

At  two,  we  sent  out  the  Indians  again.  They  returned  at 
four,  with  the  news  that  the  enemy  had  abandoned  the  fort 
and  bringing  back  with  them  a  few  weapons  and  some  mer- 
chandise from  a  bilander,  which  the  enemy  had  left  loaded 
with  supplies  of  some  value.  The  companies  of  grenadiers 
were  now  sent  out  to  occupy  the  said  fort,  and  at  six  o'clock 
the  entire  body  took  up  the  march  along  the  beach  where 
we  recognized  the  three  bilanders  that  had  been  burnt, 
whose  cargo  must  have  consisted  of  flour  and  meat,  be- 
cause we  found  many  barrels  on  the  beach.  These  stores 
however  profited  but  few,  for  in  their  keen  desire  to  find 
stuff  of  any  value  whatever,  the  Indians  had  spoiled  them; 
recognizing  that  the  same  thing  had  happened  to  the  armed 
bilander  at  the  hands  of  the  said  Indians  as  well  as  of 
the  sailors  who  had  sacked  it,  an  ofificer  was  detached  with 
a  guard  to  preserve  whatever  he  could,  and  orders  were 
given  to  the  agent  of  the  exchequer  to  make  an  inventory 


-JK  *-"        S    «  "■  «.    at      .    J»    .  »« 
-"•   -   All*"      -   ^         *  "  *«    » 


Plar^oMa.  da,, dad,:- 


"f.  \S-S^i'' 


ill:?j¥;■;.:i•^':■e^>r^ 


f^-: 


JfH^.; 


I.cijcihi— 

Clianiifl  IcatliiiK  o\ 

cr  the  bar: 

C 

iii  depth  in  fnilion 

2*  dimiu- 

iihes  to  3  at  hall 

idc. 

ScitU-mcnl  forlilit-'i 

by  a  bai- 

ury   of    16   guns.  S 

-  pounders. 

and  11  houses  of  boards  ami 

palms,  called   Fort 

Frederica. 

The     RivL-r    of    S; 

m    Simon 

leading  to  the  to\s 

n  of  Frcd- 

Careening  ground 

•*  Road    joining 

lu-    scltlc 

men!   and   carceni 

e  ground. 

Tidal   inlets. 

River   leadiii«   t.. 

h.     n.ir   i.i 

Whales. 

island  of  Sp;.rr,.» 

11,.!-.., 

of  WhnU-s. 

Sawmill    of    the 

1  ■.Ji-I, 

•  The  letter  i;  il.. 


'<iend  of  till'  Scale— 


1     plicate.     Havana.  M.iy  15,  173;. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA      71 

of  whatever  should  be  found.  Similarly,  on  finding  that 
the  schooner  and  man-of-war  had  succeeded  in  escaping 
during  the  night,  the  naval  commander,  Don  Antonio  Cas- 
taSeda  placed  the  captain  of  the  galley,  Don  Domingo  de  la 
Cron,  under  arrest,  for  having  failed  to  execute  the  order 
given  him  to  approach  the  man-of-war  as  soon  as  the  land- 
ing should  have  taken  place,  and  fire  upon  him  during  the 
rest  of  the  night  in  order  to  prevent  his  escape.  We  found 
on  the  beach  an  Englishman  badly  wounded  in  the  back  by 
a  gunshot,  who  said  that  he  was  the  captain  of  the  bilander 
that  had  a  cargo.  He  declared  that  Obletorp  had  retired 
to  Frederica  with  five  hundred  men  and  that  he  himself 
could  give  no  account  of  Frederica  because  he  had  never 
been  there,  since  it  was  only  a  few  days  since  he  anchored 
in  Gualquini.  This  prisoner  was  sent  on  board  the  hospital 
ship  to  be  cured. 

The  troops  had  now  got  up  to  the  fort  and  orders  were 
given  to  reach  the  northern  entrance  by  marching  under 
the  cover  of  some  tall  and  thick  live  oaks  found  here  and 
also  of  the  plantations  or  settlements  of  neat  houses  which 
surround  the  neighborhood.  The  soldiers  were  forbid- 
den under  pain  of  death  to  go  more  than  two  hundred  paces 
beyond  their  posts.  Inside  the  fort,  we  found  another 
Englishman,  a  sailor,  who  could  give  no  more  account  of 
things  than  the  wounded  man.  We  also  found  another 
man  dead,  killed  by  our  Indians,  who,  according  to  their 
custom,  had  scalped  him.  These  declared  that  they  had 
done  this  because  he  had  resisted  them  with  his  sword. 
The  fort  is  made  wholly  of  earth,  composed  of  four  cur- 
tains, with  a  salient  in  the  midst  of  each.  It  has  a  ditch 
and  a  good  stockade  with  a  glacis,  and  on  the  glacis,  joined 
to  the  stockade,  a  parapet  of  barrels  filled  with  earth.. 
There  were  besides  a  few  huts  and  some  large  magazines, 
one  of  which  had  been  blown  up,  for  we  came. upon  three 
burnt  eighteen-pounders,  imperfectly  spiked,  whose  car- 
riages were  of  such  especial  construction  and  so  well  de- 
signed that  two  men  sufficed  to  maneuver  them;  one  of 
these  had  been  dismounted  by  a  cannon  shot  from  one  of 
our  vessels.  We  also  found  six  six-pounders,  five  of 
which  had  been  imperfectly  spiked,  and  one  left  unspiked ; 
and  inside  of  a  budge-barrel  190  loaded  handgrenades,  and 
a  number  of  musket  balls ;  among  the  remains  of  the  mag- 
azines that  had  been  burnt,  we  found  various  kinds  of  iron 
wares,  shovels,  picks  and  some  barrel  hoops. 


72         THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


From  the  fort  to  a  block  house,  which  is  at  the  entrance 
of  the  harbor,  there  is  a  level  stretch  of  country,  more  or 
less  elevated,  which  commands  and  looks  out  on  the  beach, 
and  the  rim  or  entrance  of  the  woods.  This  stretch  could 
contain  eight  or  ten  thousand  men.  Here  we  found  six 
lines  of  houses  in  the  form  of  a  camp ;  among  these  were 
sixty  distant  only  one  pace  from  one  another.  These  we 
were  able  to  save,  because  we  succeeded  in  preventing  dis- 
order on  the  part  of  the  soldiers  who,  without  having  re- 
ceived orders  to  that  effect,  had  set  fire  to  sixty  other 
houses  along  the  lines  just  spoken  of  and  to  four  magazines 
of  supplies.  The  block  house  is  made  of  earth  with  a  body 
of  oyster  shell,  whitewashed  and  resembling  stone  work. 
It  is  composed  of  two  curtains,  and  of  an  arc  of  circle  on 
the  side  which  overlooks  the  entrance  of  the  port.  In  it 
we  found  a  shell  mortar,  nine  burnt-out  handgrenades,  a 
magazine  and  some  huts,  in  whose  remains  we  found  a 
few  grenades,  bullets  and  other  ammunition.  Beyond  this 
house,  at  a  short  distance  and  in  front  of  it,  had  been  con- 
structed a  battery.  This  battery  overlooked  the  entrance 
of  the  port  and  mounted  six  guns,  left  unspiked,  four  six- 
pounders  and  two  four-pounders.  In  the  sack  of  the 
houses,  of  the  camp  and  of  the  plantations,  there  had  been 
some  disorder,  as  is  usually  the  case  on  these  occasions,  in 
consequence  of  which  we  lost  some  cattle  and  goats  and 
considerable  quantities  of  rich  wines,  oils,  beer,  fine  but- 
ter, cheeses  and  other  delicacies,  to  say  nothing  of  a  great 
supply  of  hard  tack,  salt  meat  and  flour.  These,  which 
had  been  all  burnt,  might  have  been  very  useful  for  our 
maintenance.  We  continued  our  march  to  the  terrain  be- 
tween the  two  forts  where  we  took  up  a  formation  in  the 
shape  of  a  hammer,  sending  from  this  point  two  guards, 
one  to  each  fort ;  and  having  announced  to  the  troops  that 
whenever  there  was  a  call-to-arms,  the  site  just  mentioned 
should  be  the  assembling  point,  orders  were  given  to  re- 
turn to  the  sixty  houses  which  we  had  found  in  the  camp. 

July  18th. 

At  six  in  the  morning,  Don  Sebastian  SAnchez,  with  one 
of  the  companies  of  the  garrison  of  St.  Augustine  and  a 
picket  of  forty  men  was  sent  out  to  reconnoiter  the  road 
to  the  careening  ground,  as  he  was  considered  well  fitted 
for  this  duty.  Similarly  Don  Nicholas  Herniindez  with 
twenty-five    men    of    his    company    and    the    forty    Indian 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  73 

scouts,*  was  dispatched  alon^  the  road  through  tlK;  coun- 
try to  Frederica,  the  purpose  being  to  select,  according 
to  the  information  they  should  bring  back,  the  best  direc- 
tion in  which  to  attack  that  town. 

At  8  o'clock  we  found  a  dragoon  dead  at  the  edge  of  the 
woods,  and  some  other  people  who  were  accustomed  to  use 
in  these  parts,  brought  the  news  of  having  found  one  of 
our  Indians  dead.  As  some  hostile  Indians  also  brought  in 
this  news,  and  we  ourselves  heard  shots  fired  in  the  wood, 
the  troops  stood  to  arms  and  orders  were  given  to  send 
out  two  pickets  as  outposts.  At  ten  o'clock,  came  a  sol- 
dier sent  by  Don  Sebastian  Sdnchez  with  the  report  that 
he  had  found  a  very  narrow  trail,  and  that  Don  Antonio 
Barba,  who  was  in  command  of  the  reconnoitering  party 
had  succeeded  in  going,  say  two  leagues,  and  that  nearly 
the  entire  trail  was  nothing  but  a  path  passing  through 
thick  woods,  leading  at  intervals  into  a  few  savannahs  or 
clearings  of  a  swampy  nature,  and  going  across  on  a  cause- 
way made  of  brush  wood  no  wider  than  the  trail ;  that 
thus,  no  formation  whatever  was  possible  nor  any  manner 
of  march  than  single  file  because  any  one  leaving  the 
brush  wood  would  be  mired ;  and  he  reported  further  that 
two  miquelets**  and  a  corporal  with  two  Indians  whom  they 
had  found  and  carried  on  with  them,  and  four  grenadiers, 
had  noticed  on  the  path  something  novel,  consisting  of  a 
cut-log  stockade,  and  also  here  and  there  some  brush  wood 
arranged  like  a  parapet,  none  of  which  they  had  observed 
before.  He,  therefore,  halted  to  reconnoiter  the  place,  and 
at  the  same  time  they  began  to  fire  on  him  from  the  right 
and  the  left  without  his  being  able  to  see  anything  more 
than  the  flash  of  discharge.  This  fire  he  undertook  to  re- 
turn for  more  than  one  hour  without  knowing  whom  he 
was  engaged  with  because  of  the  thickness  of  the  forest. 
He  continued  firing  until  he  had  used  up  all  his  ammunition 
and  then  retired  in  good  order,  so  as  not  to  have  his  retreat 
cut  off,  seeing  that  the  ground  gave  all  the  advantage  to 
the  enemy.  In  this  action,  the  two  companies  lost  seven 
men  killed  and  eleven  wounded;  among  the  killed,  the 
ensign  of  the  company  of  Havana,  Don  Miguel  Bucardi. 
Themilitia  suffered  no  loss,  because  they  formed  the  rear 
guard,  which  was  not  reached  by  the  fire  of  the  enemy. 

•  Desplayadores,    the  word  is  not  found  In  the  dictionaries. 

♦*  According   to    Spanish    authorities,    the   miquelet    Is   the    ancestor   of    the 
modern    scout. 


74         THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

On  receiving  this  news,  the  troops  stood  to  arms  and  con- 
tinued from  this  night  to  sleep  on  them  in  hammer-like  for- 
mation. Two  other  advance  outposts  were  turned  out  and 
their  reserves  indicated  for  each  one. 

On  this  day,  we  noticed  a  few  pirogues  going  about  with 
people  of  the  island  on  board.  They  were  waiting  to  pass 
through  the  channel  that  goes  to  Frederica.  We  sent  out 
a  little  boat  with  six  sailors  through  this  channel  to  get 
water,  but  they  were  all  killed  by  hostile  Indians. 

July  19th. 

At  six,  the  Indians  were  sent  out  to  reconnoiter  the  for- 
est and  to  see  if  they  could  find  some  other  road  through 
it  to  Frederica.  At  9 :00  we  sent  out  a  small  boat  with 
eight  men  to  obtain  water  in  a  lagoon  at  a  short  distance 
from  the  shore  and  on  the  edge  of  the  woods  and  not  more 
than  half  a  cannon  shot  from  our  camp.  Two  of  these 
men  were  killed  by  hostile  Indians  and  the  remainder  fled 
precipitately  to  our  camp.  The  sailors  who  were  on  the 
shore  withdrew  when  they  heard  the  shots  so  close,  where- 
upon we  beat  to  arms  and  sent  out  two  pickets,  one  of 
grenadiers  along  the  beach,  and  the  other  through  the 
woods.  We  also  gave  an  order  to  the  galley  to  come  up 
close  and  fire  on  them.  But  all  these  orders  were  at  once 
cancelled  because  the  Indians  had  already  withdrawn.  At 
12:00  our  people  returned  without  having  discovered  any 
other  road  than  the  narrow  one,  and  without  having  seen 
any  enemy.  Having  heard  that  pirogues  of  the  Island 
of  Frederica  had  been  seen  plying  back  and  forth,  Indians 
were  sent  out,  who  returned  saying  that  there  were  no 
people  in  it,  and  that  they  had  burnt  houses  which  they 
had  entered  and  took  to  be  hospitals,  because  there  were 
many  beds  and  mattresses  and  a  few  saddles  which  they 
brought  back.  During  the  entire  day  eight  or  ten  re- 
turned, miquelets,  and  a  few  wounded  from  the  picket 
of  Sdnchez,  besides  a  few  disabled  by  the  rough  character 
of  the  woods ;  and  also  a  few  Indians  who  had  been  missing, 
but  not  one  of  whom  had  suflfered  any  harm  because  they 
returned  in  complete  health.  All  announced  that  they 
had  seen  Captain  SAnchez  beaten  with  blows  and  taken 
prisoner:  that  they  knew  nothing  of  the  captain  of  the 
miquelets,  Hernandez. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA      75 

July  20th. 

At  2:00  in  the  morning,  the  captain  of  miquelets,  Don 
Nicholas  Herndndez,  came  to  our  camp ;  confirming  the  in- 
formation just  given,  he  declared  that  he  had  tried  to 
escape  from  the  enemy  by  leaving  the  trail  and  hiding  in  the 
woods,  but  that  in  a  short  time  he  ran  into  two  men  who 
made  him  prisoner,  but  that  he  had  succeeded  in  freeing 
himself  from  them  because  he  recognized  that  they  were 
somewhat  careless,  and  the  hope  inspired  by  this,  gave 
such  an  impulse  to  his  valor  that  he  succeeded  in  carrying 
out  the  extreme  resolution  of  killing  them  both.  At  6:00 
we  sent  out  the  Indians  to  reconnoiter  the  woods  and  to 
find  some  other  road  to  Frederica.  We  began  to  demolish 
the  forts  and  to  carry  their  guns  on  board,  and  considering 
the  serious  inconveniences  resulting  from  not  having  com- 
pleted our  water  supply  through  the  risk  to  which  it  ex- 
posed our  people,  and  that  we  had  no  buckets  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  the  camp  or  the  castles,  for  which  reason  we 
had  lost  eight  men,  we  determined  to  make  a  sufficient 
number  to  give  a  supply  to  all  in  the  ditch  of  the  fort;  and 
so  we  have  begun  to  complete  our  water  supply. 

At  8:00  o'clock,  there  took  place  a  junta,  at  which  were 
present  Don  Antonio  de  Castaneda,  the  captains  of  the 
grenadiers  and  of  miquelets,  to  consider  certain  facts,  such 
as  the  position  of  the  trail  and  the  difficulties  of  the  for- 
ests. In  view  of  the  fact  that  they  had  decided,  and 
especially  the  captain  of  miquelets,  who  understands  wood- 
craft, that  another  road  ought  to  be  found,  before  un- 
dertaking to  attack  Frederica,  and  as  all  agreed  that  none 
other  had  been  found,  except  the  narrow  one,  and  that  an 
attack  along  this  line  was  impracticable,  it  was  decided 
to  send  the  galley  and  the  galliots  on  a  reconnaissance 
through  the  channel  that  leads  to  Frederica,  to  see  how 
much  depth  of  water  it  held,  and  to  find  a  point  more  suit- 
ed for  the  disembarkation,  and  further  that  the  engineer 
from  St.  Augustine  should  go  out  on  this  business. 

At  two  of  the  afternoon  there  arrived  at  this  port  a 
schooner  and  one  launch  with  one  hundred  men  of  the 
pickets  of  St.  Augustine.  These  had  been  separated  from 
the  convoy  by  bad  weather.  As  many  as  fifteen  vessels 
had  come  together;  among  them,  the  four  galliots  under 
the  command  of  the  naval  ensign,  Don  Francisco  Pineda. 
He  had  arrived  within  sight  of  this  port,  and  not  meeting 
any  of  our  vessels,  which  had  within   twenty-four  hours 


76         THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

been  sent  off  by  the  staff  officer  who  happened  to  be  in 
command  of  that  post,*  he  had  considered  it  proper  to  main- 
tain himself  in  those  waters  and  await  news  of  the  arrival 
of  our  convoy  at  Gualquini.  On  seeing  that  this  news  was 
delayed,  he  determined  to  send  on  the  vessels  already  men- 
tioned,** to  notify  the  commanding  general  of  all  these 
matters,  and  that  in  passing  he  had  engaged  Fort  San 
Pedro  for  one  hour ;  and  that  one  of  his  galliots  had  been 
attacked  by  four  large  pirogues  filled  with  troops,  one  of 
which  he  had  sunk  near  the  shore  where  her  people  suc- 
ceeded in  saving  themselves. 

At  4:00  of  the  afternoon  the  entire  body  of  troops  formed 
up  for  a  review  which  was  over  at  6 :00,  when  we  posted 
anew  the  usual  guards  in  the  form  which  has  always  pre- 
vailed, namely,  that  of  a  hammer.  At  prayers  we  saw  out 
on  the  beach  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  fort  a  few  Indians, 
wherefore  we  strengthened  its  guard  and  marched  out 
the  supports  to  re-enforce  the  outposts;  our  Indians  sallied 
to  explore  but  returned  in  two  hours  without  having  met 
anybody.  During  this  night,  there  were  two  false  alarms 
so  that  the  entire  body  remained  under  arms. 

July  21st. 

At  5 :00  in  the  morning,  we  began  to  entrench  the  out- 
posts with  barrels  of  earth  on  account  of  the  repeated  false 
alarms  which  kept  the  troops  continuously  anxious  and 
because  our  camp  had  no  protection  whatever  nor  artil- 
lery. This  had  not  been  put  ashore  because  we  were  await- 
ing from  one  day  to  another  the  arrangements  to  be  made 
to  march  on  Frederica.  At  6:00  we  sent  out  the  Indians 
to  explore  the  forests  and  at  the  same  time  we  sent  out  a 
launch  toward  the  Bar  of  Whales,  ordering  the  naval  ensign 
Don  Francisco  de  Pineda  to  proceed  by  the  interior  chan- 
nel, sounding  the  passes  as  far  as  that  port.  The  com- 
manding general  had  approved  his  conduct  in  the  operations 
which  he  reported  having  undertaken  with  the  convoy 
under  his  orders. 


•  What  po8t  Is  meant,  there  Is  no  means  of  determlnlnsr.  The  original 
passaKP  Is  more  or  less  obscun'  In  its  referencf-s.  The  vessels  inentioned 
are  those  reported,  ante  under  date  of  the  3d,  aa  belngr  compelled  to  soell 
•helter  under  the  coast. 

••  The   schooner  and   launch. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  71 

At  4:00  in  the  afternoon,  the  galley  and  the  galliots  re- 
turned from  a  reconnaissance  of  the  passes  leading  to  Fred- 
erica.  These  had  gone  out  in  the  morning  under  the  or- 
ders of  Naval  Lieutenant  Don  Adrian  Cantein.  He  de- 
clared that  the  channel  contained  enough  water  for  all  the 
boats,  but  that  at  a  little  more  than  half  tide,  the  least  depth 
he  had  found  was  20  spans,  the  three  vessels  entering  on 
the  same  front ;  that  on  arriving  within  cannon  shot  of 
Frederica  they  opened  on  him,  apparently  with  four  guns, 
eight-pounders,  and  fired  18  shots,  all  of  which  passed  over 
his  head,  and  four  bombs  so  well  aimed  that  they  fell  very 
close ;  that  there  is  a  stretch  to  be  reached  only  by  passing 
within  cannon  range,  but  that  beyond  they  would  be  shel- 
tered from  fire,  in  a  stretch  of  pine  woods,  clear,  open,  and 
level,  large  enough  for  the  formation  of  a  far  greater  num- 
ber of  troops  than  ours ;  but  that  he  was  in  doubt  whether 
the  beach  was  firm  enough  for  a  landing  because  grass 
land  was  seen  everywhere,  and  that  because  in  this,  quak- 
ing grass  is  usually  found ;  that  he  was  unable  to  examine 
into  this  matter  because  he  noticed  that  a  number  of  troops 
had  passed  in  pirogues  to  the  shore  of  the  island  and  that 
they  could  have  done  him  much  harm  by  musketry  fire, 
especially  as  he  had  received  orders  not  to  open  fire  him- 
self. Our  Indians  returned  without  finding  anything  in 
the  woods,  having  been  unable  to  catch  a  prisoner  or  a  de- 
serter who  could  give  us  any  light  or  any  help  toward 
forming  any  plans  for  the  attack  on  Frederica  with  the 
accuracy  that  is  desirable. 

July  22nd. 

Our  Indians  sallied  forth  at  6 :00  in  the  morning  to  re- 
connoiter  the  woods,  according  to  daily  custom.  As  doubt 
exists  in  our  minds  in  respect  of  the  firmness  of  the  ground 
for  the  landing  in  the  channels,  we  determined  again  to 
send  out  the  galley  and  two  galliots  for  the  determination 
of  this  matter.  The  commanding  general  turned  this  mat- 
ter over  to  the  senior  naval  officer,  Don  Antonio  Castafieda 
for  the  next  day. 

During  the  morning  there  came  in  a  miquelet,  whose 
declaration  confirms  the  others:  thirty-six  men  being 
missing  so  far  of  the  two  pickets  o£  Sanchez  and  Hernan- 
dez. This  man  told  us  that  he  had  come  along  the  beach, 
outside  of  the  port,  and  that  at  a  short  distance  from  the 
entrance  he  found  a  trench  with  three  loaded  six-pounder 


78  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


guns  ready  to  spike  and  that  he  thought  this  battery  had 
been  put  up  through  fear  lest  we  should  disembark  out- 
side. This  day  we  had  no  false  alarm,  nor  did  anything 
special  occur.  The  Indians  returned  like  all  the  rest  with- 
out having  accomplished  anything  whatever,  but  we  should 
not  be  astonished  that  they  should  refuse  to  expose  them- 
selves, seeing  that  they  are  rich,  for  a  few  have  more  than 
six  hundred  dollars  worth  of  loot.  These  are  the  only 
people  who  have  succeeded  in  getting  anything,  being  the 
first  ones  to  engage  in  loot. 

July  23d. 

The  junta  or  council  appointed  for  the  day  did  not  take 
place  because  Don  Antonio  Castaneda  was  sick  and  it  was 
put  off  until  the  following  day.  Today  there  was  nothing 
^especial.     We  continued  demolishing  the  forts. 

July  24th. 
At  2:00  in  the  morning  we  were  informed  by  our  out- 
posts that  they  had  heard  four  shots  and  at  once  we  heard 
in  our  camp  the  noise  of  drums,  for  which  reason  our  peo- 
ple stood  to  arms  and  we  re-enforced  the  outposts.  At 
3:00  there  came  into  our  camp  a  deserter,  a  prisoner,  of  the 
French  nation,  who  declared  that  Obletorpe  had  been 
marching  the  entire  night  with  500  men  with  the  design  of 
surprising  us,  and  that  having  heard  the  shots  which  put 
our  camp  on  its  guard,  he  thought  that  he  was  discovered 
and  therefore  withdrew,  beating  his  drums.  During  this 
time,  the  deserter  succeeded  in  making  his  escape.  He 
also  told  how  he  had  been  compelled  to  take  arms  and 
that  the  five  hundred  men  were  made  up  of  two  hundred 
regular  troops,  two  hundred  militia,  fifty  Indians  and  fifty 
sailors;  that  he  believed  that  the  entire  force  in  Frederica 
amounted  to  from  nine  hundred  to  one  thousand  men,  and 
that  help  was  expected  from  Boston,  from  which  news 
had  been  received;  that  he  [Oglethorpe]  had  sent  all  the 
women  fifty  leagues  inland,  and  that  in  the  affair  with  our 
two  pickets,  he  had  taken  about  twelve  prisoners,  among 
them.  Captain  Silnchez.  At  8:00  in  the  morning,  this 
prisoner  was  sent  on  board  the  Penelope.  At  the  same 
time  Don  Antonio  Arredondo  held  a  conference  with  Don 
Antonio  Castaneda  on  this  news  and  to  propose  action  that 
could  be  most  rapidl)'^  taken,  after  all  our  vessels  should 
have  taken  on  their  water. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  79 


Between  12 :00  o'clock  and  1 :00  of  this  day,  one  or  our 
outposts  reported  that  five  vessels  had  been  seen  to  the 
north,  apparently  headed  for  the  port.  In  a  short  time, 
we  could  make  them  out  and  having  taken  account  of  their 
build,  seeing-  that  they  were  only  two  or  three  leagues 
off,  we  saw  that  one  was  a  frigate  of  thirty  guns,  and  that 
there  were  two  packet  boats,  a  brigantine  and  a  sloop. 
This,  together  with  the  occurrence  of  the  morning  (al- 
though this,  like  the  arrival  of  the  French  prisoner  and  his 
declarations,  was  considered  an  artifice),  caused  us  to  fear 
not  so  much  what  was  involved,  nor  the  vessels  in  sight, 
as  the  vessels  which  might  follow  in  greater  force.  These 
reflections  were  held  to  justify  our  resolution  to  withdraw, 
which  was  forthwith  carried  out  in  the  best  form  and  order 
possible.  After  having  collected  everything  in  the  camp 
without  leaving  anything  that  had  been  disembarked,  the 
commanding  officers  were  taken  in  the  galliots  to  the 
Island,  named  after  the  castle,  facing  Gualquini,  the 
Penelope  having  been  the  first  to  cross  after  collecting 
her  crew ;  the  plan  was  to  journey  to  the  interior  chan- 
nels over  the  bars  of  San  Pedro  and  San  Juan  to  Florida, 
demolishing  on  the  way  the  forts  of  Bajeses  and  San 
Pedro.  Orders  were  consequently  given  the  troops 
to  disembark  and  march  two  leagues  in  order  to  ar- 
rive in  front  of  the  castle  or  fort  of  Bajeses,  and  to  all 
the  small  boats  to  pass  through  the  said  channels  as  soon 
as  the  tide  should  permit,  in  order  to  cross  over  the  troops 
to  the  said  fort  which  was  situated  on  another  island  in 
front;  but  because  the  orders  were  misunderstood,  some 
confusion  resulted,  for  some  entire  pickets  and  a  few  scat- 
tered men  not  having  come  up  with  any  boats,  followed  the 
convoy  of  CasteSeda.  About  fifteen  hundred  men  remain- 
ed this  night  on  the  island  in  question. 

The  naval  commander  Don  Antonio  Castaneda  ordered 
the  galley  to  approach  the  shore  and  endeavor,  if  it  could 
do  so  without  exposing  its  crew,  to  put  its  small  boat  over- 
board for  the  purpose  of  spiking  the  two  guns  lying  on  the 
shore  and  to  burn  certain  houses  if  it  were  decided  there 
were  no  enemies  in  the  camp.  This  was  done,  for  we  saw 
them  burning,  as  we  did  some  hostile  boats  which  could 
not  be  manned.  Don  Adrian  Cantein  carried  these  orders 
out.  At  the  same  time  this  commander  made  his  disposi- 
tions for  receiving  the  enemy,  drawing  up  his  strong  ves- 
sels in  line  and  withdrawing  more  to  the  interior  of  the 


80         THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

port  those  that  were  unarmed.  He  had  determined  to  set 
out  with  the  tide  on  the  following  day  if  the  weather  per- 
mitted, to  attack  the  enemy's  ships  outside  in  case  they  had 
not  first  come  in  themselves.  At  sunset  we  saw  them 
standing  for  the  outside  and  it  was  in  this  state  that  we 
left  the  houses  of  Gualquini  at  the  time  of  our  withdrawal. 

July  24th. 

At  3 :00  in  the  morning,  the  troops  took  up  the  march  and 
continued  along  the  beach  until  7  o'clock,  when  we  began  to 
make  out  a  few  of  our  vessels,  for  which  reason  we  halted 
in  order  to  wait  for  all  of  them,  because  now  we  could  see 
that  they  were  at  anchor  solely  to  wait  for  the  slight  tide. 
At  about  four  of  the  afternoon  a  schooner  having  come  up, 
the  company  of  grenadiers  of  the  battalion  of  Havana  went 
on  board  of  her  with  the  Indians  in  order  to  cross  over  to 
the  fort  of  Bajeses  which  was  considered  to  be  abandoned 
by  the  enemy,  so  that  having  taken  possession  of  it,  all 
disorder  should  be  prevented,  and  the  place  preserved  with 
its  magazmes  until  the  entire  body  of  troops  could  be 
brought  up,  and  other  directions  should  be  given.  At 
about  6 :00  of  the  evening,  the  vessels  which  had  been  at 
anchor  moved  up,  excepting  those  of  Truxillo,  Oyarbidos, 
and  Camejo.  These,  on  account  of  their  size,  and  of  the 
stores  they  had  aboard,  the  last  one  carrying  the  guns  and 
mortars  of  the  enemy,  drew  too  much  water,  for  which 
reason  they  were  compelled  to  take  up  their  course  out- 
side. This  was  verified  by  the  adjutant  Don  Albaro,  who 
on  account  of  the  anxiety  caused  by  this  matter,  was  sent 
out  to  determine  the  reason  why  the  said  boats  held  back. 
He  returned  with  the  information  that  he  had  seen  them 
all  put  out  with  the  vessels  under  the  command  of  Don 
Antonio  Castafieda,  the  last  one  being  the  packet  boat  of 
the  king,  for  v^^hich  reason  and  because  it  had  seen  a  few 
hostile  people  on  the  beach,  it  fired  a  few  shots.  We  began 
to  embark  the  troops,  but  could  not  finish  because  night  hact 
fallen. 

July  26th. 

We  continued  embarking  the  troops  until  6:00  in  the 
morning,  when  they  were  all  on  board.  W^e  waited  at  this 
hour  until  the  four  galliots,  under  command  of  Naval  En- 
sign Don  Francisco  de  Pineda,  should  join  the  whole  col- 
lection of  our  vessels ;  and  having  noticed  the  absence  of 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA     81 

the  remainder  of  his  convoy,  we  learned  that  they  had  with- 
drawn with  the  troops  they  had  on  board  to  Florida,  by  an 
order  which  they  had  to  this  purpose  from  the  general  and 
which  was  dispatched  in  his  own  launch  from  Gualquini. 
Proceeding  thus  to  the  Fort  of  Bajeses,  we  arrived  at  8:00 
in  the  morning  and  anchored,  and  at  one  and  the  same  time 
all  the  troops  began  to  go  ashore  in  as  good  order  as  was 
permitted  by  the  nature  of  the  ground.  We  found  the  fort 
abandoned  and  containing  only  a  few  things,  such  as  a 
four-pounder  gun  spiked,  two  swivel  guns  unspiked,  fifty 
handgrenades,  six  empty  jars  and  number  of  iron  hoops. 
The  fort  is  situated  upon  an  eminence  which  commands 
the  entire  beach  and  has  no  other  fortification  than  that 
afforded  by  a  dense  girdle  of  lofty  and  large  pines  and  the 
superiority  of  its  position.  Within  this  enclosure  was  a 
house  of  limited  accommodation  and  in  an  angle  an  under- 
ground room  which  appeared  to  be  a  powder  magazine ; 
about  one  hundred  paces  beyond  this  circle  were  three 
houses  at  a  short  distance  one  from  the  other,  the  largest 
of  which,  from  its  construction  seemed  to  be  a  storehouse ; 
the  next  one  was  a  stable  because  it  was  surrounded  by  a 
fence  inside  of  which  we  found  fifty  to  sixty  horses.  These 
at  first  we  thought  we  would  take  on  to  Florida  with  us, 
but  as  we  had  no  means  of  doing  so,  an  order  was  given 
that  they  should  be  immediately  killed  in  order  that  our 
enemies  might  have  a  taste  of  the  same  treatment  to  which 
they  had  subjected  us  in  Florida.  At  this  very  moment, 
however,  this  order  was  suspended  until  we  should  begin 
our  march.  The  third  house  was  immediately  at  the  land- 
ing which  showed  that  it  was  either  a  tavern  or  a  low  eat- 
ing house.  Our  commanding  officers  took  for  their  head- 
quarters the  house  in  the  fort,  leaving  the  others  for  the 
other  officers.  The  troops  went  into  camp  at  a  distance 
of  about  two  hundred  paces  from  the  fort  in  an  open  pine 
grove  on  level  ground  and  more  or  less  shady  on  account 
of  the  thick  pines  growing  there.  There  seemed  to  be  an 
abundance  of  water  with  which  the  men  refreshed  them- 
selves ;  they  managed  to  resist  the  scarcity  of  food  from 
which  they  suffered  on  this  day  until  the  afternoon,  for  it 
occurred  to  some  of  the  men  to  obtain  relief  by  killing  a 
few  horses  and  eating  their  flesh.  In  the  afternoon  an  issue 
was  ordered  of  a  little  rice  and  of  one  hard  tack  apiece 
and  at  the  same  time  a  return  was  asked  of  the  stores  which 
were  actually  on  board  in  the  boats  with  us.     This  was 


82  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

all  the  more  easy  to  make  from  the  fact  that  the  stores  on 
hand  permitted  us  to  subsist  for  the  space  of  eight  days 
and  no  more,  because  the  boats  that  carried  the  reserve 
stores  were  no  longer  within  reach.  This  being  the  state 
of  affairs,  orders  were  given  to  man  the  boats  in  propor- 
tion to  their  burden  and  naturally  the  issue  of  rations  fol- 
lowed suit. 

July  27th. 

At  4  :00  of  the  afternoon  we  remarked  in  the  direction  of 
the  entrance  of  the  Bay  of  Whales,  three  pirogues  and  one 
launch  or  canoe,  passing  from  one  side  to  the  other  as 
though  they  were  carrying  troops ;  for  which  reason  Don 
Antonio  Arredondo  proposed  that  the  galliots  should  go 
out  to  stop  them,  and  that  the  Indians  should  be  put  ashore 
to  cut  off  the  advance  of  any  people  who  might  be  coming 
to  the  help  of  those  who  were  in  the  fort  of  San  Pedro ;  for, 
according  to  the  information  received  from  the  galliots,  it 
was  known  that  the  said  castle  was  garrisoned,  since  it 
had  fired  on  them  the  night  before.  But  the  General  would 
not  consent  to  this  and  therefore  this  action  was  not  taken, 
but  instead  the  order  was  given  at  about  5  :00  in  the  after- 
noon for  the  troops  to  go  on  board.  This  operation  was 
begun  and  carried  on  until  three  or  four  pickets  had  em- 
barked ;  when  the  order  was  suspended  and  another  one 
issued  that  everybody  should  march  and  take  up  a  forma- 
tion near  the  fort,  where  we  remained  all  night. 

July  28th. 

At  dawn,  the  pirogues  or  schooners  which  had  brought 
about  the  resolution  to  embark  on  the  day  before,  again  be- 
gan to  reconnoiter  and  for  the  same  cause  on  this  day  we 
hastened  a  fresh  embarkation,  so  that  at  about  9  :00  o'clock 
we  were  all  on  board.  At  this  hour  we  provided  for  the 
security  of  our  vessels  by  the  following  disposition:  the 
sloops  and  large  schooners  were  to  sail  outside  under  the 
orders  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Don  Antonio  de  Salgado;  and 
the  galliots,  with  the  remaining  vessels  and  a  number  of  the 
little  boats,  should  proceed  by  interior  channels  to  the  Bar 
of  the  St.  Johns  River.  With  these  were  to  go  the  Com- 
manding General,  Don  Francisco  Rubiani,  and  the  Chief- 
of-Staff  and  Engineer-in-Chicf,  Don  Antonio  Arredondo, 
because  it  had  been  provided  in  advance  that  horses  from 
Florida  should  join   the  detachment  at  the  mouth  of  the 


ATTACK   ON   THE    COLONY    OF   GEORGIA  83 


St.  Johns  River  and  in  this  way  facilitate  the  return  of  the 
said  gentlemen  and  officers  to  the  garrison  of  St.  Augustine, 
Florida.  The  time  now  having  come  to  separate  the  ves- 
sels into  these  two  classes,  Don  Antonio  Salgado  pointed 
out  that  inasmuch  as  his  vessels  were  of  no  military- 
strength,  it  would  be  proper  that  the  galliots  should  con- 
voy him  out  beyond  the  bar  of  the  Bay  of  Whales  but  this 
suggestion  raised  considerable  opposition,  in  which  Don 
Antonio  Arredondo  took  the  lead,  showing  over  and  over 
again  what  inconvenience  this  course  would  cause  the 
General,  who,  his  mind  now  being  made  up,  ordered  the 
galliots  to  proceed  to  the  point  mentioned  in  accordance 
with  the  plan  of  embarkation,  and  that  he  was  only  waiting 
on  them  before  setting  out  himself,  and  so  Don  Antonio 
Salgado  put  out  with  his  convoy  and  succeeded  in  crossing 
the  bar  without  having  met  the  hostile  vessels,  of  which 
he  was  so  fearful,  and  the  galliots  returned  to  join  the  gen- 
tral.  The  wind  fell  at  half  past  six  and  the  convoy  anchored 
about  a  league  outside  the  bar, 

July  29th. 

At  four  o'clock  in  the  morning,  we  hoisted  anchor,  the 
land  breeze  blowing,  and  at  9 :00  o'clock,  found  ourselves 
in  front  of  the  entrance  of  the  Bar  of  San  Pedro  and  about 
two  leagues  off;  at  10  :00  having  gone  about  one  league  more 
from  the  said  mouth  and  at  a  distance  slightly  more  than 
three  from  the  fort,  we  began  to  hear  a  few  cannon  shots 
and  remarked  that  these  were  answered  by  a  few  vessels 
which  we  could  not  see  because  they  were  hidden  by  the 
land.  The  number  of  rounds  rose  to  more  than  seventy 
and  we  heard  besides  a  few  discharges  of  musketry,  lasting 
for  an  hour.  We  then  saw  a  few  boats  coming  out,  which 
from  their  bearing  left  no  doubt  in  our  minds  that  they 
were  the  convoy  of  our  general.  Nothing  unusual  occurred 
in  the  journey  to  the  Bar  of  the  St.  Johns  where  we 
anchored  because  the  wind  had  fallen. 

July  30th. 

At  2:00  o'clock  in  the  morning  we  hoisted  anchor  with 
the  wind  fresh  from  the  east-northeast.  At  noon  we  found 
out  that  we  had  slipped  by  St.  Augustine  six  leagues  and 
were  now,  thanks  to  a  heavy  squall,  separated  from  the 
convoy.  The  currents  too  were  now  carrying  us  with 
great  force  to  the  south,  so  that  it  would  have  caused  us 


84         THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

much  effort  to  return  to  the  said  bar.  Moreover,  it  was 
agreed  by  the  captain  and  officers  of  this  sloop,  whose  name 
was  El  Canto,  that  it  was  perfectly  clear  that  the  weather 
was  such  as  would  greatly  help  us  to  continue  our  voyage 
to  the  Port  of  Havana.  This  course,  too,  would  be  useful 
to  the  service  of  the  King,  because  the  general  and  other 
officers  of  high  rank  had  been  heard  to  say  with  respect  to 
the  remaining  vessels  that  it  would  be  of  advantage  to 
send  them  on  as  rapidly  as  possible  on  account  of  the  disad- 
vantage that  would  result  from  any  other  course,  because 
St.  Augustine  with  so  many  people  within  its  limits  would 
be  called  upon  to  make  a  great  expenditure  of  stores  and 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  revictual  it,  considering  that 
it  would  be  necessary  in  the  weather  prevailing  to  send 
stores  for  thirty  days.  And  even  if  the  vessels  should  find 
it  impossible  to  make  the  journey,  a  report  would  be  given 
to  the  Governor  of  Havana  so  that  he  could  himself  issue 
the  necessary  orders  in  the  case.  Having  considered  all 
these  things,  and  the  fact  that  the  campaign  was  over,  and 
that  we  had  a  sufficiency  of  stores  on  board  for  returning 
the  troops  with  which  we  had  come  out,  we  unanimously 
agreed  upon  the  said  resolution  of  returning  straight  to 
Havana.  On  this  day  we  saw  a  sloop  astern  following  in 
our  wake,  for  which  reason  we  thought  it  must  belong  to 
the  convoy. 

July  31st. 

At  12 :00  o'clock,  noon,  we  arrived  off  the  Bar  of  Mosquito 
Inlet  and  skirting  the  coast  with  but  little  wind,  we 
anchored  at  night  because  it  had  fallen  calm. 

August  1st. 

At  4:00  o'clock  we  hoisted  anchor,  with  the  wind  to  the 
east-southeast.  Upon  its  veering  to  the  southeast  and 
falling  almost  a  dead  calm,  we  anchored  at  6:00  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon  at  about  six  leagues  from  the  Canaveral 
Channel. 

August  2nd. 

At  2:00  o'clock  we  set  out  with  the  wind  northeast  and 
light.  We  passed  the  Canaveral  Channel  at  noon  and  the 
wind  falling,  we  anchored,  having  rounded  the  Real  de  la 
Almiranta  de  Chebes  and  being  about  two  leagues  to  the 
windward  of  the  River  of  Ys. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  85 


August   3(1. 

At  4:00  we  set  out  with  the  wind  east-northeast  and  at 
9 :00  o'clock  rounded  Casacho  and  anchored  at  6 :00  by 
reason  of  a  calm. 

August  4th. 
At  4:00  o'clock  we  set  out  with  the  wind  east-northeast 
and  at  12:00  rounded  Ropa  tendida.  At  about  6:00  of  the 
afternoon  the  wind  shifted  to  the  east-southeast,  and  so 
stood  fresh  all  night  but  we  made  no  progress  because  of 
the  force  of  the  currents  and  so  anchored. 

August  5th. 
At  7:00  we  turned  the  Inlet  of  Sober  and  at  6:00  in  the 
afternoon  were  off  Sega,  having  kept  the  wind  all  day  east- 
southeast.  At  6:00  o'clock  in  the  morning  we  descried  a 
frigate  off  our  bow  at  a  distance  of  three  leagues,  and,  like 
us,  at  anchor  through  lack  of  wind.  At  11 :00  we  hoisted  an- 
chor with  the  wind  east-northeast  and  fresh,  and  corning 
up  at  2  :00  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  to  within  less  than  one 
league  we  showed  this  frigate  our  colors,  confirming  it  by 
a  gun  shoi,  in  the  belief  that  she  must  belong  to  our  con- 
voy because  she  had  followed  the  same  course  as  we,  close 
in  shore.  It  appeared  to  us  to  be  the  Httle  frigate  of  the 
company  commanded  by  Pablo  Rodriguez,  but  as  she 
refused  to  show  us  her  colors  we  continued  on  our  voyage, 
leaving  her  at  sunset  astern. 

August  6th. 
At  dawn,  it  was  calm ;  we  had  not  gained  more  than  one 
league  during  the  past  night  on  account  of  the  great 
strength  of  the  currents.  We  remained  at  anchor  this  en- 
tire day  and  night  through  lack  of  wind.  We  employed  a 
part  of  this  day  in  taking  on  water  from  a  lagoon  close  by. 

August  7th. 
The  calms  and  contrary  winds  continuing  we  remained 
at  anchor  this  entire  day  and  night. 

August  8th. 
At  3 :00  we  hoisted  our  anchor  with  the  wind  east-north- 
east which  we  kept  until  night  when,  because  it  fell  off,  we 
anchored  at  the   Banda  del  S.   R.  of  the  Rio   Seco,  one 
league. 


86  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


August   9th. 

At  2:00  in  the  morning  we  hoisted  our  anchor  with  the 
wind  northeast  and  at  6  :00  passed  Ratones  inlet ;  and  at  10 
anchored  at  the  inlet  to  the  north  of  Biscayne  Key. 

August  10th. 

At  5 :00  of  the  morning  we  hoisted  anchor  with  the  wind 
east.  We  passed  Biscayne  Key,  the  Candiles  de  la  Parida,. 
the  Candiles  de  las  Mdscaras,  the  shoal  de  las  Mdscaras, 
the  first  Canaleja  of  Long  Key,  the  Playuelas,  the  shoal  of 
las  Tetas  with  its  inlets,  Escribano  Key,  and  anchored  near 
Melchior  Rodriguez  at  10  of  the  night. 

August   11th. 

At  5:00  o'clock  we  hoisted  anchor  with  the  wind  east,. 
passed  Tabanos  Key,  the  inlets  of  Guimero,  Old  MatacumbL 
and  Young  Matacumbi,  Biboras  Key,  Bascas  Key,  and  at 
10  of  the  night  anchored  in  Bahia  Honda. 

August  12th. 

At  5  we  hoisted  anchor,  wind  east ;  passed  Caguamas 
Point,  and  Boca  chica,  and  anchored  at  4  of  the  afternoon 
in  Key  West. 

August  13th. 

We  stayed  here  all  day,  anchored  at  night  because  of 
squalls. 

August  14th. 

Hoisted  at  2  of  the  morning,  and  anchored  about  a  half 
league  out  in  Key  West  Channel.  Hoisted  anchor  at  5:30, 
wind  N.  N.  E.  and  put  out  through  the  small  channel  of 
Key  West.  Proceeding  thus,  at  10  the  wind  shifted  to  the 
north,  at  5 :30  to  N.  E.,  at  8  of  the  morning  to  E.  W.  and  so 
held  until  12  when  it  veered  to  the  S.  S.  O.  where  it  held  all 
day,  our  course  being  S,  E. 

August  15th. 

At  six  we  made  out  the  range  of  Camarioca ;  when  about 
6  leagues  to  leeward  of  them,  the  wind  shifted  to  the  E.  S. 
E.,  and  with  our  head  to  the  south,  at  5  of  the  afternoon  we 
reached  Bacuniaga,  5  leagues  to  leeward  of  Matanzas. 


i 

ATTACK  ON   THE   COLONY   OF   GEORGIA  87 


August   16th. 

Dawn  found  us  in  Jaruco  Inlet,  8  leagues  to  leeward  of 
Havana,  in  which  harbor  we  anchored  at  2 :30  of  the  after- 
noon. 


[  End  of  Casinas'  Journal.] 


THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


MONTIANO'S   OWN   REPORT. 


Sir, — 

I  transmit  the  report  herewith,  to  the  end  that  your  Lord- 
ship place  it  in  the  hands  of  the  Royal  and  Supreme  Coun- 
cil of  these  Indies  for  their  information. 

Your  Lordship  holds  me  in  faithful  unalterable  affection, 
always  at  your  command,  and  praying  Our  Lord  to  keep 
Your  Lordship  many  years. 

Saint  Augustine,  in  Florida,  3  August,  1742. 

Don  Manuel  de  Montiano,  your  most  obedient  servant, 
kisses  your  Lordship's  hand. 

To 

Don  Fernando  Trivino. 


Letter  of  Montiano  to  the  King. 

Sir:— 

In  a  letter  of  October  31st  of  the  past  year,  Don  Jos6  del 
Campillo  advised  me  that  Your  Majesty  had  resolved  upon 
the  formation  in  Havana  of  an  expedition  to  lay  waste  Caro- 
lina and  its  dependencies,  and  that  he  was  communicating 
this  news  to  me  by  command  of  Your  Majesty,  to  the  end 
that  I  might  give  Lieutenant  General  Don  Juan  Francisco 
de  Guemes  y  Horcasitas,  Governor  of  Havana,  all  the  infor- 
mation that  I  might  have  and  that  might  conduce  to  the 
happy  issue  of  these  royal  instructions.  These,  I  obeyed 
with  all  the  promptness  demanded,  and  posted  the  results 
to  the  aforesaid  Lieutenant  General  Governor  of  Havana, 
offering  myself  for  any  duty  in  the  Royal  Service  that  he 
might  see  fit  to  give  me.  In  consequence  he  informed  me 
in  a  letter  of  May  14,  brought  by  an  officer  of  that  garrison 
[Havana]  in  a  small  boat,  that  he  had  selected  me  for  the 
command  of  the  expedition,  sending  me  at  the  same  time 
the  particular  charges  and  directions  for  the  best  advantage 
of   Your    Majesty's    Service.     He    informed    me    that    the 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  89 

expedition  was  ready  to  put  to  sea,  and  that,  although  a 
secret  council  he  had  called  of  the  senior  officers  of  both 
Services  in  Havana,  as  w^ell  as  of  those  of  the  squadron  under 
the  orders  of  Lieutenant  General  Don  Rodrigo  de  Torres, 
had  declared  impracticable  the  royal  intention  and  will  of 
Your  Majesty  through  lack  of  sufficient  naval  forces,  yet  it 
was  agreed  that  at  the  right  time  some  operation  should 
be  set  afoot  against  Georgia,  to  indemnify  us  in  part  for 
the  insults  and  perfidies  attempted  and  committed  to  the 
injury  of  these  Provinces,  and  of  Your  Majesty's  indispen- 
sable right  to  them. 

The  convoy  of  ten  small  vessels  manned  by  a  few  mili- 
tiamen and  escorted  by  a  galley,  sent  in  advance  by  the 
aforesaid  Lieutenant  General,  fell  in  on  June  6th  with  an 
English  coastguard  man-of-war  of  24  guns,  which  with 
its  artillery,  launch,  and  boats,  attacked  a  few  of  our 
vessels  beforementioned.  And  as  our  galley  could  not  go 
to  the  help  of  all  of  these,  they  presently  found  themselves 
in  danger  so  great,  that  two  of  them  were  compelled  to  run 
ashore,  one  of  them  having  lost  a  lieutenant  of  artillery  and 
a  corporal  killed,  and  had  a  lieutenant  of  militia  wounded. 
One  of  their  boats  tried  to  board  a  sloop  of  ours  aground, 
but  our  troops  that  were  on  shore  began  to  fire  and  so 
forced  the  crew  of  the  English  boat  to  ask  for  quarter. 
We  thus  captured  one  officer  and  18  sailors. 

On  the  15th  of  the  aforesaid  month  the  entire  expedition 
arrived  safely  off  this  bar  [that  of  Saint  Augustine]  under 
the  command  of  Colonel  Don  Francisco  Rubiani.  But  on  ac- 
count of  the  scarcity  of  water,  and  because  of  the  fierce 
squalls  and  strong  winds  which  did  us  some  damage,  and 
wrecked  a  launch,  drowning  a  chaplain  and  some  sailors,  I 
was  unable  to  leave  this  port  [Saint  Augustine]  before  the 
23rd  of  the  month ;  and  as  on  that  very  day  the  wind  blew 
hard  out  of  the  northeast,  I  delayed  my  departure  until  July 
1st,  when  I  put  to  sea  with  all  the  vessels  of  the  Expedition. 
I  laid  my  course  for  Georgia,  and  reached  its  neighborhod 
on  the  2d,  when  a  furious  storm  beyond  any  human  power 
to  resist,  overtook  us  from  the  southwest  and  scattered 
us  all.  We  remained  dispersed  many  days.  The  greater 
part  of  the  fleet  having  reassembled  (except  4  galliots,  4 
pirogues,  2  schooners,  2  launches  and  1  small  boat),  we 
anchored  on  the  10th  in  sight  of  the  port  of  Gualquini,  where 
we  remained,  unable  to  close  in  by  reason  of  the  contrary 
winds,  until  the  16th,  when  we  gloriously  forced  the  port. 


90  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

with  no  greater  loss  than  5  men,  against  resistance  by  sea 
and  land  in  succession. 

At  the  entrance  of  the  harbor  was  constructed  a  fort  of 
sod  with  brick  parapets,  in  the  shape  of  a  horseshoe,  con- 
taining a  bronze  shell  mortar,  and  five  for  smaller  shells.* 
It  had  in  its  neighborhood  a  large  trench  mounting  3  guns 
to  sweep  the  entrance.  At  a  distance  of  two  musket  shots, 
and  to  the  west,  was  another  fort,  of  square  trace,  with  four 
bastions,  one  in  the  middle  of  each  curtain,  constructed  of 
heavy  timbers  and  of  earth,  and  having  a  ditch  one  toise** 
and  a  half  wide  and  four  feet  deep.  On  its  parapet  were  a 
few  rows  of  barrels  filled  with  earth,  and  planted  with 
thorns,  to  serve  as  a  parapet.  Along  the  interior  ran  a 
stockaded  covered  way  to  prevent  a  surprise,  on  which 
were  mounted  7  guns,  3  of  them  18-pounders  and  six  gren- 
ade-mortars. Between  the  first  and  this  second  fort  they 
had  constructed  a  strong  trench  mounting  5  guns:  to  the 
west  of  these  works  was  yet  another  large  trench  of  circular 
form,  whose  purpose  it  was  to  annoy  us  by  musketry. 

Within  this  harbor  between  the  forts  mentioned  were  sta- 
tioned a  24-gun  frigate,  a  schooner  of  14,  then  a  bilander 
of  10  guns.  Behind  these  came  a  line  of  eight  bilanders  and 
schooners  well  manned  to  defend  the  entrance  with  mus- 
ketry; but  in  spite  of  all  this,  we  took  possession  of  the 
Port  and  anchored  at  five  of  the  afternoon. 

I  immediately  gave  orders  for  the  disembarkation  of  the 
entire  body,  in  order  to  allow  the  enemy  no  opportunity  to 
recover  from  the  dismay  into  which  our  triumph  had  thrown 
him.  This  operation  was  successfully  accomplished  with- 
out resistance.  At  dawn,  I  set  out  with  the  entire  force, 
my  intention  being  to  advance  on  the  first  fort.  I  first 
sent  out  some  Indians  to  approach  and  reconnoiter  the  state 
of  affairs  and  movements  of  the  enemy;  these  having  re- 
turned and  reported  having  seen  no  one,  the  Chief  of  Staff, 
Don  Antonio  de  Arredondo,  moved  forward  to  verify  the 
information,  having  with  him  two  companies  of  Grenadiers 
which  I  ordered  out  to  ensure  the  greater  thoroughness  of 
the  reconnaissance,  and  to  determine  whether  the  enemy  had 
really  retired.     When  this  was  confirmed,  I  continued  my 


•  Gratvadaa  reales,  emaller  than   the    homban,   but   projectiles  of   the   same 
fort. 

••  The    toesa    (tuesa  In  MS.),   a  measure   of  length  about   6.4   feet. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA      9r 


march  to  his  works  which  I  at  once  occupied,  posting  the 
necessary  guards,  and  a  few  pickets  on  what  appeared  to  be 
avenues  of  approach,  in  order  to  check  any  attack  they 
might  make. 

The  Indians  and  grenadiers  brought  in  two  prisoners, 
who  confirmed  the  flight  of  General  Oglethorpe  to  the  town 
of  Frederica,  distant  slightly  more  than  two  leagues  from 
the  forts  of  Gualquini.  Although  I  might  have  overtaken 
him,  this  step  did  not  appear  to  be  prudent,  so  long  as  I 
was  ignorant  of  the  road  and  of  the  ground  over  which  one 
should  march  with  full  knowledge.  Accordingly,  as  it 
seemed  to  me  advantageous  to  advance  on  Frederica  along, 
two  lines  -at  the  same  time,  I  dispatched  the  captain  of  one 
of  the  pickets  of  this  post  [Saint  Augustine],  Don  Sebastian 
Sdnchez  with  50  men,  as  being  acquainted  with  these  parts, 
to  reconnoiter  the  road  leading  to  the  careening  ground,  at 
which  point  it  seemed  to  me  that  it  might  be  more  advan- 
tageous to  disembark  the  artillery. 

At  the  same  time  I  sent  the  Captain  of  Miquelets,  Don 
Nicholas  Herndndez,  with  25  of  his  men  and  40  Indians,  to 
examine  the  road  that  leads  directly  to  Frederica,  It  fell 
out  that  Don  Sebastian  Siinchez  lost  the  trail  he  was  to 
follow,  and  joined  the  Hernandez  party.  These  two  con- 
tinued as  far  as  the  town,  in  whose  vicinity  they  were 
attacked  by  a  body  of  English  and  Indians  in  a  very  narrow 
defile  of  the  woods.  This  accident  brought  on  inevitable 
disorder,  in  which  we  suffered  the  loss  of  the  two  captains 
and  11  men  captured,  10  men  wounded,  and  12  killed. 
When  news  of  this  reached  me,  I  detached  three  companies 
of  grenadiers  to  support  our  troops  and  cover  their  re- 
treat; but  before  the  companies  of  grenadiers  could  reach 
the  site  of  the  action,  they  were  attacked  themselves  by. 
another  ambuscade  surrounding  a  swamp,  over  which  the 
path  gave  passage  only  in  single  file.  The  Captains  of 
Grenadiers,  realizing,  if  they  continued  their  efiforts,  that 
no  advantage  was  to  be  gained  save  the  sacrifice  of  their 
troops,  through  the  impossibility  of  seeing  who  was  firing 
on  them,  or  of  taking  up  any  formation  by  reason  of  the 
nature  of  the  ground,  prudently  resolved  to  withdraw  in  as 
good  order  as  possible,  with  the  loss  of  Don  Miguel  Bucareli 
and  6  grenadiers,  who  were  killed. 

The  Captain  of  Miquelets,  Don  Nicholas  Herndndez,  tak- 
ing advantage  of  the  fact  that  he  had  been  very  insecurely 
tied    by    the    two    soldiers    who    were    taking   him    along^ 


92         THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

succeeded  in  breaking-  loose,  which  the  soldiers  observed  ;  on 
their  endeavoring  to  make  him  secure  by  tying  his  arms, 
he  gave  them  no  chance,  for  like  a  man  of  valor  and  spirit, 
he  rushed  upon  one  of  them  and  took  away  his  sword,  and 
with  it,  its  owner's  life,  and  then  slew  the  other,  thus  earn- 
ing his  liberty  and  returning  to  our  camp  four  days  later. 
This  Captain  and  some  of  his  soldiers,  although  born  woods- 
men {hombres  de  monte),  were  so  exhausted  by  the  difficul- 
ties of  the  undefbrush,  that  they  thought  they  would  give 
up  the  ghost  before  coming  out  on  the  road. 

I  now  took  these  matters  under  serious  consideration,  as 
well  as  the  report  of  the  Captains  of  Grenadiers  and  our 
Indians,  to  the  effect  that  the  forest  was  impenetrable  be- 
cause of  its  impassable  undergrowth,  besides  being  full  of 
swamps  and  lagoons.  Furthermore,  the  representations  of 
Don  Antonio  de  la  Atora,  agent  of  the  Exchequer,  in  re- 
spect of  the  consumption  of  stores,  and  that  those  to  be 
consumed  on  our  withdrawal  should  receive  first  thought, 
there  being  barely  enough  in  hand  to  last  to  the  end  of 
August,  gave  me  pause. 

The  tempestuous  weather  of  August  and  September  was 
also  a  fact  of  no  mean  weight.  I  was  moreover  compelled 
to  take  into  account  the  naval  forces  then  off  the  coast  of 
Carolina,  superior  to  ours.  Our  prisoners  declared  that  it 
was  commonly  known  that  General  Oglethorpe  was  expect- 
ing them.  Our  delays  caused  by  bad  Aveather,  the  action 
between  the  man-of-war  and  our  galley  and  small  convoy, 
and  the  fact  that  we  had  maintained  ourselves  on  his 
coasts,  must  have  convinced  the  General  of  our  inten- 
tion to  attack  him,  and  thus  have  given  him  time  to  prepare 
his  defense.  The  failure  of  thirteen  vessels,  among  them 
four  galliots  carrying  some  troops  and  all  the  sappers,  to 
rejoin  the  convoy,  had  caused  us  supreme  embarrassment, 
for  without  these  men  and  the  row  boats,  no  operation 
was  possible  ashore  or  on  the  rivers  within  a  radius  of  some- 
what more  than  two  leagues.  Lastly,  I  could  not  overlook 
the  special  injunctions  of  Lieutenant  General  Don  Francisco 
de  Guemes  y  Horcasitas  to  consider  the  most  important 
matter  of  assuring  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops,  having  re- 
gard to  the  notable  reduction  that  had  taken  place  in  the 
garrisons  of  both  Havana  and  Saint  Augustine. 

Having  therefore  maturely  considered  all  these  matters,  I 
called  a  council  of  war  composed  of  the  senior  officers  of 
the  army,  and  having  laid  before  them  the  reasons  which 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA     93 


had  led  me  to  assemble  then,  I  asked  them  to  advise  what 
we  should  do  in  the  situation  that  faced  us.  They  answer- 
ed that  there  was  in  their  opinion  nothing  else  better  than 
to  reconnoiter  the  river  leading  to  the  town  of  Frederica, 
and  see  if  there  were  not  some  place  where  the  men  and 
artillery  could  be  conveniently  disembarked,  in  order  to 
batter  the  fort  and  town ;  that  while  this  was  in  hand,  the 
vessels  could  continue  taking  on  water,  for  it  was  to  be 
recollected  that  even  if  favorable  terrain  could  be  found 
for  the  disembarkation,  nothing  should  be  undertaken  that 
would  demand  more  than  six  days  for  its  execution.  The 
fact  that  we  had  supplies  for  no  later  than  the  end  of  Au- 
gust was  of  such  gravity  that  we  ought  to  think  of  nothing 
else  but  to  withdraw  to  our  respective  garrisons,  and  thus 
avoid  the  dangers  threatened  by  delay.  In  consequence 
of  this  advice,  the  Engineer  Don  Pedro  Ruis  de  Olano  went 
out  with  the  galley  and  the  two  galliots  to  make  the  recon- 
naissance agreed  upon,  and  got  within  musket  shot  of  Fred- 
erica,  without  finding  any  place  suitable  to  a  disembarka- 
tion, because  the  bank  of  the  river  is  a  marsh  throughout 
its  length,  and  overgrown  with  grass ;  he  was  unable  to 
determine  whether  it  was  quaking  grass  or  water  swamp, 
and  it  was  only  within  cannon  range  that  he  thought  there 
might  be  a  clear  place  where  he  thought  a  landing  might 
be  possible.  But  on  taking  into  account  the  well-recogniz- 
ed risk  of  exposing  the  men  to  much  loss,  especially  as  he 
had  been  unable  to  determine  whether  there  was  a  battery 
or  entrenchment  or  not,  I  resolved  that  it  would  be  disad- 
vantageous to  undertake  an  operation  so  palpably  danger- 
ous. Nevertheless,  I  withheld  my  decision  so  far  as  to  call 
a  second  council,  principally  because  at  dawn  of  this  day 
a  deserter  came  into  camp,  and  declared  that  General  Ogle- 
thorpe had  been  marching:  the  entire  night  with  500  men 
to  surprise  us  before  dawn.  In  answer  to  questions  intend- 
ed to  inform  me  as  to  the  condition  and  forces  of  Ogle- 
thorpe* he  said  they  numbered  one  thousand,  half  of  them 
regular  troops  of  his  own  regiment,  and  the  remainder  set- 
tlers and  Indians,  that  the  town  of  Frederica  was  defended 
by  a  battery  that  commanded  the  river,  and  mounting  small 
guns,  some  18-pounders,  and  mortars  of  both  and  large 
calibre;  and  that  on  the  bank  of  the  river  near  the  town 
there  was  a  trench  in  which  he  could  place  his  men  under 
cover,  and  prevent  our  landing.  He  continued  that  another 
channel  through  which  our  vessels  could  easily  pass  was 


94  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

defended  by  a  garrisoned  mortar  battery.  He  added  that 
the  General  was  placing  his  chief  trust  in  the  thickness  of 
the  woods  and  the  morasses.  He  also  declared  that  he 
was  expecting  both  men  and  ships,  that  the  people  of  Caro- 
lina would  not  be  long  in  appearing,  likewise  Virginians 
and  Philadelphians,  in  as  much  as  he  had  sent  letters  in  all 
directions  by  reason  of  the  suspicions  excited  by  the  affair 
of  the  galley  and  small  convoy  oflf  Cape  Canaveral,  and 
confirmed  by  our  long  stay  on  his  coasts. 

A  few  hours  after  the  arrival  of  the  deserter,  and  just  as 
the  second  council  was  about  to  sit,  the  outposts  on  the 
shore,  and  the  men  in  the  tops,  announced  that  three  cruis- 
ers, one  bilander  and  a  schooner  were  approaching  the 
port.  This  information  compelled  me  to  adjourn  the  coun- 
cil, and  to  hold  one  composed  only  of  Colonel  Don  Fran- 
cisco Rubiani,  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Don  Antonio  Sal- 
gado,  and  of  the  Chief  of  Staflf  Don  Antonio  de  Arredon- 
do.  These  all  agreed  that  we  should  bend  all  our  ener- 
gies to  retreat,  that  our  fear  lest  Oglethorpe  should  at- 
tack by  land  while  his  ships  did  the  same  by  sea  was 
normal.  I  consequently  ordered  that  all  the  troops  should 
cross  over  to  the  island  in  front,  in  order  to  give  our  ships 
time  to  prepare,  unencumbered,  for  the  defense;  and  that 
the  smaller  vessels  should,  while  I  was  marching  ashore 
with  the  troops,  enter  the  River  of  Whales,  and  await  me  on 
the  bar  of  the  same  name,  where  I  intended  to  embark  and 
go  on  to  the  capture  and  demolition  of  Fort  Saint  Andrew. 
This  was  all  done ;  the  fort  I  found  unoccupied,  it  had  one 
gun,  a  4-pounder,  three  stone  mortars,  a  few  implements, 
and  a  number  of  horses,  which  we  killed.  From  this  point, 
in  order  to  improve  the  time  while  the  smaller  vessels  were 
completing  the  task  of  bringing  up  the  stores  that  were 
lacking,  I  arranged  to  detach  200  men  ashore  to  occupy 
Fort  San  Pedro,  which  the  night  before  had  fired  on  the 
four  galliots,  launches  and  pirogues  separated  from  us  by 
the  storm,  and  which  had  now  rejoined;  but  as  I  was  with- 
out supplies,  inasmuch  as  the  vessels  that  had  them  on 
board,  were  going  outside  straight  to  Florida,  I  thought 
the  most  rapid  transportation  possible  of  the  troops  to 
Saint  Augustine,  preferable  to  a  delay  without  provisions. 

I  consequently  commanded  all  the  vessels  to  pass  out  by 
the  Bar  of  Whales,  while  I  with  the  4  galliots,  launches  and 
pirogues  took  the  inside  of  the  river,  in  order  to  reconnoiter 
the  aforesaid  Fort  San  Pedro,  and  to  attend  to  anything 


7. 


Ch 


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A  A   7,.;>  ■I'u/.l.j 


•^fM/j  t„„m^c  Jb^f,,'., 


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CuO^'^i^^ 


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m 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  95 

that  might  come  up.  This  done,  and  notwithstanding  the 
fire  which  they  opened,  and  which  I  ordered  the  4  gaUiots 
to  return,  I  continued  on  my  way  and  reached  the  River 
Saint  John,  where  I  went  ashore  and  thence  on  August  1st, 
to  this  fortress  [Saint  Augustine]  where  I  found  all  the 
troops  carried  by  the  vessels  that  had  gone  outside. 

During  the  time  in  which  I  abode  in  camp  at  Gualquini, 
notwithstanding  the  lack  of  sappers,  I  took  such  measures, 
that  the  troops  and  militia  in  detachments  destroyed  and 
razed  the  castles  [i.  e.,  forts]  and  batteries;  that  the  artil- 
lery, mortars,  and  implements  were  carried  aboard ;  that 
the  houses  in  the  country  were  burned  to  the  number  of 
thirty,  and  the  planted  fields  laid  waste;  and  so  finished 
this  business  on  the  last  day  as  regards  the  remainder  of 
the  settlement,  say  seventy  houses  in  seven  streets,  that  not 
a  sign  or  vestige  remained,  to  show  that  the  place  had  ever 
been  settled. 

And  I  did  the  same  sort  of  thing  with  the  enemy's  ves- 
sels, excepting  two  bilanders,  which  I  manned,  and  put  into 
our  armada,  and  the  war  ship,  which  on  the  very  night  we 
forced  the  pass,  under  favor  of  the  darkness,  and  of  a  storm, 
succeeding  in  escaping,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  Don 
Antonio  Castaiieda  to  prevent  its  flight. 

I  consider  that  the  damage  done  the  English  will  amount 
to  between  250,000  and  300,000  pesos.  On  the  day  when 
I  went  by  land  to  the  Island  of  Vejeces,  the  land  wind  that 
was  blowing  drove  off  the  hostile  vessels  from  the  coast, 
and  also  took  ours  out,  for  it  was  the  intention,  suggested. by 
me,  of  Don  Antonio  de  Castaiieda,  commander  of  the  Fleet, 
to  attack  the  enemy.  As  he  was  unable  to  find  them  how- 
ever, he  set  his  course  for  Havana. 

All  the  officers,  both  senior  and  junior,  of  regular  troops 
and  militia;  Don  Antonio  de  Castaueda,  and  the  naval  vol- 
unteers, have  given  proof  of  special  zeal  and  devotion  to 
the  service  of  Your  ■Majest}'' ;  and  particularly  Colonel  Don 
Francisco  Rubiani,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Don  Antonio  Saiga- 
do,  and  the  Engineer  of  the  Second  Class,  Don  Antonio  de 
Arredondo,  who  discharged  the  functions  of  Chief  of  Staff 
with  incessant  toil.  For  these  reasons  I  recommend  them 
to  the  notice  of  Your  Majesty  as  worthy  of  distinction. 

I  do  not  know,  Sir,  whether  my  conduct  of  affairs  will 
meet  with  the  roval  approbation  of  Your  IMajesty,  seeing 
that  my  entire  effort  has  been  to  discharge  the  trust  com- 
mitted to  my  care  with  no  other  end  than  the  ruin  of  the 


96         THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


enemies  of  the  Crown,  and  the  honor  and  glory  of  the  arms 
of  Your  Majesty.  These  might  have  been  better  advanced 
had  not  the  All  Powerful,  who  disposes  of  all  things,  brought 
to  naught  the  plan  I  had  in  mind,  of  sending  3  galliots  under 
the  orders  of  the  Naval  Lieutenant  Don  Adrian  Cantein  to 
the  river  of  Saint  Simon,  and  two  to  the  river  of  Whales 
under  the  command  of  the  Ensign  Don  Francisco  Pineda, 
for  the  purpose  of  cutting  the  enemy's  communications  and 
prevent  succor  reaching  him  from  the  north,  agreeably  with 
the  instructions  of  Lieutenant  General  Don  Juan  Francisco 
de  Guemes  y  Horcasitas. 

Nevertheless,  I  expect  of  the  royal  magnimity  of  Your 
Majesty,  that  it  will  deign  to  regard  itself  as  having  been 
well  served  in  the  operations  under  question,  and  that  I 
shall  have  the  satisfaction  of  receiving  honors  from  Your 
Majesty,  whose  Catholic  royal  person  I  pray  our  Lord  to 
preserve  as  many  happy  years,  as  Christendom  may  need. 
Saint  Augustine,  in  Florida.  August  3,  1742. 
Don  Manuel  de  Montiano. 

(flourish.) 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  97 


ORDERS  FOR  THE  CONDUCT  OF  THE  TROOPS  IN  THE 

EXPEDITION  TO  BE  UNDERTAKEN  AGAINST 

THE  ENGLISH. 


Orders  to  be  observed  by  the  officers  of  the  troops  des- 
tined for  the  expedition  to  be  undertaken  for  the  expulsion 
of  the  foreigners  that  have  intruded  upon  the  territories 
of  His  Majesty  in  the  provinces  of  Saint  Augustine  in 
Florida,  under  command  of  Colonel  Don  Juan  Bautista  de 
Echevarria,  appointed  as  commanding  general  for  its 
duration,  in  respect  not  only  of  regular  operations,  but  also 
of  the  orderly  conduct  of  the  march. 

1.  They  will  obey  with  the  greatest  punctuality  and  ac- 
curacy all  and  any  orders  whether  written  or  oral,  all  apply- 
ing the  most  particular  attention  to  discipline,  and  to  the 
good  condition  of  the  unit  committed  to  their  care.  When- 
ever the  case  calls  for  it,  they  will  display  the  constancy  and 
fortitude,  corresponding  to  their  obligations  and  to  the 
honor  and  glory  of  the  arms  of  the  King. 

2.  All  the  small  vessels  told  off  to  the  expedition  which 
is  to  pass  through  the  channels,  will  proceed  with  the  troops 
and  officers  assigned  to  each  under  the  orders  of  the  com- 
manding general ;  the  total  number  will  be  divided  into  four 
parts  or  squadrons  each  with  its  designated  chief. 

3.  Whenever  the  commanding  general  shall  hoist  a  sig- 
nal, the  chiefs  of  squadrons  will  at  once  hoist  the  same  by 
way  of  answer ;  as  soon  as  the  signal  is  hauled  down,  the 
others  will  follow  suit  successively,  to  show  that  the  signal 
has  been  understood. 

4.  When  the  formation  is  single  line  abreast,  the  post 
of  each  chief  of  squadron  will  be  in  front  of  his  squadron; 
in  forming  four  lines  in  four  ranks,  on  the  right ;  in  column 
of  four  or  more  abreast,  at  the  head,  and  on  the  right,  of 
the  first  file  of  his  squadron ;  in  forming  single  line  abreast 
with  the  four  squadrons,  he  will  occupy  the  proper  post  by 
the  side  of  the  last  vessel  of  the  squadron  he  is  following, 
keeping  the  remainder  of  his  vessels  on  his  left  flank,  all 
of  which  will  proceed  to  their  proper  places  in  succession 
on  the  flank    of    their  commander,  and  preserving  in  all 


98  THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

movements  their  place  and  distance,  whether  under  way, 
at  anchor,  or  moored. 

5.  Every  commanding  officer  of  a  vessel  must  observe 
with  care  all  the  signals  whether  day  or  night,  made  by  his 
immediate  chief,  and  included  in  the  list  which  each  for 
better  understanding  will  have  wath  him :  he  will  without 
delay  execute  the  import  of  said  signals. 

6.  Each  commanding  officer  of  a  vessel  will  divide  his 
crew  into  two  watches,  which  will  be  on  both  by  day  and 
by  night;  the  watch  will  be  relieved  every  four  hours;  dog 
watches  will  be  stood  between  4  and  8  of  the  evening,  in 
order  to  share  fatigue  and  rest.  Two  sentries  will  be  left- 
continuously  posted,  one  in  the  bow,  the  other  in  the  stern, 
with  orders  to  keep  a  sharp  lookout  in  all  directions,  for 
people  ashore,  signal  fires  or  boats ;  they  shall  carefully  ob- 
serve the  signals  made  by  their  immediate  commander,  and 
communicate  them  at  once  to  the  sergeant  or  corporal  of 
the  guard,  and  the  latter  to  his  officer,  for  suitable  action. 

7.  Each  commanding  officer  of  a  vessel  will  give  severe 
orders  to  maintain  the  deepest  silence  by  night  and  by  day, 
and  that  no  one  discharge  a  fire  arm  without  orders;  in  no 
case  w'ill  anyone  be  allowed  to  smoke*  by  night. 

8.  Each  time  that  a  signal  is  made  to  go  ashore  to  cook, 
the  master  of  the  vessel  will  take  ofif  only  the  number  ab- 
solutely necessary  for  the  purpose,  that  is,  will  detail  a  num- 
ber sufficient  to  act  as  guard.  No  one  else  will  be  allowed 
ashore.  As  soon  as  the  food  is  cooked,  he  will  order  it 
carried  on  boaid,  in  order  that  all  may  eat.  He  will  do  the 
same  in  respect  of  going  ashore  for  water;  and  see  to  it  that 
his  people  do  not  mingle  with  those  of  other  boats,  and 
that  the  business  in  hand  shall  be  carried  on  as  near  his 
boat  as  possible,  in  order  that  his  people  may  promptly  go 
on  board,  should  necessity  require  it. 

9.  The  armed  party  that  goes  ashore  to  act  as  guard,  will 
post  itself  as  strongly  as  possible  covering  the  watering  or 
cooking  party,  in  such  a  way  as  to  command  the  approaches 
and  so  prevent  any  sudden  attack. 

10.  Whenever  the  flagship  signals  to  head  inshore  and 
disembark  for  any  purpose,  each  commander  of  a  vessel 
will  so  order  the  landing  that  as  it  progresses,  his  men 
shall,  if  the  nature  of  the  ground  permit,  form  four  in  front 
and  three  deep ;  and  if  it  should  not  permit,  eight  or  more  in 


•  Chupar  tcjioco,    a  quaint   expression,   literally  to   "suck   tobacco." 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  99 

front,  according  to  circumstances,  marching  at  the  same 
time  on  one  line  to  occupy  sufficient  ground  for  the  forma- 
tion of  the  entire  body  under  his  orders.  This  movement 
concluded,  he  will  halt  and  await  orders. 

11.  Each  commanding  officer  of  a  vessel  will  at  dawn 
cause  his  sails  to  be  furled  and  remain  under  bare  poles ;  he 
will  send  a  man  aloft  to  look  around  for  signs  or  people 
ashore,  signal  fires  or  boats;  and  will  communicate  his  dis- 
coveries by  proper  signal. 

12.  Only  the  commanding  general  will  fly  by  day  a  blue 
pennant,  which  he  will  cause  to  be  lowered  whenever  he 
wishes  to  make  a  signal. 

13.  Whenever  the  commanding  general  shall  set  a  signal 
he  will  keep  it  flying  until  he  is  satisfied  that  the  squadron 
commanders  understand  it.  This  will  be  signified  to  him 
by  their  using  the  same  signal  in  answer;  when  the  com- 
manding general  hauls  down  his  signal,  the  squadron  com- 
manders will  do  the  same,  it  being  understood  that  no  one 
shall  fly  a  flag,  unless  ordered,  or  necessary  for  signalling 
as  prearranged. 

14.  Whenever  the  commanding  general  shall  make  the 
signal  for  general  disembarkation,  each  commanding  officer 
of  a  vessel  shall  at  once  obey  it,  leaving  on  board  only  two 
soldiers  as  a  guard,  and  the  sailors,  ordering  them  under 
no  circumstances  to  leave  the  position  in  which  ordered  to 
remain. 

15.  Each  commander  of  a  vessel  on  discovering  any  peo- 
ple ashore,  boats,  or  fires  will  at  once  inform  his  squadron 
commander  by  suitable  signal,  and  keep  his  signal  up  until 
said  commander  answers  by  the  same:  in  all  cases  this  pro- 
cedure will  indicate  that  signals  have  been  understood. 

16.  Each  squadron  commander,  on  receiving  a  signal 
from  any  vessel  of  his  squadron,  will  determine  its  meaning, 
and  then  answering  with  the  same,  will  keep  it  flying  until 
the  commanding  general  shall  have  made  suitable  acknowl- 
edgement. 

17.  The  commanding  general  on  receiving  a  signal  from 
a  squadron  commander  will  acknowledge  with  the  same, 
after  he  has  made  out  the  cause,  and  will  give  such  orders 
as  he  deems  proper. 

18.  The  commanding  general  will,  whenever  the  nature 
of  the  channels  to  be  navigated  permit  it,  adopt  the  forma- 
tion in  column  four  abreast,  or  anchor  in  this  order,  as  best 
lending  itself  with  least  confusion  to  all  other  maneuvers 


wo       THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 

demanded  by  circumstances.  He  will  order  the  galliots  to 
precede  the  entire  fleet,  the  other  boats  to  follow  in  order, 
so  as  to  be  on  hand  for  such  action  as  offers. 

19.  Each  commanding  officer  of  a  vessel,  besides  ob- 
serving orders  given,  shall  constantly  maintain  himself  near 
the  flagship,  so  as  to  hear  promptly  whenever  hailed  by  it 
either  by  voice  or  speaking  trumpet  to  draw  near  in  order 
to  receive  orders.  These  will  be  at  once  executed.  To  this 
end,  each  commanding  officer  will  take  turn  on  guard;  so 
that  if  nothing  material  comes  up,  the  captain  of  the  guard- 
boat  will  at  11  of  the  morning,  the  hour  at  which  the  orders 
must  be  given,  go  on  board  the  flagship  to  receive  the  coun- 
tersign and  parole,  and  will  then  proceed  to  communicate 
it  to  all  the  squadron  commanders  and  captains,  so  that  if 
at  night  some  vessel  not  of  the  convoy,  or  some  hostile  ves- 
sel should  be  met,  that  fact  may  be  recognized  by  its  fail- 
ure to  give  the  countersign  and  parole  when  challenged. 
Should  this  happen  and  be  verified,  suitable  action  will  be 
taken.  If  the  guard  boat  should,  when  needed,  be  on  duty 
elsewhere,  the  next  boat  on  the  roster  will  come  up  when 
hailed  by  the  flagship,  so  that  the  commanding  general  may 
always  have  some  one  to  distribute  any  orders  he  may  wish 
to  give. 

Juan  Francisco  de  Guemes  y  Horcasitas. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  101 

Havana,  March,  1738. 
LIST  OF  NAVAL  SIGNALS,  AND  VARIOUS  DIRECTIONS, 
FOR  THE  EXPEDITION  AGAINST  GEORGIA. 


Signals  to  be  made  by  night  by  the  Commanding  General  and  obey- 
ed by  Commanding  Officers  of  Squadron  and  Ships. 


A  light  astern  and  one  in  1.  Hoist  anchor  and  get 
the  bow.  under     way     forming    front 

with  the  entire  fleet. 

Two  lights  astern.  2.     Hoist    anchor   and    get 

under  way  each  squadron  in 
four  ranks. 

Light  astern.  3.     Hoist    anchor    and    get 

under  way  in  column  of  four 
abreast. 

Light  in  the  foretop  for  the  4.  Hoist  anchor  and  sail 
first  and  light  in  the  bow  in  column,  two  abreast,  or  in 
for  the  second.  single  file,  bow  and  stern. 

Light  astern  and  one  in  the  5.  Anchor  with  the  fleet 
bow.  in  a  single  line. 

Two  lights  astern.  6.     Anchor    each    squadron 

in  four  ranks. 

Light  astern.  7.     Anchor  in  column,  four 

abreast. 

Light  in  the  foretop  for  the  8.  Anchor  in  column,  two 
first  case,  and  one  in  the  abreast,  or  in  single  file,  bow 
bow  for  the  second.  and  stern. 


102        THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


Lig-ht  to  port  and  another  to 
starboard. 


9.     Go  ashore  and  cook. 


The  same  signal  aloft,  add- 
ing another  light  in  the 
bow. 


10.     Each  man  to  go  aboard 
his  ship. 


Light  in  the  main  top,  anoth-  11.     Everybody        to        go 
er  in  the  foretop  and  one        ashore. 
on  the  bow. 


Light  in  the  main  top,  anoth- 
er in  the  foretop. 


12.  The  people  of  the  first 
and  second  squadrons,  and 
no  more,  to  go  ashore 
reckoning  the  command- 
ing general's  as  the  first. 


Light    in    the    foretop    and 
another  in  the  bow. 


13.  The  people  of  the  sec- 
ond and  third  squadrons 
to  go  ashore. 


Light  at  half  mainmast  and 
another  at  half  foremast. 


14.  People  of  the  third  and 
fourth  squadrons  to  go 
ashore. 


Light  at  half  mainmast. 


15.     Half  the  people  of  each 
boat  to  go  ashore. 


Light  at  half  foremast. 


16.     A  fourth  of  the  people 
of  each  boat  to  go  ashore. 


Three  gun  flashes  if  to  the 
westward  and  two  if  to 
eastward. 


17.  To  give  notice  that 
there  are  people  or  a  noise 
ashore. 


To  show  a  light  three  times     19.     To  give  notice  of  one  or 
at    the    bow,    giving   sufii-       of  many  boats, 
cient  time  between  appear- 
ances to  allow  them  to  be 
distinctly  counted. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA 


103 


Light  in  the  bow.  20.       Whenever     the     com- 

manding officer  of  a  vessel 
g-ives  notice  that  he  needs 
something-,  or  reports 
something  unforeseen  or 
unprovided  for  aboard  his 
ship. 

Light  astern  and  three  gun,   21.    To   give   notice   that   a 
flashes.  hostile  ship  has  been  en- 

countered and  captured. 


Light  astern   and  four   gun 
flashes. 


22.  To  give  news  that  a 
hostile  ship  has  been  en- 
countered and  has  escap- 
ed. 

23.  All  the  ships  will  go  to 
quarters. 

24.  All  the  vessels  will  fire 
their  swivel-guns  against 
their  antagonists  whether 
ashore  or  afloat. 

25.  All  the  vessels  will  open 
with  their  swivel-guns 
and  small  arms. 


A  swivel-gun  shot  and  a 
light  in  the  main  top. 

A  light  in  the  main  top  and 
three  rounds  from  a  swiv- 
el-gun shots. 

Light  in  the  main  top  and 
three  swivel-gun  shots. 

Note- 
It  should  be  noticed  that  this  order  deals  only  with  ves- 
sels having  the  enemy  in  their  front  or  on  their  flanks  and 
not  embarrassed  by  such  others  of  their  own  ships  as  might 
be  ahead;  because  if  it  should  be  impossible,  as  it  may,  for 
all  our  ships  to  extend  their  front  against  th*b  enemy  and 
thus  perhaps  be  unable  to  fire  all  at  the  same  time-  as  intend- 
ed by  this  order,  then  only  those  will  open  that  have  a  clear 
field  of  fire  in  front,  or  are  so  situated  that  they  can  fire 
without  embarrassing  one  another,  so  that  the  fire  may  be 
opportune  and  useful  and  all  confusion  and  danger  avoided, 
for  these  could  easily  occur  in  our  own  fleet  unless  these 
precautions  were  taken. 


Two  lights  on  the  mainmast, 
one  about  a  yard  below  the 
other. 


2.     To  go  about  whether  un- 
der sail  or  under  oars. 


104        THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


Note- 
It  should  be  noticed  that  this  maneuver  must  be  carried 
out  so  that  the  vessels  of  the  second  file  shall  go  about  after 
having  occupied  the  place  in  which  the  flagship  or  its  file 
and  vanguard  went  about;  the  third  file  will  do  the  same 
where  the  second  went  about;  the  fourth  where  the  third 
and  the  movement  will  be  carried  out  in  this  fashion  until 
the  rear  guard  is  reached ;  one  succeeding  the  other  in  the 
same  order  and  distance  so  that  after  all  the  vessels  shall 
have  tacked,  the  fleet  will  remain  in  the  same  formation  as 
before. 


Day  Signals  to  be  made  by  the  Commanding  General  and  obeyed  by 
the  Commanding  Officers  of  Squadron  and  Ships. 


The  Spanish  ensign  in  the 
bow  and  the  pennant  of 
Spain  in  the  mainmast. 


1.  Hoist  anchor  and  get 
under  way  forming  front 
with  the  whole  fleet. 


Ensign  of  Spain  in  the  bow 
and  the  same  pennant  in 
the  foretop. 


2.     Hoist    anchor    and    get 
under  way  in  column,  four 

abreast. 


Standard  of  Spain  in  the  bow 
and  the  pennant  at  half 
mainmast. 


3.     Hoist    anchor    and    get 
under  way  in  column,  four 

abreast. 


Ensign  of  Spain  in  the  bow 
and  the  pennant  at  half 
foremast  in  the  first  case; 
and  in  the  second  the  en- 
sign of  Spain  in  the  fore 
top. 

Ensign  of  Spain  in  the  bow 
and  pennant  of  Spain  in  the 
maintop. 

Ensign  of  Spain  in  the  bow 
and  the  same  pennant  in 
the  foretop. 


4.  Hoist  anchor  and  get 
under  way  in  column,  two 
abreast,  or  in  single  file,^ 
bow  to  stern. 


5,     Anchor  in  single  line  of 
the  whole  fleet. 


6.     Anchor,  each  squadron 
in  four  ranks. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA 


105 


Ensign  of  Spain  in  the  bow 
and  the  pennant  at  half 
mainmast. 

Ensign  of  Spain  in  the  bow 
and   pennant   at  half  fore- 
mast for  the  first  case ;  and 
for  the  second,  ensign  of 
Spain  in  the  foretop. 


7.     Anchor  in  column,  four 
abreast. 


^.  Anchor  in  column,  two 
abreast,  or  in  single  file, 
bow  to  stern. 


Ensign  of  Spain  in  the  main-  9.     Go  ashore  to  cook, 
top. 

Ensign  of  Spain  in  stops  in  10.     Each  man  to  return  to 

the  bow  and  blue  pennant  his  ship. 
in  the  maintop. 

Blue  pennant  in  the  foretop.  11.     Go  ashore  for  water. 

The   same   blue   pennant  at  12.     Each  man  to  return  to 

half  mainmast.  his  ship. 


Ensign  of  Spain  in  the  bow 
and  red  pennant  in  the 
maintop. 

Ensign  of  Spain  in  the  main-    14. 
top  and  pennant  of  Spain 
in  the  foretop. 


13.     All   ships    will    display 
their  ensigns  in  the  bow. 


Everybody  ashore. 


Ensign  of  Spain  in  the  main- 
top and  blue  pennant  in  the 
foretop. 


Ensign  of  Spain  in  the  main- 
top and  blue  pennant  in  the 
foretop. 

Ensign  of  Spain  in  the  fore- 
top  and  Spanish  pennant 
in  the  maintop. 


15.  The  people  of  the  first 
and  second  squadrons,  and 
no  more,  to  go  ashore, 
reckoning  the  command- 
ing general's  as  the  first; 
the  people  of  the  remain- 
ing squadrons  not  to  stir. 

16.  The  people  of  the  sec- 
ond and  third  squadrons, 
and  no  more,  to  go  ashore. 

17.  The  people  of  the  third 
and  fourth  squadrons,  and 
no  more,  to  go  ashore. 


106       THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


Ensign  of  Spain  at  half  main- 
mast and  Spanish  pennant 
at  half  foremast. 


18.  Half  the  people  of  each 
ship,  and  no  more,  to  go 
ashore. 


Ensign  of  Spain  at  half  main- 
mast. 


The  ensign  of  Spain  in  stops 
at  the  stern  and  the  bow 
set  or  pointing  to  the  place 
where  the  people  were 
seen,  and  so  kept  until  the 
flagship  answers  with  the 
same  signal  which  will  be, 
when  it  will  have  picked 
up  the  said  people. 

Spanish  ensign  in  stops  in 
the  maintop  and  the  bow 
pointing  where  fire  was 
seen  and  to  remain  in  this 
fashion  until  the  flagship 
answers  wtih  the  same  sig- 
nal. 

Ensign  of  Spain  in  stops  in 
the  bow,  this  pointing 
where  the  ships  were  seen 
and  the  said  stopped  flag 
hoisted  and  lowered  as 
many  times  as  there  were 
boats  seen,  with  a  suffi- 
cient interval  to  give  op- 
portunity to  distinguish 
them. 

Ensign  of  Spain  in  the  bow, 
hoisted  and  lowered  three 
times  and  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  squadron  will 
answer  in  the  same  way  in- 
forming the  commanding 
general,  who  will  take  the 
proper  action. 


19.  A  quarter  of  the  people 
on  each  ship,  and  no  more, 
ashore. 

20.  To  give  notice  of  hav- 
ing seen  people  ashore. 


21.     To  give  notice  of  some 
fire  ashore. 


22.     To  give  notice  of  one  or 
of  many  vessels  seen. 


23.  Whenever  the  com- 
manding officer  of  a  vessel 
gives  notice  that  he  needs 
something  or  reports  some- 
thing unforeseen  or  unpro- 
vided for  aboard  his  ship. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  107 

Ensign  of  Spain  in  the  bow  24.  All  ships  whether  under 
and  red  pennant  in  the  sail  or  at  anchor  will  go  to 
foretop.  quarters. 

Ensign  of  Spain  in  the  bow  25.  All  vessels  to  open  fire 
and  the  red  pennant  in  the  with  their  swivel-guns  on 
maintop.  their  antagonists   whether 

afloat  or  ashore. 

Ensign  of  Spain  in  the  bow,  26.  All  vessels  will  open  fire 
red  pennant  in  the  maintop  with  their  swivel-guns  and 
and  another  Spanish  pen-  muskets  at  one  and  the 
nant  in  the  foretop.  same  time. 

Note — 

It  should  be  noticed  that  this  order  deals  onl}^  with  ves- 
sels having  the  enemy  in  their  front  or  on  their  flanks  and 
not  embarrassed  by  such  others  of  their  own  ships  as  might 
be  ahead ;  because  if  it  should  be  impossible,  as  it  may,  for 
all  our  ships  to  extend  their  front  against  the  enemy  and 
thus  perhaps  be  unable  to  fire  all  at  the  same  time,  as  in- 
tended by  this  order,  then  only  those  will  open  that  have 
a  clear  field  of  fire  in  front,  or  are  so  situated  that  they 
can  fire  without  embarrassing  one  another,  so  that  the  fire 
may  be  opportune  and  useful  and  all  confusion  and  danger 
avoided,  for  these  could  easily  occur  in  our  own  fleet  unless 
these  precautions  were  taken. 

Spanish  pennant  in  the  main-  27.  To  go  about  whether 
top.  under  sail  or  under  oars. 


Note- 
It  should  be  noticed  that  this  maneuver  must  be  carried 
out  so  that  the  vessels  of  the  second  file  shall  go  about  after 
having  occupied  the  place  in  which  the  flagship  or  its  file 
and  vanguard  went  about :  the  third  file  will  do  the  same 
where  the  second  went  about ;  the  fourth  where  the  third ; 
and  the  movement  will  be  carried  out  in  this  fashion  until 
the  rear  guard  is  reached;  one  succeeding  the  other  in  the 
same  order  and  distance  so  that  after  all  the  vessels  shall 
have  tacked,  the  fleet  will  remain  in  the  same  formation 
as  before. 


108       THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


Day  and  Night  Signals  which  the  Commanding  General  of  the  Ex- 
pedition will  Order  to  be  made  on  the  Coast  and  in  the  Places 
Indicated,  to  Maintain  the  Union  and  Co-operation  Required 
and  Provided  for  in  the  Instructions  on  the  Journey  and  During 
the  Operations  of  Both  Fleets. 


A  fire  on  the  beach. 


1.  In  order  that  the  com- 
manding officer  of  the  sea 
squadron  may  know  where 
the  interior  flotilla  happens 
to  be,  let  him  either  lie-to 
or  anchor. 


Two  fires  on    the    beach,    a 
quarter  of  a  mile  apart. 


2,  The  said  commanding 
officer  will  put  to  sea  and 
continue  his  voyage. 


One  fire  in  the  place  indicat- 
ed and  eight  or  ten  flashes 
of  powder  at  intervals. 


3.  Order  the  disembarka- 
tion of  the  troops  designat- 
ed upon  the  beach  of  the 
Island  of  St.  Simon,  get 
under  way  and  capture  the 
port  of  Gualquini,  accord- 
ing to  previous  instruct- 
ions. 


Two  fires  on  the  same  beach 
already  mentioned,  the 
same  flashes  and  a  few 
musket  shots  at  the  same 
time. 


4.  Order  the  disembarka- 
tion of  the  troops  on  the 
beach  of  the  said  island, 
get  under  way,  capture  the 
port  as  soon  as  this  signal 
is  received,  without  wait- 
ing for  any  other. 


jj 

i 


SUPPLIES 


sngth  of  3  in.  rope 


,«ii  f* 1-1  _ 


10     Bolts 

O  T 1_     C 


\ 


Ketum  which  gives  Ships  of  War,  Transports,  Staff  Officers,  Troops,  Militia,  Rations,  Ammunition,  Arms  and  Tools,  for  the  River  Service  and  to    leave  in  reserve  in  Florida,  destined  for  the  Expedition  which  is  directed  horn  the  port  of  Havana  for 
operations  in  the  Royal  Service  in  the  Provinces  of  Florida;  as  follows: 


"1"i 


(•MkMN^      • 


"Tjr 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  109 


Three  fires  on  the  beach  at  5.  The  armed  bilandcrs  to 
a  distance  of  a  quarter  of  get  under  way,  enter  the 
a  mile,  one  from  the  other.         Bay  of  St.  Simon  so  as  to 

co-operate  with  the  disem- 
barkation of  the  troops, 
told  off  for  this  purpose, 
on  the  beach  of  the  south 
point;  the  ships  to  remain 
at  anchor  outside,  as  al- 
ready decided. 


Signals  of  Recognition  by  Day  or  Night. 


Whenever  the  commanding  general  sends  a  boat  or 
launch  to  speak  to  the  commanding  officer  of  the  sea  squad- 
ron, if  it  should  be  day,  he  will  carry  a  Spanish  flag  in  his 
bow  and  fire  a  blank  cartridge  from  his  swivel-gun.  To 
this,  answer  will  be  made  with  a  Spanish  flag  in  the  stern, 
by  clewing  up  the  mainsail  and  foresail,  lowering  and  hoist- 
ing the  main  topsails,  and  by  bracing  the  foretopsail,  lying- 
to  and  waiting.  If  it  should  be  night,  he  will  show  a  light 
in  his  bow  and  fire  three  blank  rounds  from  a  swivel-gun 
and  the  answering  signal  will  be  a  light  in  the  stern,  another 
in  the  bow,  and  lying-to  to  wait. 

Whenever  the  commanding  officer  of  the  sea  squadron 
shall  send  a  boat  or  launch  to  speak  to  the  commanding  gen- 
eral- if  it  be  day,  he  will  carry  the  Spanish  ensign  in  his 
bow  and  when  near  enough,  will  fire  five  musket  shots. 
The  answering  signal  will  be  to  lower  the  distinguishing 
pennant,  to  place  the  ensign  in  the  bow  and  five  mus- 
ket shots.  If  it  be  by  night,  he  will  show  a  light  in  his 
bow,  and  challenged  "Who  goes  there?"  will  answer  "Phil- 
lip the  Fifth  and  Havana."  The  answering  signal  will  be 
a  light  in  the  stern,  and  as  many  other  musket  rounds,  and 
on  receiving  the  same  challenge,  the  answer,  "Spain  and 
Cuba." 


no        THE  SPANISH  OFFICIAL  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


NOTE  ON  THE  BATTLE  GROUND   OF  BLOODY   MARSH. 
By  Otis  Ashmore. 


The  battle  in  which  Oglethorpe  defeated  Montiano  on 
St.  Simon's  Island  is  known  locally  as  the  Battle  of  Bloody 
Marsh  and  the  exact  site  of  this  engagement  has  long  been 
in  much  doubt. 

In  the  summer  of  1912,  accompanied  by  Lawton  B. 
Evans,  C.  B.  Gibson,  Col.  Charles  M.  Snelling,  and  L.  B. 
Robeson,  I  made  a  visit  to  St.  Simon  Island  for  the  pur- 
pose of  identifying  if  possible  the  exact  location  of  the 
battlefield.  Every  account  of  the  battle  had  been  carefully 
studied,  including  that  of  Montiano  himself,  from  transla- 
tions furnished  by  Lieut.  Col.  C.  DeW.  Willcox,  U.  S.  A., 
professor  at  the  United  States  Military  Academy. 

In  the  light  of  all  these  accounts,  and  after  going  over  the 
ground  very  carefully,  there  seems  to  be  no  doubt  that  this 
memorable  battle  was  fought  at  a  point  upon  the  margin 
of  the  marsh  about  two  miles  from  the  south  end  of  the 
island,  and  about  one  mile  from  the  hotel,  where  the  road 
from  Gascoigne's  Bluff  enters  the  road  to  Frederica.  This 
spot  agrees  perfectly  with  the  account  of  Capt  Thomas 
Spalding,*  which  for  many  obvious  reasons  is  by  far  the 
clearest  and  the  most  trustworthy.  A  sketch  of  the  island 
and  of  the  battle  ground  itself,  made  at  the  time  of  my 
visit,  will  make  more  clear  Spalding's  graphic  account,  and 
will  show  all  the  stragetic  points  in  the  campaign  more 
satisfactorily  than  any  verbal  description  could  do. 

It  is,  perhaps,  needless  to  say  that  with  the  exception 
of  the  causeway,  which  still  exists,  and  the  crescent  shaped 
woodland  so  well  described  by  Spalding,  not  a  vestige  of 
this  tragic  episode  remains.  No  trace  of  the  road  around 
the  crescent  could  be  found,  as  this  circuitous  pathway  has 
long  since  been  abandoned  for  the  more  direct  road  across  it. 


•  See    account    of    thia    battle    by    Capt.    Thomas    Spalding    In    Vol.    I.    Ga. 
Hist.    Society    Collections. 


•^J*  ^   ""^  '♦ 


^    ^mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm 


-    fi 


i    -  '\ 


■^ 


1-' 


''^'^"'    :^<^f,'   ■^\^^^^)if^'^-^'^-^ 'V^^  ^    t^v*^ 


-j^TTte  CJroomo  or  3i^ooY    Marsh 


-  ci      'i    ,-■ 

.           I 

1                                  ..'            "'' 

;~ 

.'          J3  ;^  O  C   t  W 

----\     •         MA    KC,H 

■ 

!                                                         ,  f    ■-                                                         _  .  - 

i                                                          -.i     ', 

;'             .                                               "-^~ 

'  )•     ■ 

Battle  Groumd  OF  Bioooy    M>(Rsh 

j      ''      A'  B     T«e.    Amku%£Ai>E- 

J 

Sl,  Simons  Island  and  Fred 


ATTACK  ON  THE  COLONY  OF  GEORGIA  111 

The  traditions  of  the  people  living  upon  the  island  all 
agree  that  the  marsh  just  east  of  the  causeway  is  the  true- 
battle  ground  of  Bloody  Marsh. 

There  is  scarcely  a  doubt  that  the  ambuscade  was  laid 
at  the  two  points  of  the  crescent  woodland  where  the  road 
from  Gascoigne's  Blufif  enters  the  main  road  to  Frederica. 
and  that  the  Spaniards  were  entrapped  in  the  curved 
roadway  around  this  crescent.  In  their  confusion  the 
Spaniards  attempted  to  retreat  along  the  road  over  the 
causeway,  but  when  they  were  met  by  the  claymores  of  the 
Highlanders,  they  were  forced  into  the  marsh  just  east 
of  the  causeway  where  much  of  the  execution  took  place. 


rv 


( 


JDeturn  Kvhich  embraces  the  ship.s,  tlieir  names,  tljeir  Captains,  the  number  of  the  crew  &  troops;  the  kinds  of  242,200  ordinaiv  rations;  the  180, yoo  rations 
-*-^     foi  io5  days;  the  45, 200  foi  5oo  zecruits  that  ought  to  be  taken  cottesponding  to  85  lation  days,  and  likewise  14, 532  tations  for  sick  and  wounded; 
Artillery;  Stores;  Ammunition,  and  other  utensils,  &c. 


NAMES  OF  SHIPS 


NAMES  OF  THE 
CAPTAINS 


Hundred  weights  of  Kinds  of  Rations 


PounHs  of  I  FDod  tor  Sick  a 
Tallow      , 

Fat        I  I 

Cnndles         Chickens 


Hundredwelehts  of 


with 
Iroc  Hoops 


S»  Theresa 

La  Prudente  Sara 

S"  Malheo 

La  PIcchH 

La  Sacta  Familta 

So  Antny  las  Animi 

San  Joseph 


SI"  Yaabel 

;  Sloops 

San  Joseph 

Divina  Pastora 

Sd  Judas  Thadeo 

LaKossa 

S"  Joseph  y  Las  Anima! 

Sn  Joseph,  alias  Fscalen 

Ijr«  S^^de  la  Merced 

El  Canto 

L«  Gran  Bestia 

La  Rebccft 

La  Soledad  y  la  Rosa 


Schooners 


"        Urrutia 
Manuel  de  Viera 
Xplov'  Pabou 
Pablo  Kodriguei: 


Pedro  Garaicoecba 


Domingo  de  la  Cn 


Pedro  Trustillo 
Miguel  Fonaris 
Joachin  PSrez 
Pedro  la  Madrid 
Marcos  Torres 
Francisco  Gonzales 
Juan  Fran"  Oynrvit 
Diego  de  Moya 
Pedro  Loreoso 
Francisco  Camejo 
Pedro  Romero 
Manuel  AUemle 


Animas 

Raphael  Francisco 

La  Candtlaria 

Marcos  Fernfindez 

1^9  Dolores 

Ignacio  Amaro 

San  Raphael 

Francisco  Gil 

San  Antonio 

La  SantisBinw 

Trinidad 

Juan  Palomares 

N   S'"  de  los  Dolores 

Estcvan  G.-.mcz 

Round  Pnnips 


Sctsot 
Weights  up 
:o  6  pouna! 


FUNNELS 
^n         I     Wooden 


BRONZE  CANNON     ,      GUN  CARRIAGES 
oponuders  I  16  pounders     Decorated       Spare  (in 


CANNON  HALLS       i  AMMUNITION 

p--        I         p.-  Grape  Shot  |    Same  for    I      Canvas      I 

ppoundcn,  .epoSen.       _/"  Sjivel  Cove,  for 


,     Powder     }     Leather  Combat 

Flaiks  with  I    Cartridge    |     Vats  for 

wholes  Cssea       ;        pitch 


UTENSILS  FOR  SERVING  CANNON 


Lanyards         ^,^1/5  Ramro'^" 


BOXES  OF 
Hand       ,      „ , 


HUNDREDWEIGHTS  OF 
Iron  Tallow 


Pnlleva  ^'B^""  Ilavon. 


ARMS  ENUMERATED 
ilccs       I     Shovels  Spades 


Boards  ko» 

For  Artillen 


BOARDS 

I     Pish  for 
nary  MastM  of 


Material 
for 
Wads 


■■""»"■»  I  tzrJ°^.  irJ,',,.  I  »»'  I  »"■ 


LAMPS 
Lights 


FOR  USING  PITCH 


I      „        ,        '  Small  Dags       Majagua        Undressed  . 

1  Hemp       ^;'S^  of  Rough   ,        Yarn  -''hwpsV-ns ,    Caidrons  Udles 


Buckets  Kaclctof     Stove  Boxes  . 

with  Iron     Prying  Panti     Majagna      Linen  with 
Hoops  Knpe  Tin 


^ads  of  Wheel         -  „,  p,„, 

ipe  Yarn  i      Mallets        ^^"'  *^*K' 


CENDIARY  MATERIAL 


FUSEGUARDS  YARDS  OF 

_  I     Helmets  I  .,    . .       , 


,      Ht.vy 
Needles 

Hawsers 

Till 

Packing 

Rawhide    Thin  I 


RBSSRVB  SDPPLY  OP 
cl..t.     j    Ramrod,    I     ISS. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


Page 
Preface    3 

Affidavit  of  Juan  Castelnau,  a  prisoner  in  Georgia. ...       7 

Letter  of  Montiano  to  the  King 16 

The  King  orders  the  dispatch  of  an  expedition  against 

Georgia 20 

Montiano  acknowledges  the  receipt  of  orders  for  the 

expedition    25 

The  Governor  General  of  Cuba  gives  the  Governor  of 

Florida  information  with  respect  to  the  expedition     27 
The  Governor  General  of  Cuba  appoints  Montiano  to 

the  command  of  the  expedition  and  gives  orders. .     32 

Orders  to  the  Commanding  Officer  of  the  Fleet 39 

The  Governor  General  of  Cuba  reports  the  failure  of 

the  expedition  and  sends  journals  of  events 48 

Arredondo's    Journal    52 

Casinas's   Journal    65 

Montiano's  own  report    88 

Orders  for  an  expedition  against  the  English 97 

List  of  signals,  etc.,  for  the  expedition  against  Georgia  101 
Return  of  the  troops,  crews  and  stores,  ship  by  ship, 

facing 108 

Note  on  the  Battle  Ground  of  Bloody  Marsh 110 

Return  of  ships,  troops  and  stores  of  the  expedition 

facinsr 112 


LIST  OF  MAPS  AND  ILLUSTRATIONS 


Portrait  of  Oglethorpe   Frontispiece 

Map  of  the  Atlantic  Coast  from  St.  Augustine 

to   Charleston    ,  ,  =  .  = facing  page  7 

De   Brahm's    Plans,    Sections   and    Elevations 

of    Works    projected    for    the    Colony    of 

Georgia   facing  page  11 

Illustrations  of  Spanish  Guns pages  36-38 

Map   of  Jekyll   Sound    facing  page  66 

Arredondo's  Map  of  the  Entrance    to    Gual- 

quini   facing  page  71 

Plan  of  Fort  Saint  Andrew   facing  page  94 

Map  of  St  Simon  and  Frederica   facing  page  110 


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